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Abstract
Essays in Asset Pricing and Financial Intermediation
Sharon Yin Ross
2021
This dissertation consists of three essays on the topics of asset pricing, financial intermediation, and
macrofinance.
The first essay shows the role of government risk in asset prices. Firms that depend on the government—
either through implicit guarantees or direct sales—face a special risk: government risk. I show that this risk
is priced and is not spanned by other factors. I study four cases: U.S. banks, U.S. auto companies, U.S.
government suppliers, and Japanese zombie firms. The U.S. cases involve direct exposure to government
risk, and a U.S. government risk factor prices portfolios formed from government-dependent firms. Japanese
zombies rely on the government’s constraints through the intermediary sector, and covariance with government
risk drives the intermediary asset pricing result in an environment of loan forbearance.
In the second essay, I show that the effects of regulatory forbearance in Japan confound asset pricing
premiums. Japanese zombie firms—companies that receive subsidized credit from banks—arise from regulatory
forbearance, and they affect Japanese value and momentum premiums. Controlling for zombies revives
the momentum effect in Japan, widely known to be “too low.” Zombie-adjusted momentum doubles the
unadjusted momentum Sharpe ratio, commands a positive price of risk, and is unspanned by other factors.
Value, too, looks more in line with international results. The low momentum effect arises in Japan because of
zombies’ relationship with their bank lenders. Syndicated loan lending relationships indicate that firms with
forbearance-inclined lenders drive low momentum, and zombie losers’ high bank beta leads to low momentum
returns in strong bank return months.
The third essay, coauthored with Chase P. Ross and Landon J. Ross, studies the effect of firm cash
holdings on equity returns. U.S. companies hold cash on their balance sheets, and the share of assets held in
cash varies across companies and over time. A firm’s cash holdings is an implicit holding in a low-return
asset, which pushes down a firm’s equity return, and investors should thus hedge out the cash on the balance
sheets when calculating equity returns. We show that neglecting to consider cash holdings results in biases
in portfolio optimization, factor creation, and cross-sectional asset pricing. We decompose common stock
market betas into components, which depend on the portfolio’s cash holding, the return on cash, and the
portfolio’s cash-hedged equity return.

Essays in Asset Pricing and Financial Intermediation
A Dissertation
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of
Yale University




Dissertation Directors: Gary B. Gorton and Tobias J. Moskowitz
June 2021
Copyright © 2021 by Sharon Yin Ross
All rights reserved.
Dedicated to my parents, Chase, and Grant.
iii
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to my advisers, Gary Gorton and Toby Moskowitz, and my dissertation
committee members Stefano Giglio, Bryan Kelly, and Andrew Metrick for their advice and
guidance.
I want to thank many current and former faculty at Yale School of Management, including
Nick Barberis, Will Goetzmann, Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham, Jon Ingersoll, Song Ma, Alan
Moriera, Kelly Shue, Matt Spiegel, and Alex Zentefis.
I would also like to thank current and former Ph.D. students for their many thoughts
and comments, including Natee Amornsiripanitch, Thomas Bonczek, Toomas Laarits, Ben
Matthies, Cameron Peng, Adriana Robertson, Andrew Sinclair, Kaushik Vasudevan, Chen
Wang, Xiaochuan Xing, and Natalie Zhu. I am also grateful for Junko Oguri’s thoughtful
comments.
Finally, I am especially grateful to Chase.
iv
Contents
1 Government Risk Exposure 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Direct Government Dependence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4 Intermediated Government Dependence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.6 Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.7 Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.8 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2 Zombie Asset Pricing 57
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.5 Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.6 Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.7 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3 Cash-Hedged Stock Returns 94
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.2 Motivating Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.3 Decomposing Stock Returns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
v
3.7 Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
3.8 Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136




1.1 Government Risk and the Ratio of Government Sales To Total Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.2 Cumulative Abnormal Return of Government Suppliers and Non-suppliers After the U.S.
Sovereign Debt Downgrade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.3 Beta to Synthetic U.S. Government Risk Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.4 Average Fitch Bank Support Rating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.5 Fitch Bank Support Ratings and Beta to Government Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.6 Beta to U.S. Government Risk Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.7 Percentage of Zombie Firms in Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.8 Intermediary Asset Pricing Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.9 Realized vs. Predicted Returns using the Intermediary Leverage Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
1.10 Price of Risk for Bank-Dependent Portfolios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
1.11 Synthetic U.S. Sovereign CDS Spread . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.1 Global Comparison of Value and Momentum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.2 Value and Momentum Betas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
2.3 Securities Market Line for Value and Momentum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
2.4 Cumulative Abnormal Returns in Japan, November 1997 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.5 Cumulative Abnormal Returns in Japan, November 1997 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
2.6 Cumulative Difference in Zombie and Non-zombie Momentum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
2.7 Contribution of Top 20 Bank Return Months, Relative to Cumulative Difference . . . . . . . 85
2.8 Momentum Factors’ Betas to Government Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
2.9 Cumulative Abnormal Returns in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.1 Aggregate market cash share and cross-sectional cash share standard deviation . . . . . . . . 121
3.2 Aggregate market average value of $1 and its cross-sectional standard deviation . . . . . . . . 122
3.3 Optimal portfolio allocation to risky asset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
vii
3.4 Cumulative returns for value and momentum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
3.5 Factor portfolios’ net cash holdings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
3.6 Net Cash Holdings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
3.7 Security Market Line for Standard Market and Cash-Hedged Betas for 25 size and book-to-
market portfolios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
3.8 CAPM Beta Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
3.9 Security Market Line for Market from the Fama–French 3 Factor Model for 25 size and
book-to-market portfolios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
3.10 Expected Excess Returns and SMB Betas from the Fama–French 3 Factor Model for 25 size
and book-to-market portfolios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
3.11 Expected Excess Returns and HML Betas from the Fama–French 3 Factor Model for 25 size
and book-to-market portfolios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
3.12 Stock and Cash-Hedged Beta from 3 Factor Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
3.13 Stock and Cash-Hedged Beta Comparison from 3 Factor Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
3.14 Efficient frontier for 9 standard and cash hedged size and book-to-market sorted portfolios . . 134
3.15 Efficient frontier for standard and cash hedged first-letter-of-ticker-symbol sorted portfolios . 135
viii
List of Tables
1.1 Cross-Sectional Asset Pricing of U.S. Government-Dependent Portfolios . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.2 Cross-Sectional Asset Pricing of U.S. Firms using Firm Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.3 Spanning Tests of the U.S. Government Risk Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.4 Examples of Government Suppliers and Non-suppliers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.5 Beta of Government Suppliers to the U.S. Government Risk Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.6 Beta of U.S. Commercial Banks to the Synthetic U.S. Government Risk Factor . . . . . . . . 26
1.7 Beta of U.S. Auto Companies to the U.S. Government Risk Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.8 Intermediary Asset Pricing of Japanese Portfolios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.9 Intermediary Asset Pricing of Japanese Bank-Dependent Portfolios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.10 Beta of Japanese Firms to the Japanese Government Risk Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.11 Intermediary Asset Pricing of Japanese Portfolios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1.12 Intermediary Asset Pricing with Components of LevFacJP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1.13 Intermediary Asset Pricing with Components of CapFacJP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
1.14 Intermediary Asset Pricing of Bank-Dependent Portfolios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1.15 Intermediary Asset Pricing of Bank-Dependent Portfolios with Components of LevFacJP . . . 48
1.16 Intermediary Asset Pricing of Bank-Dependent Portfolios with Components of CapFacJP . . 49
1.17 Correlation of the U.S. Government Risk Factor with Other Government Risk Measures . . . 50
1.18 Beta of U.S. Commercial Banks to the Synthetic U.S. Government Risk Factor, Robustness . 51
1.19 Difference-in-difference Regression of Synthetic U.S. Government Risk Factor Betas . . . . . . 52
1.20 Difference-in-difference Regression of Synthetic U.S. Government Risk Factor Betas, Placebo
Test of 1 Year Earlier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
1.21 Beta Comparision between Large Banks Near the Too Big to Fail Cutoff . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
1.22 Beta of U.S. Auto Companies to the U.S. Government Risk Factor, Robustness . . . . . . . . 55
2.1 Value and Momentum in Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.2 Global Comparison of Value and Momentum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
ix
2.3 Value and Momentum for Japanese Firms Classified by Syndicated Loan Lending Relationships 72
2.4 Cross-Sectional Regressions with Zombie-Adjusted Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.5 Spanning Tests for Zombie-Adjusted Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.6 Spanning Tests with Quality Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.7 Bank Betas in Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.8 Bank Beta and Market Beta for Momentum Legs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2.9 Returns in Months with Top Bank and Market Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2.10 Average Percentage of Zombies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
2.11 Components of Value and Momentum Premiums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
2.12 Value and Momentum Correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
2.13 Bank Betas in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
2.14 Bank Beta Relative to Market Beta After Crises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.1 Summary of return decompositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
3.2 Decomposition of Portfolio Returns into Non-cash and Cash Components . . . . . . . . . . . 137
3.3 Non-cash and Cash Portfolio Returns for Single-Sorted Portfolios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
3.4 Cash to total asset ratios for tercile portfolio sorts on book-to-market, size, momentum, and
cash-to-total assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
3.5 Summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
3.6 Regression of stock excess returns on non-cash excess returns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
3.7 Sort and factor premia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
3.8 Average Cash Share for 25 Size/BEME-Sorted Portfolios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
3.9 Regression of cash share percentile onto characteristic percentiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
3.10 Spanning Test: Fama–French Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
3.11 Spanning Test: Cash-Hedged Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
3.12 Spanning Test: Cash-Hedged Factors with CASH Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
3.13 Net Cash Holding Is Statistically Non-zero for Value and Momentum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
3.14 Net Cash Holding is Statistically Zero in Cash-Hedged Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
3.15 Beta Decomposition for 25 Size and Book-to-Market Sorted Portfolios . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
3.16 Decomposition of Market Beta from the Fama–French 3 Factor Regression for 25 Size and
Book-to-Market Sorted Portfolios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
3.17 Decomposition of SMB Beta from the Fama–French 3 Factor Regression for 25 Size and
Book-to-Market Sorted Portfolios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
x
3.18 Decomposition of HML Beta from the Fama–French 3 Factor Regression for 25 Size and
Book-to-Market Sorted Portfolios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
3.19 Tangency Portfolio Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
3.20 Pricing 25 Size/Book-to-Market Portfolios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
3.21 Summary Statistics and Pricing Errors 25 Size and Book-to-Market Portfolios Under Standard
CAPM and Cash-Hedged CAPM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
3.22 Cross-sectional Regression of Firm Returns Using Cash Share . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157





Government dependence takes many forms. In the U.S., government suppliers rely on the government through
commercial sales, and banks and auto companies depend on the government’s implicit guarantees. In Japan,
zombie firms count on the government to allow banks to continue evergreening loans. All four types of firms—
U.S. government suppliers, U.S. banks, U.S. auto companies, and Japanese zombies—rely on the government’s
budget capacity. When the government’s budget constraint grows more binding, government-dependent firms’
returns decrease compared to their less government-dependent peers’ returns. Firms with greater government
risk exposure have higher expected returns to compensate for bearing government risk.
U.S. government suppliers, large banks, and auto companies rely directly on the government’s budget
capacity. I show that a U.S. government risk factor prices monthly portfolios of the government-dependent
firms and that other factors do not span the government risk factor. In Japan, zombies—companies that
receive subsidized credit from banks—are exposed to government risk through the intermediary sector. I show
that a Japanese intermediary factor prices zombies because intermediary risk covaries with government risk.
In all four cases, government-dependent firms load more on government risk than their counterparts, and the
risk exposure increases after the government announces policies that support government-dependent firms.
I proxy for government constraints using a government risk factor constructed from sovereign credit-
default swap (CDS) spreads. The government’s CDS spread reflects the market’s expectation of default.
The government risk factor proxies for the shadow price of the government’s budget constraint, and the
government risk factor reflects the risk that a transfer of taxpayer wealth to a government-dependent firm
does not occur. Suppose the need for such a transfer arises: if the government carries a higher default risk,
then the associated higher CDS spread reflects a higher financing cost of government interventions, and
politicians may be less willing to act. Such wealth transfers—sometimes called bailouts—can occur in many
1
flavors, including capital injections, emergency loans, or lax regulatory oversight, but ultimately, bailouts
require government resources. The government must have the budget capacity to execute the transfer.
I separate my results into three parts. First, government risk determines the expected returns of U.S.
government-dependent firms. I form size-and-book-to-market portfolios from government suppliers, large
banks, and auto companies separately. I show that a U.S. government risk factor prices the portfolios.
Second, I conduct event studies to show that government-dependent firms have greater government risk
exposure than other firms. Government suppliers rely on the government to translate taxpayer funding
into purchase orders, and a budget-constrained government may cut orders. Firms with sales to the federal
government are most likely to be affected by government belt-tightening, and I show that government suppliers
face lower abnormal returns than non-suppliers after the 2011 U.S. sovereign debt downgrade.
Banks and autos derive their dependence from support announcements by the government. Large U.S.
banks were viewed as too big to fail starting in the 1980s, and auto companies received federal bailouts in the
Global Financial Crisis. Both groups rely on the government’s implicit support of bailouts in bad states, and
large banks and automakers have higher betas to the government’s constraints after implicit and explicit
bailout announcements.
Last, I examine zombies in Japan. Beginning in the 1990s, Japanese banks restructured loans to insolvent
borrowers—zombie firms—to avoid recognizing non-performing loans and their associated capital write-down.
Banks rolled over loans many times in an environment of regulatory forbearance and implicit government
support. Zombies rely on the government to continue supporting forbearance, and the support exists through
the intermediary sector.
The intermediary factor prices zombie firms sorted into 25 size-and-book-to-market portfolios. I decompose
the intermediary factor into two components: a part driven by government risk and a part orthogonal to
government risk. The component of intermediary risk correlated with government risk drives the intermediary
pricing of zombies. Non-zombies are not dependent on the government and are not priced by the same
component.
Zombie firms differ from bank-dependent firms in their government dependence, and the difference is
reflected in asset pricing tests. I classify firms as bank dependent using three measures: external-finance
dependence, bank beta, and whether the firm finances itself through long-term debt issuance. I form bank-
dependent portfolios, and I show that the overall intermediary factor also prices bank-dependent portfolios,
but the component of intermediary risk that is unrelated to government risk drives the result.
Outside of Japan and the U.S., banks and government risk are closely linked. Unlike virtually all other
industries, banks are widely believed to have recourse to the government purse in bad states, given the negative
externalities of bank failures and financial instability. I use Fitch bank support ratings for international banks
2
to show that banks with a higher probability of government support have greater domestic government risk
exposure.
The relationship between the government’s budget capacity and firms’ returns is salient in the wake of
the covid-19 pandemic. The U.S. government’s unprecedented mobilization supplied $2.6 trillion—12.6% of
GDP—in discretionary fiscal easing, excluding automatic stabilizers and loan guarantees. In Europe, the
European Central Bank unveiled the $1.5 trillion Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program to buy public
and private securities. Investors worldwide spent considerable resources reading the tea leaves of if or when
governments would backstop national champions. To name only a few: American Airlines, Lufthansa, Air
France, KLM, and Renault all received some form of unusual government aid during the pandemic. Whether
investors view covid-19 as reshaping the likelihood of future government intervention in bad times or as a
100-year flood with a proportionate government response, the role of government risk in financial markets
will be first-order important for the near future.
Section 3.4 describes the data and factor construction. Section 1.3 shows the cross-sectional pricing results
for U.S. government-dependent firms and U.S. event studies. Section 1.4 presents the Japanese intermediary
asset pricing results. Section 3.6 concludes.
Related Literature
This paper builds on earlier papers that study the role of government involvement in financial markets. Cohen
and Malloy (2016) show that firms with a commercial sales relationship with the government become less
competitive than their industry peers because the government-dependent firms invest less in physical and
intellectual capital. Gandhi and Lustig (2015) show that the largest commercial bank stocks have lower
risk-adjusted returns than smaller bank stocks because the largest bank stocks have government guarantees.
Belo et al. (2013) measure government exposure as the proportion of the industry’s total output using the
NIPA input-output data and show that firms are priced by exposure to the government sector conditional on
the presidential party in power. Dissanayake (2019) prices the cross-section of asset returns using shocks to
government defense spending to create a factor-mimicking portfolio.
I construct a government risk factor from sovereign CDS spreads, a high-frequency market price that
measures the expensiveness to finance government spending or the capacity of government spending, rather
than the amount of realized government spending. Chernov et al. (2020) show that U.S. sovereign CDS
premiums reflect the endogenous risk-adjusted probabilities of fiscal default. Using sovereign CDS spreads
also incorporates political uncertainty risk, which commands a risk premium in equity option markets (Kelly
et al., 2016) and a larger risk premium in a weak economy (Pastor and Veronesi, 2013).
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This paper also contributes to the literature on zombie credit. In Japan, the lost decade of the 1990s
turned into more than two lost decades because of low productivity growth (Hayashi and Prescott, 2002).
Underlying the productivity problems were zombies. Japanese banks evergreened loans to weak firms to
avoid losses on their bank balance sheets, with more troubled firms more likely to receive bank credit (Peek
and Rosengren, 2005). Caballero et al. (2008) show that zombies have negative externalities for healthy
firms because zombies reduce the profits of healthy firms and lower investment and employment growth for
non-zombies. Zombies had large macro effects on Japan’s productivity growth and altered the competitive
process.
Zombies are not unique to Japan. Andrews et al. (2017) document an increase of zombie firms in OECD
countries since the mid-2000s, and they show that the zombies’ survival attenuates labor productivity growth.
Banerjee and Hofmann (2018) show a rise of zombies in 14 advanced economies since the late 1980s, and they
attribute the increase to reduced financial pressure in the form of lower interest rates. Acharya et al. (2020)
show how zombie credit has a disinflationary effect by creating excess production capacity, increasing supply,
and lowering prices. Schivardi et al. (2019), Bonfim et al. (2020), and Blattner et al. (2019) show the role of
bank lending relationships to zombie firms in Italy and Portugal.
My paper relates to the literature on intermediary asset pricing, in which financial intermediaries are the
marginal investors. When intermediaries’ balance sheet capacity declines and intermediaries face tight funding
constraints, intermediaries have a high marginal utility of wealth. Assets that do not pay off in bad states
are considered risky and must have a higher expected return to compensate for the risk. Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2009) show how funding liquidity enters the pricing kernel and use leverage to proxy for funding
conditions. He and Krishnamurthy (2012) create a model in which low intermediary capital decreases the
marginal investor’s risk-bearing capacity. He and Krishnamurthy (2013) model risk premiums during crises.
Empirical work supplements the theory of intermediary asset pricing. Adrian et al. (2014) show that
shocks to the leverage of securities broker-dealers price equity and bond portfolios. He et al. (2017) construct
a factor of shocks to the equity capital ratio of primary dealers. They show that the capital ratio factor prices
portfolios of corporate bonds, sovereign bonds, derivatives, commodities, and currencies.
1.2 Data
U.S. Data I use CRSP return data and Compustat annual financial statement data. I follow Fama and
French (1992a) to merge the return data and accounting data. In this way, I match accounting data in
calendar year t − 1 with return data for July t to June t + 1 to give a 6-month minimum gap between the
fiscal year-end and the return data.
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I use the Compustat Segments dataset to calculate a firm’s government sales ratio—the percent of sales
to the U.S. government—on an annual basis. Firms are required to report operating segments that represent
more than 10% of revenues and customers that make up more than 10% of total reported sales in their
financial reports under Statements of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 131.1 Firms classify customers
as one of seven customer types: company, geographic region, market, state government, local government,
domestic government, or foreign government. I calculate the government sales ratio as the sales to the U.S.
domestic government as a fraction of total sales for each company and year.2 The Compustat Segments data
began in 1976.
Japanese Data I use Japanese market data and accounting data from Datastream and Worldscope. The
data cover 1979 to 2018 and consist of the universe of Japanese stocks in Datastream and Worldscope. I
restrict my sample to companies with a book value in the previous six months and at least 12 months of
return history, and I exclude financials (including REITs) and stocks that have a share price less than $1 at
the start of each month.
Similar to Asness et al. (2013a), I restrict the data to a sample of liquid stocks. Each month, I sort stocks
by market capitalization in descending order. Starting with the largest market capitalization stock, I include
all stocks until the cumulative market capitalization is 90% of the total market capitalization for that month.
Identifying Zombies I identify zombies following Caballero et al. (2008): I compare a firm’s actual interest
payment, Ri,t, to an estimated lower-bound Ri,t. The lower-bound stands for the interest payments a firm i
could expect if it borrowed at no spread to the prime rate at time t:









where Si,t is short-term debt and Li,t is long-term debt, and rst and rt are the Bank of Japan’s short-term
and average long-term prime rates, which reflect the prime lending rate at which principal banks lend.
I construct the interest-rate gap, Xi,t, as the difference between the actual interest payment and the lower




= ri,t − ri,t. (1.2)
1Before 1997, Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) No. 14 required firms to report the data.
2I exclude sales labeled as sales to the domestic government but have a customer name linked to foreign domestic governments
and agencies (e.g. “Brazilian Air Force” or “Canadian Government”).
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In principle, only the highest-quality companies should borrow at effective rates near the prime rate, and most
corporate borrowers would expect to borrow at a nontrivial spread to the prime rate. Following Caballero
et al. (2008), I define companies with an interest-rate gap below 0 as crisp zombies, and companies borrowing
near the prime rate—those with an interest-rate gap of 0 to 50 bps—as fuzzy zombies. I lag the interest-rate
gap by six months to match the accounting data lag and ensure the balance sheet data are in the investors’
information set.
Zombies-ness is persistent, and switches from zombie to non-zombie or vice versa occur roughly 1.5% of
the time. The interest-rate gap is uncorrelated with firm size. Before removing small and illiquid stocks to
restrict the sample to a liquid sample, size has a correlation of −0.1% with the interest-rate gap, a correlation
of 4.8% with an indicator for crisp zombie, and a correlation of 3.8% with an indicator for crisp or fuzzy
zombie. Cleaning the dataset to the liquid set of stocks increases the share of zombies from 20% to 48%.
Government Risk Factors I derive my measure of government risk using the sovereign credit-default
swap (CDS) spread. A CDS swaps credit risk of the reference entity, which can be either a private entity or
a sovereign. Investors that buy sovereign CDS buy insurance from credit events such as a missed coupon
payment, a default, or a debt restructuring. The CDS spread reflects the market’s expectation of default,
and issuers with higher CDS spreads face higher financing costs. All else equal, governments with higher
CDS spreads will face higher financing costs should the sovereign turn to markets to finance an intervention.
I construct each country’s government risk factor using innovations to the sovereign CDS spread from an
AR(1) regression:
SovereignCDS t = ρ0 + ρ1SovereignCDS t−1 + ut. (1.3)
I convert the innovation into a growth rate by dividing by the lagged CDS spread
GovFact = −1 × utSovereignCDS t−1
, (1.4)
and I multiply by −1 so that GovFact decreases when the government is constrained. The U.S. factor is
GovFac, and the Japanese factor is GovFacJP . I create the factor following a method analogous to He et al.
(2017). As expected, the U.S. government risk factor is correlated with news-implied and financial-statement-
implied measures of government risk from other papers. See Appendix 1.8.1 for details.
The CDS data are from Markit and begin in 2002, with U.S. sovereign CDS data are available starting in
2003. Since the too big to fail event occurred in 1984, I form a synthetic U.S. sovereign CDS spread using the
par-equivalent CDS spread approach, an industry standard and described in Beinstein and Scott (2006). See
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Appendix 1.8.1 for details. I use innovations to the synthetic U.S. sovereign CDS spread and Equations 1.3
and 1.4 to create the synthetic U.S. government risk factor, GovFacsynthetic.
Intermediary Risk Factors in Japan I construct Japanese versions of the two quarterly intermediary
factors in Adrian et al. (2014) and He et al. (2017). Adrian et al. (2014) use shocks to intermediary leverage
to construct the risk factor LevFac. I use the balance sheet data of financial dealers and brokers to form the
Japanese leverage factor, LevFacJP . The data come from Japan’s Flow of Funds and begin in 1998.
He et al. (2017) use innovations to intermediary capital ratios to form a risk factor, which I will call
CapFac. I construct the Japanese capital ratio factor, CapFacJP , from members of the “Japanese Government
Bond Market Special Participants Scheme.” The program began in October 2004 and mirrors the U.S. primary
dealer system. I manually map the members to holding companies following He et al. (2017)’s approach. I
use book debt and market equity data from Datastream to construct the intermediary capital ratio.
1.3 Direct Government Dependence
In the U.S., government suppliers, large banks, and auto companies rely directly on the federal government.
Government suppliers have a commercial sales relationship with the government, and they rely on the
government to translate taxpayer dollars into purchase orders. Big banks and automakers are government
dependent through implicit guarantees: the largest banks are considered too big to fail; auto companies
received bailouts in the Global Financial Crisis and highlight that the American-ness of a company or the
political value of their employees’ jobs might lead some companies to be more government-dependent. I show
the relationship between government risk and firms’ returns using cross-sectional asset pricing tests, event
studies, and international evidence.
1.3.1 U.S. Cross-Sectional Regressions
If government risk reflects when the government is constrained, then government-dependent firms with greater
risk exposure should have higher expected returns to compensate investors for bearing government risk. I
test this hypothesis.
I show that the U.S. government risk factor, GovFac, explains the cross-section of expected returns for
portfolios of U.S. government-dependent firms. I form monthly portfolios of three sets of government-dependent
firms, double-sorted on size and book-to-market. First, I construct 25 portfolios of U.S. government suppliers.
Government suppliers are firms with at least 10% of their annual sales to the U.S. government. Second, I
form six portfolios of the largest 50 U.S. banks. Third, I form six portfolios of U.S. automakers. All portfolio
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returns are value-weighted. Event studies in Section 1.3.2 support my classifications of government-dependent
firms.
I calculate the price of risk for a risk factor using the portfolio returns and a two-step procedure. First, I
estimate each portfolio i’s beta to the risk factor using time-series regressions of each portfolio’s excess return
on the factor:
Rei,t = αi + β′i,f ft + εi,t, i = 1, . . . , N, t = 1, . . . , T, (1.5)
where ft is a vector of risk factors. Then I run a cross-sectional regression of portfolio excess returns on the
betas estimated in Equation 2.9:
E[Rei,t] = λ0 + β̂′i,f λf + ξi, i = 1, . . . , N. (1.6)
Using ft = GovFact and the two-step procedure gives the government risk factor’s price of risk, λGovFac.
Table 1.1 shows the prices of risk from the cross-sectional regressions and GMM t-statistics. The first three
columns show the price of risk estimates, pooling all the portfolios and imposing the same price of risk across
them. I restrict the portfolios to those with data for 80% of the full period. In the cross-sectional regression,
the government risk factor commands a positive and significant price of risk for the government-dependent
portfolios. The coefficient of 0.41 means that a portfolio with βGovFac = 1 carries an annualized expected
return of 0.41%. Increasing the portfolio’s βGovFac by one standard deviation increases the annualized
expected risk premium by 3.7 percentage points (pp), and the risk compensation for GovFac is economically
large. Columns 2 and 3 show similar results with the market, size, and value factors included.
In the next three columns, I show that the government risk factor prices the cross-section of portfolios
formed from government suppliers. The risk factor earns a positive and significant price of risk, and a one
standard deviation increase in beta corresponds to a 4.8pp increase in risk premium. The GRS p-value from
the time-series regressions is large, consistent with failing to reject the model. The results are robust to
adding the market, size, and value factors to the model. Including these factors increases the time-series R2
and lowers the mean average pricing error.
In the last four columns, I use the traditional Fama–French 25 size-and-book-to-market portfolios. I show
that GovFac is not a compensated source of risk for the Fama–French portfolios. The results show that the
standard 25 portfolios are sorted in a way that yields no heterogeneity in government risk exposures across
the portfolios. In column 9, the size and value factors do not price the Fama–French portfolios because the
regression is constrained to months where GovFac is available; column 10 shows that value has a positive
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price of risk using data that starts in July 1926.
While Table 1.1 uses estimated betas, I can instead run two separate firm-level cross-sectional regressions
using the government supplier characteristic. First, I test expected returns on an indicator of whether a
company is a government supplier:
E[Rei,t] = γ0 + γ1I(Government Supplier) + ξi. (1.7)
Second, I test expected returns on the government sales ratio, which measures the intensity of a firm’s
government dependence:
E[Rei,t] = γ0 + γ1(Government Sales Ratio) + ξi. (1.8)
Table 1.2 shows the results from the two characteristic-based cross-sectional regressions. In the cross-
section, government suppliers have higher returns than non-suppliers, and the intensity of government
dependence corresponds to higher returns. The first two columns test the indicator setup and find that
government suppliers’ returns are 0.20pp higher on average than non-government suppliers. Since this test
looks across all firms, rather than testing within suppliers, the large and significant intercept shows that
non-suppliers also have positive returns. The last two columns use the intensity of the government sales
ratio instead of the indicator and find a similar result. Controlling for firm size and book-to-market does not
materially change the results.
In Table 1.3, I show that other factors do not span the government risk factor, meaning the other factors
do not contain GovFac’s economic content. The U.S. government risk factor is also not spanned on a daily or
quarterly level. In the first column, I regress GovFac on the standard Fama–French factors and find that the
government risk factor is weakly correlated with the market and HML, but neither is significant. Notably,
GovFac is not spanned by any of the factors, as shown by its large and significant intercept.
The combined results show that firms exposed to government risk earn compensation for the risk of lower
returns when the government becomes constrained. But government risk exposure matters only for a subset
of firms: returns of non-government-dependent firms are less dependent on the government’s constraints, and
the factor does not describe the cross-section of Fama–French portfolios.
1.3.2 U.S. Event Studies and International Evidence
If a firm is government dependent, and that dependence is risky, then the firm’s returns will covary with
innovations to government risk, and the firm will have lower returns after adverse shocks to government risk.
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I test these hypotheses.
First, I show that government-dependent companies’ realized returns have higher beta to a U.S. government
risk factor than the returns of their less government-dependent counterparts. Second, I use event studies
to study government-dependent companies’ returns after shocks to government risk. I show that when the
government’s budget constraint grows more binding, government-dependent firms have lower returns. After
the 2011 U.S. sovereign debt downgrade—a period when government risk increased—government suppliers
had lower returns than non-suppliers. After announcements of government support—such as the explicit
introduction of the too big to fail concept—large banks and auto companies had higher beta to government
risk.
Government risk is not unique to the U.S.; internationally, bank returns rely—often implicitly—on
government support. Governments are motivated to avoid bank failures because financial instability has large
negative externalities, and bank returns depend on the government’s capacity to support banks if bailouts
are needed. I show that a higher likelihood of external support measured by the Fitch bank support ratings
corresponds to greater dependence of banks’ loadings on their home country’s government risk factor.
Government Suppliers
I systematically measure a firm’s government dependence by its sales to the U.S. government. I calculate
each firm’s annual government sales ratio as the percent of sales to the U.S. government. I consider firms
with an annual government sales ratio of at least 10% to be government suppliers. I define firms with no
government sales reported or a government sales ratio of less than 10% as non-suppliers. Specifically, if a
company discloses no government sales, then the federal government accounts for less than 10% of that firm’s
sales that year. Table 1.4 shows examples of firms in each group. Prominent government suppliers span many
industries; unsurprisingly, defense contractors like Raytheon and Northrop Grumman have high government
sales ratios, but less obvious examples include Aetna, Con Edison, Corrections Corporation of America, and
Walgreens. Non-suppliers span many industries as well: Amazon, Coca-Cola, Microsoft, and Walmart. In
other words, sorting on government suppliers is not just a defense industry effect.
I show that government suppliers have greater government risk exposure than non-suppliers. Consistent
with my prediction that government risk is a priced risk, I show that the government sales ratio covaries with
beta to the U.S. government risk factor. First, I calculate daily value-weighted portfolios for suppliers and
non-suppliers and regress the portfolios’ returns on the government risk factor. Table 1.5 column 1 shows
that a portfolio long government suppliers and short non-suppliers significantly covaries with innovations
to government risk, as predicted. Columns 2 and 3 show the long and short legs separately: while both
significantly covary with government risk, the beta for government suppliers is thirty times larger than the
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beta for non-suppliers. The covariance of the non-suppliers portfolio with government risk isn’t surprising: my
definition of non-suppliers likely mixes some companies that have government sales rates just below the 10%
disclosure threshold with companies that have a 0% ratio. Even if I had perfect insight into companies with
no commercial relationship with the government, there are likely second-order effects—such as suppliers of
suppliers—that have links to suppliers, so it’s not clear the non-suppliers portfolio should have zero covariance
with government risk.
Digging deeper, Figure 1.1 presents a scatterplot of beta to the government risk factor against the
government sales ratio for each industry. The corresponding regression has a positive and significant
coefficient, showing that industries with higher government sales ratios also have greater government risk
exposure.
U.S. Sovereign Debt Downgrade When government risk increases, government-dependent firms’ returns
should reflect that increased risk. I compare the returns of government suppliers and non-suppliers after the
U.S. sovereign debt downgrade on August 5, 2011, when the S&P cut their rating for U.S. sovereign debt.
S&P cut the credit rating after political disagreement surrounding the debt ceiling increase in July 2011 and
a budget deal passed in early August that the S&P felt “falls short of what, in our view, would be necessary
to stabilize the government’s medium-term debt dynamics.” The rating was cut one notch, from “AAA” to
“AA+ with a negative outlook,” in the first-ever downgrade to the U.S. government’s long-term credit rating.
The ratings-cut dominated headlines, and markets responded immediately: the ratings-cut announcement
came after markets closed on Friday, and the S&P 500 dropped 6.7% on Monday.
I study cumulative abnormal returns compared to a CAPM model. I use daily data before August 5, 2011,
and regress the return of each firm i on the market return:
Ri,t = αi + βi(Rm,t − Rf,t) + εi,t. (1.9)
I use the estimated coefficients to calculate each firm’s predicted returns, R̂i,t, and I calculate the abnormal
return, ARi,t, as the difference between the realized and predicted return:
ARi,t = Ri,t − R̂i,t. (1.10)
Figure 1.2 plots the cumulative abnormal return for government suppliers and non-suppliers in the week
after the downgrade. On August 8—the first trading session after the downgrade—government suppliers and
non-suppliers both had large negative abnormal returns. But government suppliers faced a significantly larger
drop, and their cumulative abnormal returns were lower over the next week, consistent with my hypothesis
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that government-dependent firms have greater exposure to government risk.
Banks
My second group of government-dependent companies consists of large banks. Unlike virtually all other
industries, banks are widely believed to have recourse to the government purse in bad states, given the
negative externalities of bank failures and financial instability. I show that banks are government dependent
in two ways: first, I perform an event study around the announcement that some U.S. banks were too big to
fail. In 1984, amid the bailout of Continental Illinois, regulators acknowledged that the largest banks were
too big to fail. Following the event, government risk exposures increased for the largest banks, and when the
government becomes constrained, the largest commercial banks have lower returns than other commercial
banks. Second, I show that banks globally depend on their home government: I use Fitch bank support
ratings for international banks to show that banks with a higher probability of government support have
greater domestic government risk exposure.
Too Big to Fail On September 19, 1984, the Comptroller of the Currency testified before the House
Banking Committee on the $4.5 billion rescue of Continental Illinois; at the time, Continental Illinois was the
largest bank failure in U.S. history. During his testimony, the Comptroller acknowledged that some banks
were too big to fail and said this policy applied to the 11 largest banks. The Comptroller did not name the
banks, and the Dow Jones Broad Tape did not initially mention too big to fail (O’Hara and Shaw, 1990).
The next day, however, The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) published a list of the 11 largest banks based on
year-end 1983 assets, drawing considerable attention to the initially-overlooked event. The WSJ event made
banks’ implicit support explicit and common knowledge, and it categorized banks into two groups: too big to
fail versus too small to save.
After the event, the 11 affected banks had greater government risk exposure: when the government
becomes more fiscally constrained, the returns of the 11 named banks decline. I regress each commercial
bank i’s returns on the synthetic U.S. government risk factor, and the factor interacted with indicators for





+ β2GovFacsynthetic,t × I(WSJ)
+ β3GovFacsynthetic,t × I(Post)
+ β4GovFacsynthetic,t × I(WSJ) × I(Post) + εi,t
(1.11)
where i is a commercial bank, t is a day, I(Post) is an indicator for after the event, and I(WSJ) is an indicator
for the 11 banks cited by the WSJ.
Table 1.6 shows the regression results for commercial banks and for the top 50 commercial banks. When
the government becomes constrained and GovFacsynthetic decreases, commercial bank returns decline on
average (columns 1 and 6). The coefficient of 0.007 translates to a 2pp decrease in return for a one standard
deviation decrease in GovFacsynthetic on an annualized basis.
The WSJ banks have higher beta to government risk than other commercial banks. The too big to fail
banks have more than quadruple the government risk exposure of other commercial banks and more than
triple the exposure of other large commercial banks (columns 2 and 7). The coefficient for the risk factor
interacted with both indicators, β4, is positive and significant. After the event, the 11 WSJ banks have
greater government risk exposure. Moreover, after the event, banks that were not one of the treated 11
banks had lower beta. This result is consistent with investors initially believing large banks were, in general,
dependent on the government, and then updating their beliefs after the event separated banks that could
expect extraordinary support from banks that could not.
Figure 1.3 plots the beta to the synthetic government risk factor for the 11 WSJ banks and the beta of
the next two largest banks: Mellon Bank and Crocker National Bank. After the event, the government risk
beta for the 11 WSJ banks jumped up. Meanwhile, the next two largest banks remained steady in their
government dependence.3 Appendix 1.8.2 shows robustness results, including adding controls, using a placebo
event date, and restricting the banks to large banks near the too big to fail policy cutoff.
Bank Support Ratings An issuer’s credit rating measures the borrower’s creditworthiness—its capacity
to repay its financial obligations. But for banks specifically, rating agencies regularly publish two different
ratings: one that reflects the bank’s creditworthiness with government support, and one without government
3Mellon Bank and Crocker National Bank are the next two largest banks. They are the 13th and 14th largest banks because
First Interstate Bancorp is ranked 7th, consistent with news articles, but not included in the WSJ article. Crocker merged with
Wells Fargo in 1986.
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support. The existence of such ratings reinforces the close connection between banks and the government.
I examine Fitch’s bank support ratings. Fitch Ratings’ support rating assesses the likelihood that a bank
receives external support—that is, government assistance—if it runs into significant financial difficulties. The
support rating puts a minimum bound on the long-term rating, and the support rating ranges from 1 to 5. A
bank with an “extremely high probability of external support” has a support rating of 1, and a bank with “a
possibility of external support, but it cannot be relied upon” has a support rating of 5. The support rating
does not assess the bank’s intrinsic credit quality and reflects only whether the rating agency thinks a bank
would receive support if needed. The support rating is available for many banks internationally and puts a
floor on the bank’s long-term rating; banks with a support rating of 1 have a minimum long-term rating floor
of A−.
I show that a higher probability of external support corresponds to greater government risk exposure
for banks worldwide. The logic is straightforward: suppose investors expect that a bank can, in bad states,
expect a backstop from its home government. Now, suppose the market’s belief of that government’s riskiness
increases. If the government decides to finance a bank intervention, all else equal, the government will face
higher borrowing costs, meaning the intervention is either less likely or offered with worse terms. In either
case, bank shareholders are worse off.
To test the hypothesis, I use the members of the Bloomberg Banks Index, which includes 156 leading
global bank stocks from 43 countries. Of the 156 banks, 130 have Fitch support ratings. Figure 1.4 shows
each country’s average Fitch support rating and the number of ratings included in the average. For example,
all three Japanese banks in the index have an “extremely high probability of external support,” consistent
with Japan’s long history of government support of forbearance. Banks in other developed market countries
cannot rely as much on external support, and all 19 U.S. banks in the index have a support rating of 5.
Emerging market countries have a higher probability of external support. China’s 25 banks have an average
support rating of 1.7: 12 banks have a support rating of 1, and none have a support rating over 3.
Figure 1.5 plots the bins of countries’ support rating against bank beta to the country’s government risk
factor, where I calculate the government risk factors in an analogous method as for the U.S.-based GovFac
described previously. I calculate each beta by regressing the bank’s daily return against the one-day lag of
the relevant country’s government risk factor during the pre-crisis period. A higher beta to government risk
shows greater dependence on government risk and corresponds to a higher probability of external support,
and the corresponding regression shows a significant relationship.
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Auto Companies
My third category of government-dependent firms is auto companies. Auto companies are government
dependent for many reasons: they are politically important and often seen as national champions, they
are large and salient employers, and they can manufacture equipment for national security. Their implicit
government backstop became explicit during the Global Financial Crisis when U.S. automakers received
extraordinary support. The announcement of explicit government support for the largest auto companies
created a new dependence on the government. After the announcement, auto returns increased their
government risk exposure, as measured by beta to the actual government risk factor, compared to non-auto
companies.
On October 3, 2008, the United States Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.
The legislation created the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), which funded many crisis interventions,
including the Capital Purchase Program for bank equity purchases and Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan
Facility (TALF). On December 19, 2008, the U.S. Treasury unveiled the Automotive Industry Financing
Program. The program used nearly $80 billion of TARP funds to support the auto industry. The program
rescued GM and Chrysler, two of the Big Three U.S. automakers.
Combined, Klier and Rubenstein (2012) estimate that GM received $50.2 billion in financial aid through
TARP, GMAC (and Ally) $17.2 billion, Chrysler $10.9 billion, and Chrysler Financial $1.5 billion across the
Bush and Obama administrations. Ford, the other member of the Big Three, avoided a TARP bailout since
it had obtained a large line of credit a year ahead of the crisis. But Ford used the TALF and the Commercial
Paper Funding Facility, and public perception of Ford differed little from that of GM and Chrysler. Ford’s
stock price dropped alongside GM’s and Chrysler’s, and Ford’s CEO went with the CEOs from GM and
Chrysler to request emergency aid from the Congress in November 2008 (Klier and Rubenstein, 2012).
I compare the returns of the Big Three automakers against the returns of a control group of non-auto
non-commercial bank firms. I exclude commercial banks from the control group because I showed their
government dependence in section 1.3.2. I use the method from equation 1.11. Table 1.7 shows the result.
Columns 2 and 7 show that automakers have greater government risk exposure than the control group in
general: for example, the average control group firm has a government risk beta of 0.7, while the betas of
the Big Three autos are almost double that at 1.3. Column 5 presents the full result. After the government
support announcement, the beta to government risk increases by 1.6 for the Big Three. After the bailout
announcement, when the government’s constraints tighten, automakers’ returns decline more than other
companies.
Figure 1.6 shows the beta to the U.S. sovereign risk factor for auto companies and the control group.
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Before December 19, 2008, auto companies had a negative beta to the U.S. government risk factor. After the
bailout announcement, the beta turned positive and increased more sharply than the control group’s beta.
See Appendix 1.8.2 for robustness and more analysis.
1.4 Intermediated Government Dependence
I now move from examining cases of direct government dependence to intermediated government dependence.
I study Japan, given the existing work that documents the country’s unique zombie history—in this context,
Japan is the extreme example, but I expect similar effects anywhere the government condones zombies.
Figure 1.7 shows widespread zombies in Japan: in recent years, nearly half of my sample is considered a
zombie.4
In Japan, zombies rely on the government through the intermediary sector. Zombies depend on banks to
continue evergreening their loans, and zombies depend on the government to continue allowing forbearance.
The government faces a budget constraint and can allocate only so many resources toward forbearance or
subsidized credit. I show that zombies’ government dependence through the intermediary sector is reflected
in their pricing.
I find that Japanese intermediary risk factors price zombie portfolios, and I posit that the intermediary
factor is a function of government risk as long as the government condones continued forbearance. I split
the intermediary risk factor into two parts—one correlated with government risk, the other orthogonal to
government risk. The government risk component drives the intermediary pricing of the zombie portfolios.
Zombies are not just bank-dependent firms. Zombies differ from bank-dependent companies in their
government dependence: zombies are both bank dependent and government dependent. To test the difference
between bank dependence and government dependence, I try to price the bank-dependent portfolios using
the intermediary factor and its components. Bank-dependent portfolios are priced by intermediary risk (like
zombies) because they are priced by the orthogonal component (unlike zombies). These results, combined
with the zombie portfolios’ pricing results, show that the difference between bank dependence and government
dependence is reflected in pricing.
Figure 1.8 summarizes the asset pricing results for zombie and bank-dependent portfolios. The intermediary
factor prices both, but for distinct reasons. Zombies rely on the government through the intermediary sector;
the government risk component of intermediary risk prices zombie portfolios because zombies’ expected
returns reflect the riskiness of whether assets will pay off in bad states as determined by the tightness of the
4The fraction of zombie firms in my dataset is similar to the percent from Caballero et al. (2008), which uses Nikkei Needs
data.
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government’s constraints. Bank-dependent firms are not differentially affected by the government’s capacity,
and they face intermediary risk unrelated to government risk.
1.4.1 Cross-Sectional Regressions
I split my sample of Japanese companies into two buckets, zombies and non-zombies. For each bucket, I
construct 25 size-and-book-to-market portfolios. The portfolios are quarterly to match the intermediary
factor’s frequency and are value-weighted. I form portfolios using 98% of the market capitalization (rather
than 90%). Using 90% of the market capitalization gives similar price of risk results, but the number of
observations is occasionally considerably lower. I use the two-step procedure in Equations 2.9 and 2.10 and
the intermediary factor, f = LevFacJP , to calculate the intermediary factor’s price of risk.
Table 1.8 shows the price of risk from cross-sectional regressions using a single factor model. The
intermediary leverage factor, LevFacJP , explains the cross-section variation of zombie portfolios but does not
price non-zombies or Fama–French portfolios. The results are robust to using the capital ratio factor instead
of the leverage ratio factor, adding a market factor, and including the ten momentum portfolios. Unlike the
U.S., the Japanese leverage and capital factors are negatively correlated, and they have opposite price of risk
signs. I discuss the signs in detail in Appendix 1.8.3.
I use the intermediary leverage factor to calculate the predicted returns for the zombie and non-zombie
portfolios, and I plot the realized returns against the predicted returns in Figure 1.9. For zombie portfolios,
predicted and realized returns line up near the 45-degree line. For non-zombies, the predicted returns cluster
in a small range, while realized returns spread over a broader range, reflecting the failure of the intermediary
factor to price non-zombie portfolios.
The cross-sectional results show that zombie returns are differentially affected by banks’ ability to take
on leverage. Bad times for banks are worse for some zombies. As described in Adrian et al. (2014), the
intermediary stochastic discount factor (SDF) is a negative function of the leverage factor. Times of low
leverage—when banks are lending less per yen of equity—correspond to times of high marginal utility for
intermediaries and low returns for the riskiest firms. To compensate for low returns in bad times, these
zombies have high expected returns. Other zombies have strong returns in bad times, so they serve as a good
hedge and have lower expected returns. For non-zombies, the covariance of returns with the intermediary
SDF is not informative for expected returns.
Zombies’ dependence on the government manifests through the intermediary sector. Under forbearance,
Japanese intermediary risk and government risk are correlated. Japanese broker-dealer leverage and sovereign
CDS are 66% correlated in level terms, and their log changes have a 44% correlation. I show that the
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correlation between intermediary risk and government risk leads to the zombie intermediary asset pricing
result.
I split the intermediary factor into two parts: a component correlated with the government risk factor,
LevFacpredicted , and an orthogonal component, LevFacresidual . I regress the Japanese intermediary factor on
the Japanese government risk factor:





LevFacpredicted is the predicted dependent variable. LevFacresidual is the regression residual. I use the two
components of LevFacJP to price portfolios following the two-step procedure in Equations 2.9 and 2.10 and
f = LevFacpredicted and f = LevFacresidual , separately, to calculate the prices of risk.
Table 1.8 shows that LevFacpredicted prices zombie portfolios and drives the intermediary asset pricing of
zombie portfolios. The orthogonal component, LevFacresidual , does not explain the cross-sectional variation of
zombie returns; and in a horse-race of the two components, the predicted components have larger t-statistics.
Zombie portfolios are differentially exposed to the risk that the government will no longer support forbearance,
and government risk underlies the intermediary risk pricing of zombies. Non-zombies do not rely on the
government’s budget capacity in the same way and are not priced by the intermediary factor or either
component of intermediary risk. The results are robust to using the capital ratio factor instead of the leverage
factor to separate the two components, adding a market factor, and including the ten momentum portfolios.5
Zombies vs. Bank-Dependent Firms Zombies differ from bank-dependent firms in their government
dependence. Like zombies, bank-dependent portfolios are priced by intermediary risk. Unlike zombies, the
component of intermediary risk that is orthogonal to government risk drives the pricing result.
I identify bank-dependent firms using three measures: external-finance dependence, bank beta, and
long-term debt issuance. First, I construct a measure for external-finance dependence in the spirit of Rajan
and Zingales (1998), which represents the amount of a firm’s desired investment that it cannot finance through
internal cash flows alone. I use Datastream/Worldscope data on capex and cash flows from operations to
construct firms’ external-finance dependence, which is the ratio of capital expenditures less cash flows from
operations to capex. To calculate the time-series of external-finance dependence for each firm, I calculate the
external-finance ratio using data as available in the previous ten years. Second, I measure bank betas using
each firm’s bank beta using 24 to 60 months of monthly returns, as available, in the five years before July of
year t, like the Fama–French pre-ranking betas. Third, Kashyap et al. (1994) define bank-dependent firms as
5See Table 1.11, Table 1.12, and Table 1.13.
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companies that do not have a long-term issuer rating from S&P since these firms do not have easy access to
capital markets. In Japan, I use an indicator for whether the firm has a long-term credit rating from Japan
Credit Rating Agency, Ltd. This measure is an ex-post indicator for firms with credit ratings.
I classify bank-dependent firms as those in the top 50th percentile using the three bank dependence
measures. I form bank-dependent portfolios annually in June t for July t to June t + 1, using accounting
data available in December t − 1. Zombie-ness and bank dependence are related; each of the three bank
dependence measures has a significant correlation with the zombie indicator ranging from 9% to 12%, and
zombies are more bank dependent than non-zombies using each measure.
I form quarterly portfolios of bank-dependent firms, separately for each measure of bank dependence, and
I price the portfolios using the intermediary factor and its components. I use the two components of LevFacJP
to price portfolios following the two-step procedure in Equations 2.9 and 2.10 and f = LevFacpredicted and
f = LevFacresidual , separately, to calculate the prices of risk.
Table 1.9 and Figure 1.10 show the cross-sectional pricing results. Bank-dependent portfolios are priced
by the intermediary factor and the intermediary component orthogonal to government risk, LevFacresidual .
Bank-dependent portfolios are not priced by the component correlated with government risk, LevFacpredicted .
The results are similar using the capital ratio factor in place of the leverage factor and adding a market
factor.6 The intermediary factors price zombie portfolios and bank-dependent portfolios but do not price
Japanese Fama–French portfolios since they do not sort in a way that gives heterogeneous exposure to
intermediary beta. Sorting on bank dependence first gives portfolios an economically meaningful spread in
intermediary beta.
1.4.2 Japanese Event Studies
I have previously shown that firms with direct dependence on the government respond to events when the
government grows riskier. I now show the equivalent for companies with government dependence through
the intermediary sector: when the intermediary sector grows riskier, returns for these indirectly-government-
dependent companies fall. I show that Japanese zombies have higher beta to government risk than non-zombies.
Zombies also have lower cumulative abnormal returns than non-zombies after a shock to the banking system.
The results are like the U.S. event study results and reflect zombies’ government dependence through the
intermediary sector.
Table 1.10 shows the regression of daily returns on the government risk factor in Japan. Like the U.S.
result, government-dependent firms have a higher beta to government risk. Zombies have a 30% larger beta
6See Table 1.14, Table 1.15, and Table 1.16.
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than non-zombies. Unlike the U.S. government-dependent firms, zombies’ government dependence is indirect.
Zombies exist because banks forbear on their non-performing loans, and they rely on the government to
continue allowing banks to do so. Consistent with the indirect mechanism, zombies have a higher beta to
government risk than non-zombies, but the effect disappears when I control for bank returns.
Ross (2020) shows that zombies also have substantial negative abnormal returns around salient financial
events. November 1997 marked the beginning of the “acute phase” of Japan’s lost two decades and a period
associated with tighter credit (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010). During the month, four financial institutions
unexpectedly failed, and Ross (2020) shows that cumulative abnormal returns of zombies were much lower
than the cumulative abnormal returns of non-zombies.
1.5 Conclusion
Government-dependent companies are exposed to government risk. The dependence can be direct—like U.S.
government suppliers, large banks, and auto companies—or through the intermediary sector, like Japanese
zombies. In both cases, government-dependent firms’ returns covary with the government’s budget constraints,
and firms with greater government risk exposure have higher expected returns.
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1.6 Tables




+ Banks + Autos Gov’t Suppliers Fama–French
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Intercept 0.244 −0.127 −0.044 0.121 −0.553 −0.337 0.787 0.969 0.801 1.681
(0.57) (−0.18) (−0.07) (0.18) (−0.54) (−0.32) (1.93) (2.11) (1.83) (3.83)
GovFac 0.412 0.394 0.429 0.548 0.517 0.474 −0.052 −0.052 −0.009
(2.60) (2.42) (2.35) (2.29) (2.20) (1.93) (−0.34) (−0.34) (−0.08)
Mkt − Rf 0.725 0.631 1.224 1.253 −0.197 −0.027 −0.952
(1.07) (0.85) (1.32) (1.18) (−0.36) (−0.05) (−2.12)
SMB −0.056 −0.271 −0.011 0.111
(−0.21) (−0.72) (−0.06) (1.03)
HML 0.329 1.069 −0.120 0.367
(0.89) (1.12) (−0.65) (3.38)
Ann. Risk Premium (σβ × λGovFac) 3.65 3.45 4.78 4.83 4.47 3.92 −0.21 −0.22 −0.02
TS GRS p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.46 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MAPE (%) 0.76 0.58 0.56 0.73 0.59 0.55 0.57 0.16 0.13 0.12
TS Avg R2 0.01 0.41 0.51 0.01 0.43 0.50 0.01 0.82 0.93 0.91
Months (T ) 152 152 152 131 131 131 187 187 187 1,118
Portfolios (N) 31 31 31 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
80% Restriction Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No
Table 1.1: Cross-Sectional Asset Pricing of U.S. Government-Dependent Portfolios. Table presents the cross-sectional pricing results for
size-and-book-to-market monthly portfolios: 25 government suppliers portfolios, 6 bank portfolios, 6 auto portfolios, and 25 Fama–French portfolios.
Government-dependent portfolios are required to have data for 80% of the time in the pooled regressions. The regressions test if the U.S. government-risk
factor, GovFac, prices the portfolios. See the text for additional details on the factors and portfolios. Coefficients are the price of risk estimates, and
GMM t-statistics are reported. Ann. Risk Premium (σβ × λGovFac) is the annualized increase in expected risk premium associated with a one standard
deviation increase in the portfolio’s beta to the government risk factor. TS GRS p-value is the p-value of the Gibbons–Ross–Shanken test of whether
the pricing errors are jointly zero. MAPE is the mean absolute pricing error. TS Avg R2 is the average time-series R2.
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E[Rei,t] = γ0 + γ1(Characteristic)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 1.139 1.491 1.140 1.493
(4.61) (2.77) (4.61) (2.77)
I(Government Supplier) 0.195 0.171
(2.26) (2.04)






Months (T ) 462 462 462 462
Firms (N) 17,329 17,329 17,329 17,329
Table 1.2: Cross-Sectional Asset Pricing of U.S. Firms using Firm Characteristics. Table presents the cross-sectional pricing results for
monthly firm returns. The regressions test if the government suppliers have higher expected returns, and if firms with greater government dependence
have higher expected returns. Coefficients are the price of risk estimates, and Fama–MacBeth t-statistics are reported.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
GovFac GovFac GovFac GovFac






Constant 0.195∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗
(5.27) (5.33) (5.74) (5.75)
N 187 187 187 187
Adj. R2 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Table 1.3: Spanning Tests of the U.S. Government Risk Factor. Table presents time-series regressions at the monthly level. The dependent
variable is the U.S. government risk factor, GovFac. See the text for additional details on GovFac. Independent variables are Fama–French factors: the
excess market return, SMB, and HML. t-statistics using robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Booz Allen Hamilton Coca-Cola
Caterpillar Comcast
Con Edison Disney
Corrections Corporation of America Exxon Mobil
GE Home Depot
Goodyear Intel







Raytheon Proctor & Gamble
Texas Instruments Verizon
Walgreens Walmart
Table 1.4: Examples of Government Suppliers and Non-suppliers. Table presents examples of government suppliers and non-suppliers.
Government suppliers are firms with more than 10% of their annual sales coming from the federal government, and each company listed as a government
supplier has more than a year of government sales over 10%.
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GovFac 0.316∗∗ 0.327∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.392∗∗ 0.406∗∗ 0.014∗∗
(2.97) (2.98) (3.11) (3.14) (3.15) (3.22)
Constant 0.000∗ 0.000∗ 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000
(2.15) (2.12) (1.21) (1.81) (1.79) (0.69)
N 3,862 3,862 3,862 3,862 3,862 3,862
Adj. R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Table 1.5: Beta of Government Suppliers to the U.S. Government Risk Factor. Table presents time-series regressions at the daily level.
The dependent variable is the value-weighted portfolio return in percent. The government suppliers portfolio consists of firms with more than 10% of
their annual sales coming from the federal government. The non-suppliers portfolio includes firms with than 10% of their annual sales coming from the
federal government or no government sales reported. The independent variable is the U.S. government risk factor, GovFac. See the text for additional
details on the GovFac. t-statistics using robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Sample All Commercial Banks Top 50 Commercial Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Return Return Return Return Return Return Return Return Return Return
GovFacsynthetic 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.008∗ 0.009∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(4.52) (3.67) (4.88) (9.97) (10.41) (3.98) (2.28) (2.56) (4.51) (4.73)
GovFacsynthetic × I(WSJ) 0.022∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.007 0.007 0.020∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.007 0.007
(3.74) (3.53) (1.04) (0.99) (2.97) (2.93) (0.94) (0.92)
GovFacsynthetic × I(Post) −0.024∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗ −0.028∗∗
(−6.53) (−5.80) (−2.97) (−2.88)
GovFacsynthetic × I(WSJ) × I(Post) 0.041∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.047∗∗ 0.047∗∗
(3.36) (3.26) (3.10) (3.10)
Constant 0.072∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ −0.033 0.073∗∗∗ −0.033 0.051∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ −0.045 0.051∗∗∗ −0.045
(46.70) (46.72) (−0.24) (46.91) (−0.25) (16.54) (16.55) (−0.38) (16.56) (−0.38)
N 3,935,268 3,935,268 3,935,268 3,935,268 3,935,268 598,452 598,452 598,452 598,452 598,452
Adj. R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Year FE No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes
SIC FE No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes
Table 1.6: Beta of U.S. Commercial Banks to the Synthetic U.S. Government Risk Factor. Table presents time-series regressions run at
the daily level. The dependent variable is firm i’s return in percent. Independent variables are the synthetic U.S. government risk factor, GovFacsynthetic,
and the factor interacted with indicator variables. See the text for additional details on GovFacsynthetic. I(WSJ) = 1 if the bank is one of the 11 banks
cited as too big to fail by The WSJ, and 0 otherwise. I(Post) = 1 if the date is after September 20, 1984, and 0 otherwise. t-statistics using robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Treatment Group Big Three Autos
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Return Return Return Return Return Return Return Return Return Return
GovFac 0.686∗∗∗ 0.686∗∗∗ 0.869∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.686∗∗∗ 0.685∗∗∗ 0.868∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
(66.33) (66.28) (72.39) (7.10) (4.63) (66.33) (66.09) (72.22) (7.07) (4.62)
GovFac × I(Treated) 0.655∗ 0.645∗ −0.074 −0.158 0.499∗∗ 0.507∗∗ 0.145 0.060
(2.08) (2.00) (−0.16) (−0.33) (3.13) (2.93) (0.66) (0.21)
GovFac × I(Post) 0.926∗∗∗ 0.946∗∗∗ 0.925∗∗∗ 0.944∗∗∗
(41.57) (29.60) (41.47) (29.53)
GovFac × I(Treated) × I(Post) 1.521∗ 1.613∗ 0.647∗ 0.735
(2.36) (2.45) (2.03) (1.94)
Constant 0.036∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
(39.55) (39.55) (2.68) (48.17) (5.44) (39.55) (39.55) (2.68) (48.17) (5.44)
N 20,042,168 20,042,168 20,042,168 20,042,168 20,042,168 20,042,168 20,042,168 20,042,168 20,042,168 20,042,168
Adj. R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Year FE No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes
SIC FE No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes
Table 1.7: Beta of U.S. Auto Companies to the U.S. Government Risk Factor. Table presents time-series regressions at the daily level. The
dependent variable is return in percent. Independent variables are the U.S. government risk factor, GovFac, and the factor interacted with indicator
variables. See the text for additional details on GovFac. In columns 1 to 5, I(Treated) = 1 if the firm is one of the Big Three automakers, and 0
otherwise. In columns 6 to 10, I(Treated) = 1 if the firm is an automaker, and 0 otherwise. I(Post) = 1 if the date is after December 19, 2008, and 0
otherwise. t-statistics using robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Prices of Risk: E[Rei,t] = λ0 + β̂′i,f λf
Portfolios Zombies Non-zombies Fama–French
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
LevFacJP 11.790 −3.212 5.902
(2.19) (−0.56) (1.31)
LevFacpredicted 1.365 0.630 1.340
(1.96) (0.76) (2.06)
LevFacresidual 7.781 7.920 9.320
(1.69) (1.31) (1.60)
Ann. Risk Premium (σβ × λ) 2.01 1.91 1.62 −0.82 1.47 1.80 1.19 2.14 1.42
TS GRS p-value 0.11 0.23 0.24 0.33 0.11 0.57 0.42 0.35 0.08
MAPE (%) 2.14 3.05 2.18 2.76 3.26 2.60 2.37 2.77 2.42
TS Avg R2 0.14 0.02 0.18 0.13 0.03 0.12 0.15 0.01 0.18
Quarters (T ) 79 65 65 58 50 50 82 65 65
Portfolios (N) 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Table 1.8: Intermediary Asset Pricing of Japanese Portfolios. Table presents the cross-sectional pricing results for size-and-book-to-market
quarterly portfolios: 25 zombie portfolios, 25 non-zombie portfolios, and 25 Fama–French portfolios. The regressions test if the Japanese intermediary
factor and its components price the portfolios. LevFacJP is the Japanese intermediary leverage factor, and its components are LevFacpredicted and
LevFacresidual . LevFacpredicted is correlated with government risk, and LevFacresidual is orthogonal to government risk. See the text for additional
details on the factors. Coefficients are the price of risk estimates, and GMM t-statistics are reported. Intercept is included in each regression but
omitted from the table. Ann. Risk Premium (σβ × λ) is the annualized increase in expected risk premium associated with a one standard deviation
increase in the portfolio’s beta to the intermediary factor or factor component. TS GRS p-value is the p-value of the Gibbons–Ross–Shanken test of
whether the pricing errors are jointly zero. MAPE is the mean absolute pricing error. TS Avg R2 is the average time-series R2. See Tables 1.11, 1.12,
and 1.13 for results with the inclusion of the market factor, results using the capital ratio factor, results adding the 10 momentum portfolios, and
results with a horserace between the two components of the intermediary factors.
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Prices of Risk: E[Rei,t] = λ0 + β̂′i,f λf
Bank Dependence Measure External Finance Bank Beta Long-Term Issuer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
LevFacJP 11.787 9.017 14.209
(2.43) (2.16) (2.83)
LevFacpredicted 1.409 0.737 1.636
(1.62) (1.21) (1.83)
LevFacresidual 10.529 11.376 14.320
(2.22) (2.42) (2.76)
Ann. Risk Premium (σβ × λ) 3.02 2.03 2.49 2.32 1.45 2.98 3.08 2.76 3.32
TS GRS p-value 0.16 0.76 0.28 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.06
MAPE (%) 1.96 3.12 1.88 2.34 3.42 2.11 2.13 2.65 2.19
TS Avg R2 0.20 0.03 0.22 0.19 0.03 0.24 0.11 0.02 0.13
Quarters (T ) 68 65 65 79 65 65 75 63 63
Portfolios (N) 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
Table 1.9: Intermediary Asset Pricing of Japanese Bank-Dependent Portfolios. Table presents the cross-sectional pricing results for
quarterly portfolios: 25 size-and-book-to-market bank-dependent portfolios and 10 momentum bank-dependent portfolios. Firms are classified as
bank dependent using three bank dependence measures separately, and bank-dependent portfolios are formed of bank-dependent firms. See the text
for additional details on the bank dependence measures and portfolio construction. The regressions test if the Japanese intermediary factor and its
components price the portfolios. LevFacJP is the Japanese intermediary leverage factor, and its components are LevFacpredicted and LevFacresidual .
LevFacpredicted is correlated with government risk, and LevFacresidual is orthogonal to government risk. See the text for additional details on the factors.
Coefficients are the price of risk estimates, and GMM t-statistics are reported. Intercept is included in each regression but omitted from the table. Ann.
Risk Premium (σβ × λ) is the annualized increase in expected risk premium associated with a one standard deviation increase in the portfolio’s beta to
the intermediary factor or factor component. TS GRS p-value is the p-value of the Gibbons–Ross–Shanken test of whether the pricing errors are jointly
zero. MAPE is the mean absolute pricing error. TS Avg R2 is the average time-series R2. See Tables 1.14, 1.15, and 1.16 for results with the inclusion
of the market factor, results using the capital ratio factor, and results with a horserace between the two components of the intermediary factors.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Return Return Return Return Return
GovFacJP 1.183∗∗∗ 0.985∗∗∗ 1.123∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗ −0.010
(87.12) (40.47) (44.31) (18.33) (−0.48)
GovFacJP × I(Zombie) 0.294∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.042 0.007
(10.16) (8.53) (1.72) (0.31)
Bank Return 53.378∗∗∗ 6.588∗∗∗
(270.44) (31.42)






Constant 0.003∗ 0.003∗ −0.063∗∗∗ −0.007 0.006
(1.96) (2.35) (−5.23) (−0.61) (0.51)
N 2,436,106 2,436,106 2,436,106 2,436,106 2,272,511
Adj. R2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.20 0.28
Year FE No No Yes Yes Yes
SIC FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Table 1.10: Beta of Japanese Firms to the Japanese Government Risk Factor. Table presents time-series regressions at the daily level.
The dependent variable is the return in basis points. Independent variables include the Japanese government risk factor, GovFacJP , and the Japanese
value-weighted bank return. I(Zombie) = 1 if the firm is a zombie, and 0 otherwise. t-statistics using robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Figure 1.1: Government Risk and the Ratio of Government Sales To Total Sales. Figure is a binned scatterplot of beta to the U.S.













Figure 1.2: Cumulative Abnormal Return of Government Suppliers and Non-suppliers After the U.S. Sovereign Debt Downgrade.
Figure shows the daily average cumulative abnormal returns in the week after the U.S. sovereign debt downgrade and its standard errors. I calculate
each firm’s abnormal returns as the difference between the realized return and predicted return using the estimated CAPM market beta before August




























Figure 1.3: Beta to Synthetic U.S. Government Risk Factor. Figure shows the average beta to the synthetic U.S. government risk factor for
the 11 largest banks cited by the WSJ and the beta for the next largest banks, Mellon Bank and Crocker National Bank. Betas are calculated monthly






































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1.4: Average Fitch Bank Support Rating. Figure shows each country’s average Fitch bank support rating, calculated as the average
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Figure 1.5: Fitch Bank Support Ratings and Beta to Government Risk. Figure is a binned scatterplot of countries’ average Fitch bank
support ratings against banks’ return beta to the domestic government risk factor. I calculate a country-specific GovFac for each country in a method
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Figure 1.6: Beta to U.S. Government Risk Factor. Figure shows the average beta to the U.S. government risk factor for the Big Three
automakers and a control group of non-bank, non-autos. Betas are calculated monthly and averaged to the annual level. Vertical line marks 2008, the
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Figure 1.7: Percentage of Zombie Firms in Japan. Figure compares the percentage of Japanese zombies in the data and the zombie percentage









Figure 1.8: Intermediary Asset Pricing Summary. Figure summarizes the Japanese intermediary asset pricing results. Intermediary risk
factors price zombie portfolios and bank-dependent portfolios, which differ in their government dependence. Under government-condoned forbearance,
intermediary risk has two components: one correlated with government risk, one orthogonal to government risk. The former prices zombies, and the






















































































Figure 1.9: Realized vs. Predicted Returns using the Intermediary Leverage Factor. Figure shows the realized and predicted excess
returns of size-and-book-to-market portfolios. 25 zombie portfolios and 25 non-zombie portfolios are used. Predicted returns are calculated using
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Figure 1.10: Price of Risk for Bank-Dependent Portfolios. Figure shows the price of risk from cross-sectional regressions of bank-dependent
portfolio returns and GMM standard error bars. Each bar represents the price of risk calculated from the cross-sectional regression of 25 bank-dependent
portfolios on the intermediary leverage factor or a component of the intermediary leverage factor. Three sets of 25 bank-dependent portfolios are
used. Each set of portfolios is sorted on size and book-to-market, and firms are categorized as bank dependent using three separate measures of bank
dependence: external finance, bank beta, and long-term issuer. LevFacJP is the intermediary leverage factor, and LevFacpredicted and LevFacresidual
are its components. LevFacpredicted is correlated with government risk, and LevFacresidual is orthogonal to government risk. See the text for details




U.S. Government Risk Factor Correlations The U.S. government risk factor, GovFac, is correlated
with other measures of government risk. I study two sets of measures. First, I show that GovFac is significantly
correlated with the news-implied volatility indexes from Manela and Moreira (2017). Second, I show that
GovFac correlates with the Risk 1A long-short portfolio returns from Ross (2019).
Manela and Moreira (2017) create a news-implied volatility index, NVIX , which is a text-based measure
of uncertainty using articles from The Wall Street Journal. NVIX spikes during financial crises, market
crashes, and periods of elevated policy uncertainty. NVIX is decomposed into categories of disaster risk,
including “Financial Intermediation,” “Stock Markets,” and “Government,” which reflects policy-related
uncertainty. An increase in NVIX or its components reflects an increase in risk and uncertainty.
Ross (2019) uses textual analysis of Item 1A of firms’ annual filings to create 50 long-short portfolios
based on firms’ exposure to each risk. A firm’s exposure is captured by the firm’s relevance to common risks
in Item 1A. “Taxes” or “Regulations” risk portfolios are two of the government-related portfolios.
Table 1.17 regresses the U.S. government risk factor on the news-implied volatility indexes and the
Risk 1A portfolios. When the government becomes more constrained (GovFac decreases), news-implied
volatility increases both in the aggregate and in the Government, Financial Intermediation, and Stock Market
components. When government risk increases, firms with high Tax or Regulations risk exposure also have
lower returns.
Constructing Par-equivalent CDS U.S. sovereign CDS data are from Markit and begins in 2003. For
the 1984 event study, I construct a longer time-series by creating a synthetic sovereign CDS spread that is
the par-equivalent CDS spread and begins in 1962. Then I use the synthetic spread and the same method
from Equations 1.3 and 1.4 to form the synthetic government risk factor, GovFacsynthetic.
To create the par-equivalent CDS spread, I use the CRSP Treasuries dataset, Libor swap rates, and the
U.S. yield curve. For each date, I choose the bond in the CRSP Treasuries dataset that is deliverable against
a 5-year CDS contract and cheapest to buy. I use this bond’s dirty price and coupon. I iterate through
CDS spread values between 0 and 250bps, incrementing by 0.25bps, to find the CDS spread that gives the
CDS-implied bond price that most closely matches the realized bond price. I assume a recovery rate of 0.4, a
semi-annual CDS, and a face value of 100. I use Libor swap rates, when available, for the risk-free rates, and
I linearly interpolate these swap rates to get semi-annual rates. When Libor is unavailable, I use the U.S.
Treasury yield curve from the St. Louis FRED.
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Figure 1.11 plots the par-equivalent synthetic sovereign CDS spread, spliced with the actual U.S. sovereign
CDS spread from Markit. The synthetic spread is demeaned and scaled to match the actual CDS spread on
the first day the CDS spread data.
1.8.2 U.S. Event Studies Details
Banks In Section 1.3.2, I show that the 11 WSJ banks have higher beta to government risk than other
commercial banks. In this section, I show that the result is robust to adding additional controls, using a
shorter period, separate estimations for national and commercial banks, restricting the control group, and
restricting the sample to banks on the border of the too big to fail cutoff. The result is also insignificant in a
placebo test. Table 1.6 shows that after the WSJ event, the 11 WSJ banks have higher beta to government
risk than other commercial banks. Table 1.18 shows the result is robust to adding controls for individual
indicators, the market return, the bank’s market capitalization, and the bank’s assets at the end of the prior
year.
Next, I run difference-in-difference regressions to further support that the 11 WSJ banks have higher
beta to government risk than other commercial banks. First, I calculate each bank i’s monthly beta to the
synthetic government risk factor, βGovFacsynthetic,i,t . Then, I regress this beta on indicators for being one of
the 11 banks in the treatment group, after the WSJ article publication, and both. I control for each bank’s




+ γ3I(Treated) × I(Post)
+ γ4βMarket,t + γ5Sizei,t + γ6Assetsi,t.
(1.13)
Table 1.19 shows the difference-in-difference regression of the beta to the synthetic U.S. government risk
factor. After the WSJ article was published, the 11 cited banks have a higher beta to the government risk
than other banks. Over an eight-year window of four years before the event and four years after the event,
the results are stronger because there are many industry changes over the full period, including bank mergers
in the 1980s and 1990s. The WSJ banks have a higher beta to government risk after the event, and the result
holds for national and state commercial banks separately. Table 1.19 Panel B shows the result is robust to
restricting the control group to only the largest 50 banks at each point in time. This result shows the 11
banks became more government dependent after the WSJ event even compared to other big banks.
I also run a placebo regression for robustness. I show there is no effect using a placebo event date of 1
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year before the event or using a placebo treatment group of the intended national banks. I change the time
indicator as one year before the WSJ event. In this regression, the difference-in-difference coefficient should
be zero. Table 1.20 shows that the difference-in-difference coefficient is not significant for national and state
commercial banks, particularly over the window of four years earlier and four years following the placebo
event. This result shows the importance of the timing of the WSJ event.
Before the event, it was unclear where the cutoff fell between too big to fail banks and too small to save
banks. Since the event occurred during the Continental Illinois bailout, Continental Illinois itself proved too
big to fail, but the cutoff was unknown. I compare the beta of large banks near the too big to fail policy
cutoff by restricting the sample to banks that were larger than Continental Illinois and in the top 25 banks in
1984. Table 1.21 shows the divergence in government dependence between the banks that were larger than
Continential Illinois but covered by the policy and the banks that were slightly smaller.
Autos Table 1.7 shows that auto companies’ returns have higher beta to government risk than other
companies after the announcement of government support for the auto industry in the Global Financial Crisis.
Table 1.22 shows this is robust to adding additional controls, including the market return and industry fixed
effects.
1.8.3 Intermediary Asset Pricing Details
Leverage and Capital Ratio Factors in the U.S. and Japan Leverage and the capital ratio are
reciprocals, and the two intermediary factors should have opposite signs if the factors are constructed from
similar firms. In the U.S., both the leverage and capital ratio factors have a positive and significant price
of risk (Adrian et al. (2014) and He et al. (2017)) because they are formed from datasets that use different
firms as intermediaries. The leverage factor uses data on securities broker-dealers from the Flow of Funds,
which captures only the U.S. subsidiary component. The capital ratio factor uses data on primary dealer
counterparties of the NY Fed, matched to the publicly-traded holding company level, and this list includes
foreign dealers.
In Japan, securities broker-dealers and primary dealers overlap more than in the U.S. The Japanese
intermediary factors have a −51% correlation, which is significant at the α = 0.01 level. In the U.S., the
factors have a correlation of −4.9% over the same period.7
7Using updated data of the U.S. factors from Tyler Muir’s and Asaf Manela’s websites, the U.S. factors have a correlation of
0.90% from 1970Q1 to 2017Q3. Using data available from 1998Q1, the start of the Japanese leverage factor data availability, the
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Panel A: Leverage Factor
25 Size-and-B/M Portfolios 25 Size-and-B/M + 10 Mom Portfolios
Zombies Non-zombies Fama–French Zombies Non-zombies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
LevFacJP 11.790 13.020 −3.212 −4.030 5.902 8.327 8.077 8.357 −3.010 −2.760
(2.19) (2.38) (−0.56) (−0.65) (1.31) (1.41) (1.68) (1.77) (−0.59) (−0.54)
Mkt − Rf −1.576 3.741 −0.108 −1.240 2.838
(−0.77) (1.19) (−0.06) (−0.64) (1.12)
Ann. Risk Premium (σβ × λ) 2.01 2.32 −0.82 −1.39 1.19 1.65 1.51 1.70 −0.75 −0.88
TS GRS p-value 0.11 0.07 0.33 0.34 0.42 0.46 0.14 0.06 0.59 0.60
MAPE (%) 2.14 0.88 2.76 1.43 2.37 0.87 1.95 0.77 2.48 1.28
TS Avg R2 0.14 0.70 0.13 0.58 0.15 0.73 0.16 0.69 0.15 0.59
Quarters (T ) 79 79 58 58 82 82 79 79 58 58
Portfolios (N) 25 25 25 25 25 25 35 35 35 35
Panel B: Capital Ratio Factor
25 Size-and-B/M Portfolios 25 Size-and-B/M + 10 Mom Portfolios
Zombies Non-zombies Fama–French Zombies Non-zombies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
CapFacJP −8.675 −9.601 −2.644 −3.910 −4.585 −4.378 −6.531 −6.930 −2.728 −3.744
(−1.97) (−1.91) (−0.70) (−0.99) (−0.91) (−0.84) (−1.71) (−1.69) (−0.72) (−0.93)
Mkt − Rf −1.531 −2.694 0.056 −1.442 −2.747
(−0.87) (−1.06) (0.02) (−0.93) (−1.18)
Ann. Risk Premium (σβ × λ) −1.97 −2.31 −1.41 −2.76 −0.93 −1.07 −1.61 −1.74 −1.39 −2.44
TS GRS p-value 0.20 0.43 0.83 0.93 0.42 0.68 0.37 0.55 0.43 0.56
MAPE (%) 2.73 0.82 2.77 1.12 2.59 0.46 2.54 0.78 2.62 0.98
TS Avg R2 0.18 0.71 0.15 0.53 0.17 0.77 0.18 0.70 0.16 0.55
Quarters (T ) 55 55 42 42 55 55 55 55 42 42
Portfolios (N) 25 25 25 25 25 25 35 35 35 35
Table 1.11: Intermediary Asset Pricing of Japanese Portfolios. Table presents the cross-sectional pricing results for 25 size-and-book-to-market
and 10 momentum quarterly portfolios. 35 zombie portfolios, 35 non-zombie portfolios, and 25 Fama–French portfolios are used. The regressions test if
a Japanese intermediary factor prices the portfolios. LevFacJP is the Japanese intermediary leverage factor, and CapFacJP is the Japanese intermediary
capital ratio factor. See the text for additional details on the factors. Coefficients are the price of risk estimates, and GMM t-statistics are reported.
Intercept is included in each regression but omitted from the table. Ann. Risk Premium (σβ × λ) is the annualized increase in expected risk premium
associated with a one standard deviation increase in the beta to the intermediary factor. TS GRS p-value is the p-value of the Gibbons–Ross–Shanken
test of whether the pricing errors are jointly zero. MAPE is the mean absolute pricing error. TS Avg R2 is the average time-series R2.
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25 Size-and-B/M Portfolios 25 Size-and-B/M + 10 Mom Portfolios
Zombies Non-zombies Fama–French Zombies Non-zombies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
LevFacpredicted 1.365 1.372 0.630 0.589 1.340 1.323 1.493 1.506 0.834 0.820
(1.96) (2.02) (0.76) (0.79) (2.06) (1.95) (1.99) (2.14) (1.05) (1.06)
Mkt − Rf −0.780 0.064 −0.670 −0.823 −0.284
(−0.46) (0.03) (−0.30) (−0.47) (−0.13)
Ann. Risk Premium 1.91 1.83 1.47 1.47 2.14 2.30 2.09 1.98 1.90 1.96
TS GRS p-value 0.23 0.33 0.11 0.12 0.35 0.53 0.50 0.62 0.58 0.65
MAPE (%) 3.05 0.74 3.26 1.37 2.77 0.57 3.03 0.68 3.22 1.15
TS Avg R2 0.02 0.70 0.03 0.55 0.01 0.79 0.02 0.71 0.03 0.57
Quarters (T ) 65 65 50 50 65 65 65 65 50 50
Portfolios (N) 25 25 25 25 25 25 35 35 35 35
Panel B: LevFacresidual
25 Size-and-B/M Portfolios 25 Size-and-B/M + 10 Mom Portfolios
Zombies Non-zombies Fama–French Zombies Non-zombies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
LevFacresidual 7.781 8.909 7.920 6.879 9.320 9.906 7.068 7.692 7.278 6.924
(1.69) (1.78) (1.31) (1.24) (1.60) (1.50) (1.69) (1.79) (1.25) (1.32)
Mkt − Rf −0.749 0.757 0.113 −0.943 0.225
(−0.49) (0.25) (0.05) (−0.60) (0.10)
Ann. Risk Premium 1.62 1.84 1.80 2.00 1.42 1.98 1.56 1.67 1.63 1.93
TS GRS p-value 0.24 0.24 0.57 0.61 0.08 0.13 0.33 0.30 0.82 0.88
MAPE (%) 2.18 0.87 2.60 1.21 2.42 0.84 1.96 0.77 2.37 1.00
TS Avg R2 0.18 0.71 0.12 0.55 0.18 0.79 0.19 0.71 0.13 0.57
Quarters (T ) 65 65 50 50 65 65 65 65 50 50
Portfolios (N) 25 25 25 25 25 25 35 35 35 35
Panel C: LevFacpredicted and LevFacresidual
25 Size-and-B/M Portfolios 25 Size-and-B/M + 10 Mom Portfolios
Zombies Non-zombies Fama–French Zombies Non-zombies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
LevFacpredicted 1.070 0.914 0.401 −0.039 1.242 0.861 1.396 1.337 0.658 0.450
(1.64) (1.34) (0.54) (−0.06) (1.76) (1.05) (2.10) (1.90) (1.01) (0.80)
LevFacresidual 2.909 4.141 6.421 6.576 1.743 3.922 0.871 1.317 4.672 4.899
(0.53) (0.69) (1.09) (1.10) (0.29) (0.69) (0.16) (0.22) (0.87) (0.95)
Mkt − Rf −0.629 0.624 −0.528 −0.743 −0.138
(−0.39) (0.23) (−0.24) (−0.43) (−0.07)
TS GRS p-value 0.19 0.38 0.12 0.18 0.35 0.62 0.43 0.65 0.62 0.75
MAPE (%) 3.05 0.72 3.39 1.30 2.77 0.67 3.03 0.69 3.36 1.09
TS Avg R2 0.20 0.72 0.15 0.57 0.19 0.81 0.22 0.72 0.16 0.59
Quarters (T ) 65 65 50 50 65 65 65 65 50 50
Portfolios (N) 25 25 25 25 25 25 35 35 35 35
Table 1.12: Intermediary Asset Pricing with Components of LevFacJP. Table presents the cross-
sectional pricing results for 25 size-and-book-to-market and 10 momentum quarterly portfolios. 35 zombie
portfolios, 35 non-zombie portfolios, and 25 Fama–French portfolios are used. The regressions test if the
components of LevFacJP , the Japanese intermediary leverage factor, price the portfolios. LevFacpredicted is the
component correlated with government risk, and LevFacresidual is the component orthogonal to government
risk. See the text for additional details on the factors. Coefficients are the price of risk estimates, and GMM
t-statistics are reported. Intercept is included in each regression but omitted from the table. Ann. Risk
Premium is the annualized increase in expected risk premium associated with a one standard deviation
increase in the beta to the intermediary factor component: σβ × λ. TS GRS p-value is the p-value of the
Gibbons–Ross–Shanken test of whether the pricing errors are jointly zero. MAPE is the mean absolute
pricing error. TS Avg R2 is the average time-series R2.
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25 Size-and-B/M Portfolios 25 Size-and-B/M + 10 Mom Portfolios
Zombies Non-zombies Fama–French Zombies Non-zombies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
CapFacpredicted −2.735 −2.749 −1.262 −1.180 −2.684 −2.649 −2.990 −3.018 −1.671 −1.643
(−1.96) (−2.02) (−0.76) (−0.79) (−2.06) (−1.95) (−1.99) (−2.14) (−1.05) (−1.06)
Mkt − Rf −0.780 0.064 −0.670 −0.823 −0.284
(−0.46) (0.03) (−0.30) (−0.47) (−0.13)
Ann. Risk Premium −1.88 −1.81 −1.45 −1.45 −2.11 −2.26 −2.05 −1.95 −1.88 −1.93
TS GRS p-value 0.23 0.31 0.18 0.19 0.26 0.41 0.48 0.57 0.68 0.74
MAPE (%) 2.83 0.73 2.97 1.32 2.68 0.51 2.76 0.67 2.88 1.08
TS Avg R2 0.02 0.70 0.03 0.55 0.01 0.79 0.02 0.71 0.03 0.57
Quarters (T ) 65 65 50 50 65 65 65 65 50 50
Portfolios (N) 25 25 25 25 25 25 35 35 35 35
Panel B: CapFacresidual
25 Size-and-B/M Portfolios 25 Size-and-B/M + 10 Mom Portfolios
Zombies Non-zombies Fama–French Zombies Non-zombies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
CapFacresidual −7.487 −9.234 −3.520 −2.616 −5.221 −11.030 −6.121 −7.455 −2.942 −2.466
(−1.99) (−1.85) (−0.87) (−0.74) (−1.00) (−1.11) (−1.87) (−1.76) (−0.78) (−0.74)
Mkt − Rf −1.000 0.124 0.414 −0.962 −0.149
(−0.59) (0.05) (0.15) (−0.63) (−0.07)
Ann. Risk Premium −1.88 −2.13 −1.38 −1.47 −0.87 −1.77 −1.61 −1.68 −1.18 −1.35
TS GRS p-value 0.23 0.22 0.61 0.70 0.09 0.15 0.33 0.32 0.77 0.86
MAPE (%) 2.18 0.89 2.55 1.24 2.42 0.89 1.96 0.78 2.32 1.02
TS Avg R2 0.15 0.70 0.13 0.55 0.15 0.78 0.15 0.71 0.14 0.57
Quarters (T ) 65 65 50 50 65 65 65 65 50 50
Portfolios (N) 25 25 25 25 25 25 35 35 35 35
Panel C: CapFacpredicted and CapFacresidual
25 Size-and-B/M Portfolios 25 Size-and-B/M + 10 Mom Portfolios
Zombies Non-zombies Fama–French Zombies Non-zombies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
CapFacpredicted −1.839 −1.752 −0.857 −0.615 −2.696 −2.403 −2.436 −2.330 −1.495 −1.406
(−1.51) (−1.38) (−0.59) (−0.51) (−1.84) (−1.54) (−1.97) (−1.85) (−1.13) (−1.10)
CapFacresidual −5.026 −6.788 −2.139 −1.754 0.138 −1.052 −2.664 −4.110 −1.013 −0.805
(−1.44) (−1.49) (−0.63) (−0.51) (0.02) (−0.17) (−0.79) (−0.98) (−0.29) (−0.25)
Mkt − Rf −0.643 −0.153 −0.608 −0.511 −0.403
(−0.40) (−0.06) (−0.28) (−0.32) (−0.19)
TS GRS p-value 0.24 0.39 0.10 0.17 0.24 0.45 0.43 0.61 0.41 0.57
MAPE (%) 2.83 0.68 3.14 1.29 2.68 0.52 2.76 0.64 3.05 1.06
TS Avg R2 0.16 0.71 0.16 0.57 0.16 0.80 0.17 0.71 0.18 0.59
Quarters (T ) 65 65 50 50 65 65 65 65 50 50
Portfolios (N) 25 25 25 25 25 25 35 35 35 35
Table 1.13: Intermediary Asset Pricing with Components of CapFacJP. Table presents the cross-
sectional pricing results for 25 size-and-book-to-market and 10 momentum quarterly portfolios. 35 zombie
portfolios, 35 non-zombie portfolios, and 25 Fama–French portfolios are used. The regressions test if the
components of CapFacJP , the Japanese intermediary capital ratio factor, price the portfolios. CapFacpredicted
is the component correlated with government risk, and CapFacresidual is the component orthogonal to
government risk. See the text for additional details on the factors. Coefficients are the price of risk estimates,
and GMM t-statistics are reported. Intercept is included in each regression but omitted from the table. Ann.
Risk Premium is the annualized increase in expected risk premium associated with a one standard deviation
increase in the beta to the intermediary factor component: σβ × λ. TS GRS p-value is the p-value of the
Gibbons–Ross–Shanken test of whether the pricing errors are jointly zero. MAPE is the mean absolute
pricing error. TS Avg R2 is the average time-series R2.
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Bank Dependence External Finance Bank Beta Long-Term Issuer
Measure
Bank-Dependent Not Bank-Dep. Bank-Dependent Not Bank-Dep. Bank-Dependent Not Bank-Dep.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
LevFacJP 11.787 12.150 3.622 4.624 9.017 12.233 4.453 5.526 14.209 10.676 0.836 1.401
(2.43) (2.59) (0.82) (1.08) (2.16) (2.70) (1.09) (1.27) (2.83) (2.00) (0.22) (0.38)
Mkt − Rf −2.110 0.451 2.032 −0.040 −5.218 0.160
(−1.12) (0.22) (0.82) (−0.02) (−2.63) (0.09)
Ann. Risk Premium 3.02 2.94 0.77 0.96 2.32 2.86 0.89 1.03 3.08 1.93 0.26 0.34
TS GRS p-value 0.16 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
MAPE (%) 1.96 1.00 2.33 1.24 2.34 1.25 2.35 1.13 2.13 1.27 2.24 1.34
TS Avg R2 0.20 0.65 0.12 0.62 0.19 0.63 0.09 0.59 0.11 0.68 0.15 0.60
Quarters (T ) 68 68 73 73 79 79 75 75 75 75 79 79
Portfolios (N) 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
Panel B: CapFacJP
Bank Dependence External Finance Bank Beta Long-Term Issuer
Measure
Bank-Dependent Not Bank-Dep. Bank-Dependent Not Bank-Dep. Bank-Dependent Not Bank-Dep.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
CapFacJP −7.459 −7.523 −12.769 −12.776 −9.645 −9.797 −9.204 −9.143 −10.011 −9.178 −7.955 −7.502
(−1.44) (−1.40) (−2.06) (−2.08) (−1.96) (−1.91) (−1.58) (−1.60) (−2.31) (−2.16) (−1.71) (−1.52)
Mkt − Rf −1.941 −3.734 −1.834 −2.445 −4.153 −2.876
(−0.84) (−2.11) (−0.82) (−1.24) (−1.83) (−2.03)
Ann. Risk Premium −2.54 −2.56 −3.53 −4.07 −3.50 −3.71 −2.62 −3.19 −3.87 −3.38 −2.80 −2.46
TS GRS p-value 0.32 0.53 0.02 0.04 0.15 0.20 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.15 0.34 0.55
MAPE (%) 2.37 0.88 2.55 0.97 2.73 0.91 2.33 0.93 2.37 1.10 2.45 1.03
TS Avg R2 0.23 0.66 0.12 0.62 0.24 0.66 0.11 0.57 0.14 0.63 0.16 0.60
Quarters (T ) 55 55 53 53 55 55 55 55 53 53 55 55
Portfolios (N) 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
Table 1.14: Intermediary Asset Pricing of Bank-Dependent Portfolios. Table presents the cross-sectional pricing results for quarterly
portfolios: 25 size-and-book-to-market bank-dependent portfolios and 10 momentum bank-dependent portfolios. Firms are classified as bank dependent
using three bank dependence measures separately, and bank-dependent portfolios are formed of bank-dependent firms. See the text for additional
details on the bank dependence measures and portfolio construction. Not bank-dependent portfolios are formed using the other firms. See the text
for additional details on the bank dependence measures and portfolio construction. The regressions test if a Japanese intermediary factor prices the
portfolios. LevFacJP is the Japanese intermediary leverage factor, and CapFacJP is the Japanese intermediary capital ratio factor. See the text for
additional details on the factors. Coefficients are the price of risk estimates, and GMM t-statistics are reported. Intercept is included in each regression
but omitted from the table. Ann. Risk Premium is the annualized increase in expected risk premium associated with a one standard deviation increase
in the beta to the intermediary factor: σβ × λ. TS GRS p-value is the p-value of the Gibbons–Ross–Shanken test of whether the pricing errors are
jointly zero. MAPE is the mean absolute pricing error. TS Avg R2 is the average time-series R2.
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Bank Dependence Measure External Finance Bank Beta Long-Term Issuer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LevFacpredicted 1.409 0.805 0.737 0.040 1.636 0.732
(1.62) (1.42) (1.21) (0.07) (1.83) (0.84)
Mkt − Rf −3.376 −4.642 −7.172
(−1.38) (−3.32) (−2.77)
Ann. Risk Premium 2.03 1.02 1.45 0.07 2.76 1.16
TS GRS p-value 0.76 0.76 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.15
MAPE (%) 3.12 1.01 3.42 1.11 2.65 1.07
TS Avg R2 0.03 0.66 0.03 0.65 0.02 0.65
Quarters (T ) 65 65 65 65 63 63
Portfolios (N) 35 35 35 35 35 35
Panel B: LevFacresidual
Bank Dependence Measure External Finance Bank Beta Long-Term Issuer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LevFacresidual 10.529 10.415 11.376 13.006 14.320 10.826
(2.22) (2.22) (2.42) (2.69) (2.76) (1.63)
Mkt − Rf −2.583 −0.664 −7.734
(−1.40) (−0.35) (−2.56)
Ann. Risk Premium 2.49 2.30 2.98 3.04 3.32 2.31
TS GRS p-value 0.28 0.31 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.09
MAPE (%) 1.88 0.98 2.11 0.99 2.19 1.23
TS Avg R2 0.22 0.66 0.24 0.65 0.13 0.65
Quarters (T ) 65 65 65 65 63 63
Portfolios (N) 35 35 35 35 35 35
Panel C: LevFacpredicted and LevFacresidual
Bank Dependence Measure External Finance Bank Beta Long-Term Issuer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LevFacpredicted 0.170 0.168 −0.666 −0.674 0.539 0.829
(0.33) (0.33) (−1.15) (−1.16) (0.84) (0.91)
LevFacresidual 9.725 9.706 14.957 15.618 11.570 8.194
(1.88) (1.89) (3.76) (3.62) (2.43) (1.63)
Mkt − Rf −2.431 −1.470 −7.412
(−1.26) (−0.93) (−2.51)
TS GRS p-value 0.66 0.79 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.16
MAPE (%) 3.12 1.01 3.42 1.09 2.76 1.04
TS Avg R2 0.24 0.67 0.27 0.66 0.15 0.66
Quarters (T ) 65 65 65 65 63 63
Porfolios (N) 35 35 35 35 35 35
Table 1.15: Intermediary Asset Pricing of Bank-Dependent Portfolios with Components of LevFacJP.
Table presents the cross-sectional pricing results for quarterly portfolios: 25 size-and-book-to-market bank-dependent
portfolios and 10 momentum bank-dependent portfolios. Firms are classified as bank dependent using three bank
dependence measures separately, and bank-dependent portfolios are formed of bank-dependent firms. See the text for
additional details on the bank dependence measures and portfolio construction. The regressions test if the components
of LevFacJP , the Japanese intermediary leverage factor, price the portfolios. LevFacpredicted is the component correlated
with government risk, and LevFacresidual is the component orthogonal to government risk. See the text for additional
details on the factors. Coefficients are the price of risk estimates, and GMM t-statistics are reported. Intercept is
included in each regression but omitted from the table. Ann. Risk Premium is the annualized increase in expected
risk premium associated with a one standard deviation increase in the beta to the intermediary factor component:
σβ × λ. TS GRS p-value is the p-value of the Gibbons–Ross–Shanken test of whether the pricing errors are jointly
zero. MAPE is the mean absolute pricing error. TS Avg R2 is the average time-series R2.
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Bank Dependence Measure External Finance Bank Beta Long-Term Issuer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CapFacpredicted −2.823 −1.613 −1.476 −0.081 −3.277 −1.467
(−1.62) (−1.42) (−1.21) (−0.07) (−1.83) (−0.84)
Mkt − Rf −3.376 −4.642 −7.172
(−1.38) (−3.32) (−2.77)
Ann. Risk Premium −2.00 −1.01 −1.44 −0.07 −2.71 −1.15
TS GRS p-value 0.67 0.68 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.11
MAPE (%) 2.78 1.00 3.06 1.05 2.50 1.09
TS Avg R2 0.03 0.66 0.03 0.65 0.02 0.65
Quarters (T ) 65 65 65 65 63 63
Portfolios (N) 35 35 35 35 35 35
Panel B: CapFacresidual
Bank Dependence Measure External Finance Bank Beta Long-Term Issuer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CapFacresidual −7.965 −7.868 −10.360 −11.787 −10.177 −8.326
(−1.69) (−1.67) (−2.37) (−2.26) (−2.60) (−2.23)
Mkt − Rf −2.636 −1.005 −6.150
(−1.16) (−0.31) (−1.99)
Ann. Risk Premium −2.70 −2.56 −3.56 −3.66 −3.65 −2.72
TS GRS p-value 0.23 0.27 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.07
MAPE (%) 1.88 1.00 2.11 1.00 2.16 1.25
TS Avg R2 0.18 0.66 0.19 0.65 0.12 0.65
Quarters (T ) 65 65 65 65 63 63
Portfolios (N) 35 35 35 35 35 35
Panel C: CapFacpredicted and CapFacresidual
Bank Dependence Measure External Finance Bank Beta Long-Term Issuer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CapFacpredicted −0.914 −1.094 0.840 0.482 −1.261 −1.169
(−0.74) (−0.87) (0.52) (0.34) (−0.97) (−0.75)
CapFacresidual −6.855 −6.784 −11.675 −11.984 −8.566 −7.555
(−1.44) (−1.41) (−3.00) (−2.63) (−2.62) (−2.27)
Mkt − Rf −1.757 −1.213 −5.553
(−0.87) (−0.51) (−2.12)
TS GRS p-value 0.61 0.69 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.14
MAPE (%) 2.78 0.96 3.06 1.00 2.58 1.04
TS Avg R2 0.21 0.67 0.22 0.66 0.14 0.66
Quarters (T ) 65 65 65 65 63 63
Porfolios (N) 35 35 35 35 35 35
Table 1.16: Intermediary Asset Pricing of Bank-Dependent Portfolios with Components of CapFacJP.
Table presents the cross-sectional pricing results for quarterly portfolios: 25 size-and-book-to-market bank-dependent
portfolios and 10 momentum bank-dependent portfolios. Firms are classified as bank dependent using three bank
dependence measures separately, and bank-dependent portfolios are formed of bank-dependent firms. See the text for
additional details on the bank dependence measures and portfolio construction. The regressions test if the components
of CapFacJP , the Japanese intermediary capital ratio factor, price the portfolios. CapFacpredicted is the component
correlated with government risk, and CapFacresidual is the component orthogonal to government risk. See the text
for additional details on the factors. Coefficients are the price of risk estimates, and GMM t-statistics are reported.
Intercept is included in each regression but omitted from the table. Ann. Risk Premium is the annualized increase
in expected risk premium associated with a one standard deviation increase in the beta to the intermediary factor
component: σβ × λ. TS GRS p-value is the p-value of the Gibbons–Ross–Shanken test of whether the pricing errors
are jointly zero. MAPE is the mean absolute pricing error. TS Avg R2 is the average time-series R2.
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News-Implied Volatility Indexes Risk 1A Long-Short Portfolio Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
GovFac GovFac GovFac GovFac GovFac GovFac GovFac GovFac GovFac


















Constant 1.514∗∗∗ 0.768∗∗∗ 0.670∗∗∗ 0.871∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗
(11.06) (8.57) (9.42) (7.96) (3.34) (3.37) (3.35) (3.52) (3.41)
N 147 147 147 147 160 160 160 160 160
Adj. R2 0.53 0.22 0.32 0.22 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Table 1.17: Correlation of the U.S. Government Risk Factor with Other Government Risk Measures. Table presents time-series
regressions at the monthly level. The dependent variable is the government risk factor. The independent variables are other government risk measures,
including news-implied volatility indexes from Manela and Moreira (2017) and Risk 1A long-short portfolio returns from Ross (2019). t-statistics using
robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Sample All Commercial Banks Top 50 Commercial Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Return Return Return Return
GovFacsynthetic 0.018∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.008∗
(10.40) (7.29) (4.72) (2.52)
GovFacsynthetic × I(WSJ) 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.008
(0.99) (1.32) (0.93) (1.22)
GovFacsynthetic × I(Post) −0.022∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗ −0.024∗
(−5.82) (−6.63) (−2.87) (−2.50)
GovFacsynthetic × I(WSJ) × I(Post) 0.040∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗ 0.037∗∗
(3.29) (3.53) (3.06) (2.62)
I(Post) 0.070∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.068∗ 0.081∗
(5.62) (4.84) (1.96) (2.38)
I(WSJ) 0.000 −0.001 0.005 0.005
(0.01) (−0.15) (0.50) (0.56)
I(WSJ) × I(Post) −0.008 −0.002 0.004 0.001
(−0.56) (−0.15) (0.22) (0.04)






Constant −0.033 0.006 −0.044 0.007
(−0.25) (0.05) (−0.37) (0.07)
N 3,935,268 3,572,187 598,452 598,452
Adj. R2 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.20
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
SIC FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 1.18: Beta of U.S. Commercial Banks to the Synthetic U.S. Government Risk Factor,
Robustness. Table presents time-series regressions at the daily level. The dependent variable is return
in percent. Independent variables are the synthetic U.S. government risk factor, GovFacsynthetic, the
factor interacted with indicator variables, and controls for the indicator variables, the market return, the
bank’s market capitalization, and the bank’s assets. See the text for additional details on GovFacsynthetic.
I(WSJ) = 1 if the bank is one of the 11 banks cited as too big to fail by The WSJ, and 0 otherwise. I(Post) = 1
if the date is after September 20, 1984, and 0 otherwise. t-statistics using robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Panel A: All Commercial Banks
National and State Commercial Banks National Commercial Banks State Commercial Banks
Period Full 4 Year Full 4 Year Full 4 Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
βGovFacsyn. βGovFacsyn. βGovFacsyn. βGovFacsyn. βGovFacsyn. βGovFacsyn.
I(WSJ) −0.545 −7.520∗∗ 0.045 −6.609∗∗ −2.207 −5.522
(−0.84) (−2.88) (0.06) (−3.02) (−1.36) (−0.43)
I(Post) 1.462∗∗ 0.353 1.094 0.341 1.441 0.316
(2.91) (0.50) (1.64) (0.38) (1.87) (0.28)
I(WSJ) × I(Post) 3.820∗∗∗ 13.798∗∗∗ 2.044 13.465∗∗ 9.720∗∗∗ 15.483∗∗
(3.69) (3.72) (1.80) (2.72) (3.92) (2.61)
Constant −1.864 −2.046∗ −1.977 −3.304∗∗ 1.556 −1.496
(−1.45) (−2.02) (−1.47) (−3.17) (1.00) (−1.04)
N 40,966 5,989 21,084 3,492 19,882 2,497
Adj. R2 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.02
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SIC FE Yes Yes N/A N/A N/A N/A
Panel B: Restricted to Large Banks
National and State Commercial Banks National Commercial Banks State Commercial Banks
Period Full 4 Year Full 4 Year Full 4 Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
βGovFacsyn. βGovFacsyn. βGovFacsyn. βGovFacsyn. βGovFacsyn. βGovFacsyn.
I(WSJ) −0.387 −4.342 0.299 −4.106 −3.168 8.853
(−0.55) (−1.74) (0.38) (−1.95) (−1.54) (0.46)
I(Post) 2.262∗∗ 0.098 1.562 0.417 1.826 −0.930
(2.69) (0.08) (1.76) (0.36) (0.86) (−0.28)
I(WSJ) × I(Post) 2.726∗ 12.249∗∗ 1.049 10.956∗ 9.421∗∗ 14.846∗
(2.49) (3.23) (0.88) (2.20) (3.20) (2.20)
Constant −2.525 −1.528 −2.546 −3.181∗ 0.955 1.084
(−1.85) (−1.18) (−1.85) (−2.41) (0.58) (0.25)
N 11,649 2,516 8,783 1,811 2,866 705
Adj. R2 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.05 0.05
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SIC FE Yes Yes N/A N/A N/A N/A
Table 1.19: Difference-in-difference Regression of Synthetic U.S. Government Risk Factor
Betas. Table presents time-series regressions of monthly bank betas. The dependent variable is the bank’s
beta to synthetic U.S. government risk factor, estimated monthly using daily data. Independent variables
are indicator variables and controls for the bank’s monthly market beta, market capitalization, and assets.
I(WSJ) = 1 if the bank is one of the 11 banks cited as too big to fail by The WSJ, and 0 otherwise. I(Post) = 1
if the date is after September 20, 1984, and 0 otherwise. The SIC code identifies national and state commercial
banks. Regression is estimated over the full period and during a window of four years before and four years
after the event date. t-statistics using robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗
p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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National and State Commercial Banks National Commercial Banks State Commercial Banks
Period Full 4 Year Full 4 Year Full 4 Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
βGovFacsyn. βGovFacsyn. βGovFacsyn. βGovFacsyn. βGovFacsyn. βGovFacsyn.
I(WSJ) −0.108 −3.494 0.257 −1.665 −1.820 −19.801∗
(−0.09) (−1.45) (0.34) (−0.72) (−0.79) (−2.02)
I(Post, Placebo) −1.415 −1.210 −1.704 −1.924 −1.531 −0.420
(−0.85) (−1.02) (−1.12) (−1.24) (−0.85) (−0.22)
I(WSJ) × I(Post, Placebo) 3.079∗ 2.486 1.686 5.201 8.319∗∗ 3.805
(2.27) (0.86) (1.48) (1.26) (2.88) (0.83)
Constant −1.866 −1.982∗ −1.978 −3.686∗∗ 1.551 −1.914
(−0.43) (−2.01) (−1.47) (−2.89) (1.00) (−1.67)
N 40,966 5,428 21,084 3,198 19,882 2,230
Adj. R2 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.03
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SIC FE Yes Yes N/A N/A N/A N/A
Table 1.20: Difference-in-difference Regression of Synthetic U.S. Government Risk Factor Betas, Placebo Test of 1 Year Earlier.
Table presents time-series regressions of monthly bank betas. The dependent variable is the bank’s beta to synthetic U.S. government risk factor,
estimated monthly using daily data. Independent variables are indicator variables and controls for the bank’s monthly market beta, market capitalization,
and assets. I(WSJ) = 1 if the bank is one of the 11 banks cited as too big to fail by The WSJ, and 0 otherwise. I(Post, Placebo) = 1 if the date is
after September 20, 1983, and 0 otherwise. The SIC code identifies national and state commercial banks. Regression is estimated over the full period
and during a window of four years before and four years after the event date. t-statistics using robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗
















Constant −12.828∗∗∗ −0.783∗∗∗ 1.986
(−27.29) (−3.69) (1.61)
N 23,117 23,117 23,117
Adj. R2 0.00 0.01 0.04
Table 1.21: Beta Comparision between Large Banks Near the Too Big to Fail Cutoff. Table
presents time-series regressions of monthly bank betas. The dependent variable is the bank’s beta to synthetic
U.S. government risk factor, estimated monthly using daily data. Independent variables are indicator variables
and controls for the bank’s monthly market beta, market capitalization, and assets. I(WSJ) = 1 if the bank
is one of the 11 banks cited as too big to fail by The WSJ, and 0 otherwise. I(Post) = 1 if the date is after
September 20, 1984, and 0 otherwise. Sample is restricted to commercial banks larger than Continental
Illinois and within the largest 25 banks. t-statistics using robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Treatment Group Big Three Autos
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Return Return Return Return Return Return Return Return Return Return
GovFac 0.985∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗ 0.985∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗
(70.53) (8.90) (13.79) (6.42) (14.78) (70.53) (8.78) (13.69) (6.40) (14.75)
GovFac × I(Treated) 1.166∗∗ 1.172∗∗ −0.051 −0.052 0.717∗∗∗ 0.716∗∗∗ 0.153 0.192
(2.59) (2.60) (−0.10) (−0.10) (3.30) (3.29) (0.65) (0.54)
GovFac × I(Post) −0.042 −0.355∗∗∗ −0.044 −0.357∗∗∗
(−1.45) (−10.03) (−1.51) (−10.07)
GovFac × I(Treated) × I(Post) 1.982∗ 1.983∗ 0.982∗∗ 0.938
(2.54) (2.47) (2.61) (1.95)
Constant 0.026∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗
(18.94) (23.58) (7.04) (19.81) (6.38) (18.94) (23.56) (7.04) (19.80) (6.38)
N 10,803,752 10,803,752 10,803,752 10,803,752 10,803,752 10,803,752 10,803,752 10,803,752 10,803,752 10,803,752
Adj. R2 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Year FE No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes
SIC FE No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes
Incl. Treatment Indicator No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No
Incl. Market No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 1.22: Beta of U.S. Auto Companies to the U.S. Government Risk Factor, Robustness. Table presents time-series regressions at
the daily level. The dependent variable is return in percent. Independent variables are the U.S. government risk factor, GovFac, the factor interacted
with indicator variables, and controls for the market return. See the text for additional details on GovFac. I(Treated) is the treatment indicator. In
columns 1 to 5, I(Treated) = 1 if the firm is one of the Big Three automakers, and 0 otherwise. In columns 6 to 10, I(Treated) = 1 if the firm is an
automaker, and 0 otherwise. I(Post) = 1 if the date is after December 19, 2008, and 0 otherwise. t-statistics using robust standard errors are reported
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Figure 1.11: Synthetic U.S. Sovereign CDS Spread. Figure shows the par-equivalent CDS spread,






Beginning in the 1990s, Japanese banks restructured loans to insolvent borrowers—zombie firms—to avoid
recognizing non-performing loans and their associated capital write-down. Banks rolled over loans many
times in an environment of regulatory forbearance, leading to distorted macro outcomes. I show zombies also
affects asset pricing premiums, and correcting for zombie-ness revives momentum in Japan.
Compared to international counterparts, momentum in Japan is viewed as too low. Japan’s low momentum
is a long-cited concern leading some to question whether momentum is more generally a spurious result. I
examine the effect of zombies on Japanese momentum and value five ways.
First, I create zombie-adjusted value and momentum factors and show these premiums fall in line with
global averages. The momentum premium and Sharpe ratio in Japan double when I exclude zombies. Excising
zombies also reduces the value premium toward the global average. Combined, Japanese momentum and
value are consistent with other developed markets’ premiums only after controlling for zombies, and the two
anomalies retain a strong negative correlation.
Second, I use syndicated loan data to identify companies that borrow from forbearance-inclined banks.
Companies that borrow only from forbearance-inclined banks are more likely to have the opportunity to
become zombies. I show that firms with international lead arrangers have value and momentum premiums
near international equity premiums, while firms with more forbearance-inclined lenders have value and
momentum premiums like zombies.
Third, I run cross-sectional pricing tests to show that momentum commands a positive price of risk only
after adjusting for zombies. I construct zombie-adjusted factors in two ways: by controlling for zombies and
by dropping zombies. Firms fail to earn compensation for loading on Japan’s unadjusted momentum factor,
but the zombie-adjusted momentum factor prices Japanese equity portfolios. The factors’ zombie-adjustment
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also helps align portfolios’ returns with betas. Fourth, I show that the zombie-adjusted momentum factor is
not spanned by other factors, including any standard quality factors. Other factors span vanilla momentum
without the zombie adjustment.
Finally, I argue that momentum is low because of zombies’ dependence on regulatory forbearance and
banks. The syndicated loan lending results, an event study, and time-series regressions support the argument.
An event study around four financial institutions’ failures indicates that zombies faced lower abnormal
returns than non-zombies after shocks to the banking system. Time-series regressions demonstrate that
zombies have strong bank beta, and within zombies, zombie losers have particularly high bank beta. When
banks have strong returns, zombie losers also have strong returns, pushing down zombie momentum and
momentum overall. Non-zombie winners and losers have similar bank beta, so good bank returns do not have
a meaningful impact on non-zombie momentum. I show that the best 20 months of bank returns—5.5% of
the sample—account for nearly 40% of the difference between zombie momentum and non-zombie momentum.
The zombie-adjustment also removes the covariance between momentum and government risk.
Section 3.4 describes the data and factor construction. Section 2.3 presents the results. Section 3.6
concludes.
Related Literature
This paper contributes to the literature on zombie credit. In Japan, the lost decade of the 1990s turned into
more than two lost decades because of low productivity growth (Hayashi and Prescott, 2002). Underlying
the productivity problems were zombies. Japanese banks evergreened loans to weak firms to avoid losses on
their bank balance sheets, with more troubled firms more likely to receive bank credit (Peek and Rosengren,
2005). Caballero et al. (2008) show that zombies have negative externalities for healthy firms because zombies
reduce the profits of healthy firms and lower investment and employment growth for non-zombies. Zombies
had large macro effects on Japan’s productivity growth and altered the competitive process.
Zombies are not unique to Japan. Andrews et al. (2017) document an increase of zombie firms in OECD
countries since the mid-2000s, and they show that the zombies’ survival attenuates labor productivity growth.
Banerjee and Hofmann (2018) show a rise of zombies in 14 advanced economies since the late 1980s, and they
attribute the increase to reduced financial pressure in the form of lower interest rates. Acharya et al. (2020)
show how zombie credit has a disinflationary effect by creating excess production capacity, increasing supply,
and lowering prices. Schivardi et al. (2019), Bonfim et al. (2020), and Blattner et al. (2019) show the role of
bank lending relationships to zombie firms in Italy and Portugal.
My paper also adds to the literature on value and momentum. Asness et al. (2013a) find a robust negative
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correlation between value and momentum across many markets and asset classes. The low momentum
effect in Japan leads some to hesitate including momentum in asset pricing models and to question whether
momentum is a spurious result more generally. Asness (2011) shows that the pairing of low momentum with
the strong outperformance of value in Japan highlights the negative covariance of value and momentum in
Japan to explain the poor performance of momentum.
2.2 Data
Japanese Data I use Japanese market data and accounting data from Datastream and Worldscope. The
data cover 1979 to 2018 and consist of the universe of Japanese stocks in Datastream and Worldscope. I
restrict my sample to companies with a book value in the previous six months and at least 12 months of
return history, and I exclude financials (including REITs) and stocks that have a share price less than $1 at
the start of each month.
To compare my results to international value and momentum premiums, I follow Asness et al. (2013a) and
restrict the data to a sample of liquid stocks. Each month, I sort stocks by market capitalization in descending
order. Starting with the largest market capitalization stock, I include all stocks until the cumulative market
capitalization is 90% of the total market capitalization for that month.
Identifying Zombies I identify zombies following Caballero et al. (2008): I compare a firm’s actual interest
payment, Ri,t, to an estimated lower-bound Ri,t. The lower-bound stands for the interest payments a firm i
could expect if it borrowed at no spread to the prime rate at time t:









where Si,t is short-term debt and Li,t is long-term debt, and rst and rt are the Bank of Japan’s short-term
and average long-term prime rates, which reflect the prime lending rate at which principal banks lend.
I construct the interest-rate gap, Xi,t, as the difference between the actual interest payment and the lower




= ri,t − ri,t. (2.2)
In principle, only the highest-quality companies should borrow at effective rates near the prime rate, and most
corporate borrowers would expect to borrow at a nontrivial spread to the prime rate. Following Caballero
59
et al. (2008), I define companies with an interest-rate gap below 0 as crisp zombies, and companies borrowing
near the prime rate—those with an interest-rate gap of 0 to 50 bps—as fuzzy zombies. I lag the interest-rate
gap by six months to match the accounting data lag and ensure the balance sheet data are in the investors’
information set.
Zombies-ness is persistent, and switches from zombie to non-zombie or vice versa occur roughly 1.5% of
the time. The interest-rate gap is uncorrelated with firm size. Before removing small and illiquid stocks to
restrict the sample to a liquid sample, size has a correlation of −0.1% with the interest-rate gap, a correlation
of 4.8% with an indicator for crisp zombie, and a correlation of 3.8% with an indicator for crisp or fuzzy
zombie. Cleaning the dataset to the liquid set of stocks increases the share of zombies from 20% to 48%.
Value and Momentum Premium and Strategy Factors Value and momentum premium and strategy
factors are created using sorts based on the underlying signals. For value, I use the ratio of the book value of
equity to the market value of equity, where I lag book value by six months. For momentum, I sort based
on the past 12-month cumulative return, with the most recent month skipped to account for the 1-month
short-term reversal. I construct premium and strategy factors in the same way as Asness et al. (2013a).
The value premium factor is constructed by sorting the liquid set of stocks into three equal-sized groups
(called High, Middle, and Low) based on book-to-market. The value premium is the value-weighted return of
the High portfolio minus the Low portfolio. The momentum premium is created analogously, sorting based
on past return rather than book-to-market.
The strategy factors use zero-cost, signal-weighted portfolios, which dampens the impact of outliers. The

















where the weights sum to zero for each period and ct is a scaling factor to make the portfolio scaled to one
dollar long and one dollar short.
Zombie-Adjusted Value and Momentum Factors I adjust the standard value and momentum factors,
HML and WML, to account for zombies. I create HMLZA and WMLZA, the zombie-adjusted factors, in
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two ways: first, by dropping zombies from the sample before forming the factors using the conventional
method; and second, by triple-sorting to control for zombie-ness. Each of the zombie-adjusted factors can be
constructed with zombies as crisp and fuzzy varieties or as crisp zombies alone. Either process yields similar
asset pricing results.
First, I drop zombies from the sample and split the data into equal groups by value (High, Middle,
Low) and size (Small, Big). I construct six double-sorted portfolios: High/Big, High/Small, Middle/Big,
Middle/Small, Low/Big, Low/Small. I use the portfolio returns to calculate the zombie-adjusted value factor






I construct WMLZA using the same method. After dropping zombies, the data are split into equal groups by
past returns (Winner, Middle, Loser) and size (Small, Big). I form six double-sorted portfolios and calculate






Second, I keep zombies in the data and control for them in the factor creation. I sort the data into equal
groups by value (H, M, L), momentum (W, M, L), size (S, B), and zombie-ness (Z, N). I form triple-sorted
portfolios using the value, size, and zombie-ness sorts; and I form triple-sorted portfolios using the momentum,
size, and zombie-ness sorts. I use the triple-sorted portfolios to construct the zombie-adjusted factors:
HMLZA =
H/S/Z + H/S/N + H/B/Z + H/B/N
4 −





W/S/Z +W/S/N +W/B/Z +W/B/N
4 −
L/S/Z + L/S/N + L/B/Z + L/B/N
4 .
(2.8)
Syndicated Loans Data I use data from Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC) Dealscan, which has data on
Japanese firms’ syndicated loans beginning in 1988, to establish lending relationships between banks and
borrowers. I match the Datastream tickers to Compustat data using ISIN, and I link the Compustat data to
Dealscan data using the Roberts Dealscan-Compustat Linking Database, which links the data at the facility,
or loan tranche, level. The method matches 38% of Japanese loans to a specific Datastream ticker, and 59%
of my liquid Datastream data has at least one syndicated loan.
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I use the Dealscan data to classify the lead arranger for each loan, and I sort my data based on firms with
only Japanese lead arrangers and firms that have international lead arrangers. There are multiple syndicated
loans for many firms, and I consider the Japanese borrower-lender relationship to start from the earliest
syndicated loan date and calculate value and momentum for firms with only Japanese lead arrangers. Over
the same period, I calculate value and momentum for firms that have international lead arrangers.
I also classify firms with capital injection lead arrangers based on the earliest syndicated loan date, and I
calculate value and momentum for those firms and all the remaining firms over the same period.
2.3 Results
In Japan, zombies are widespread, value is high, and momentum is low. I show that zombies impact Japanese
value and momentum in five ways. First, adjusting for zombies transforms the Japanese premiums to look
more similar to global value and momentum premiums. Second, syndicated loan lending relationships show
that firms with forbearance-inclined lenders have value and momentum premiums like zombies. Firms
with less forbearance-inclined bank lenders have value and momentum premiums near international equity
premiums. Third, cross-sectional asset pricing tests indicate that momentum earns a positive price of risk
only after adjusting for zombies. Fourth, I show that a momentum factor is unspanned only after adjusting
for zombies. Last, I argue that regulatory forbearance and the relationship between zombies and their bank
lenders drive low momentum using event studies and time-series regressions.
2.3.1 Zombie-Adjusted Value and Momentum
Table 2.1 shows the returns to the value and momentum premiums and the signal-weighted strategies,
calculated separately for the full dataset of liquid stocks and with zombies removed. All returns are in
annualized terms.1 In the full data, Japan’s momentum premium is 0.96%, and the value premium is
11.45%. The value premium and strategy are statistically significant, while the momentum counterparts are
statistically indistinguishable from zero.
Removing crisp zombies doubles the momentum premium and Sharpe ratio and nearly doubles the
momentum strategy return and Sharpe ratio. Momentum grows even more after dropping both crisp and
fuzzy zombies. Value, in turn, decreases with zombies removed. The premiums maintain their strong negative
correlation even after removing zombies.2
Japan’s anomalies line up with the global average after I control for zombies. Table 2.2 compares value
1See Section 3.4 for details on signal-weighted strategy construction.
2See Appendix 2.7.1 for additional details.
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and momentum in Japan to the premiums and strategies abroad. The Global Average is the equal-weighted
mean of the premium and strategy in the U.S., the U.K., and continental Europe; the Global Stocks row
shows the value and momentum strategy factors as calculated by Asness et al. (2013a). Momentum jumps
from about 10% of the global numbers to 40% when adjusting for zombies. Value also moves closer to global
figures, declining from more than three times the global average. Figure 2.1 shows this graphically. Value
in Japan is exceptionally large, while momentum is exceptionally low, both in average returns and Sharpe
ratios. The asset pricing premiums place Japan in the bottom-right of the graph for both the premium and
strategy. All the other countries are above the 45-degree line, meaning that momentum exceeds value. After
adjusting for zombies, Japan’s strategy and premium factors move toward the 45-degree line.
2.3.2 Syndicated Loan Lending Relationships
Zombies arise from regulatory forbearance in Japan, so zombies’ subsidized credit should come from Japanese
lenders. International lenders like U.S.-based J.P. Morgan have neither the incentive nor the implicit
government support to lend at subsidized rates to Japanese firms. Thus, comparing firms with only Japanese
lenders to firms with international lenders classifies firms using a related but distinct zombie-ness measure.
Using syndicated loan data, I classify firms by their lending relationships. I find that firms with forbearance-
inclined lenders drive Japan’s high value and low momentum premiums.
Syndicated loans are large loans provided by a group of lenders. Typically, one bank is the lead arranger;
that bank is often the largest lender in the group and plays a leading role in negotiating the contract. I sort
my data based on firms with only Japanese lead arrangers and firms with international lead arrangers and
calculate the value and momentum premiums for those companies.3 Separately, I identify firms that borrowed
from one of the 21 financial institutions that received capital injections from the Japanese government in
March 1998 based on the Financial Function Stabilization Act.4 I expect that banks that needed capital
injections were those most likely to forbear on their loans.
Table 2.3 shows the value and momentum premium for these subsets. Firms with only Japanese lead
arrangers have negative momentum, and value is double the global average. In contrast, firms with international
lead arrangers have a momentum Sharpe ratio of more than quadruple the full-sample premium. Classifying
firms based on their lead arrangers’ capital injection status gives comparable results: firms without capital
injections, who presumably have less forbearance, have lower value and higher momentum.
3See Section 3.4 for data details.
4These 21 capital injections totaled 1.8 trillion, with most of the banks taking 100 billion in subordinated debt, the
amount the healthiest bank (Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi) was willing to take. But this amount was “far less" than the amount
needed to restore capital for most banks (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010), and there was price discrimination with each bank having a
different interest rate.
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2.3.3 Zombie-Adjusted Cross-Sectional Pricing
I show that a zombie-adjusted momentum factor helps explain the cross-section of expected returns for
Japanese equity portfolios. I adjust the standard value and momentum factors, HML and WML, to account
for zombies in two ways. First, I create zombie-adjusted factors HMLZA and WMLZA by dropping zombies
from the sample before forming the factors using the conventional method. Second, I triple-sort to control for
zombie-ness.5
I calculate the price of risk for a risk factor using the portfolio returns and a two-step procedure. First, I
estimate each portfolio i’s beta to the risk factor using time-series regressions of each portfolio’s excess return
on the factor:
Rei,t = αi + β′i,f ft + εi,t, i = 1, . . . , N, t = 1, . . . , T, (2.9)
where ft is a vector of risk factors. Then I run a cross-sectional regression of portfolio excess returns on the
betas estimated in Equation 2.9:
E[Rei,t] = λ0 + β̂′i,f λf + ξi, i = 1, . . . , N. (2.10)
I use the two-step procedure and f = [Mkt −Rf , SMB, HML, WML] or f = [Mkt −Rf , SMB, HMLZA, WMLZA]
to calculate the factors’ prices of risk. The regressions begin in November 1990, the first observation for
WML in Japan.
Table 2.4 shows the prices of risk from cross-sectional regressions of 25 size-and-book-to-market portfolios
in Japan. The first three columns use unadjusted factors. Column 1 is CAPM; column 2 is the Fama–French
3-factor model; column 3 is the Carhart 4-factor model, which includes momentum, WML. The results with
the unadjusted factors show that momentum does not have a significant price of risk. I use zombie-adjusted
factors HMLZA and WMLZA in the remaining columns. In columns 4 to 7, I remove zombies to construct
the factors, and in columns 8 to 11, I triple-sort zombies to construct the factors.
Adjusting for zombies recovers compensation for momentum risk. The price of risk for WMLZA is positive
and significant in the cross-sectional regressions. The time-series results are similar for the Fama–French
factors and the zombie-adjusted factors. The mean average pricing errors are similar, and the GRS p-values
tend to be large and fail to reject the null that the alphas are jointly zero; thus, in both cases, we fail to
reject the model.
Adjusting for zombies aligns the portfolios’ average excess returns with the portfolios’ betas to value and
5See Section 3.4 for details.
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momentum factors. Figure 2.2 shows the portfolios’ betas to value and momentum factors. The betas to
the Fama–French momentum factor fluctuate only slightly between portfolios, even though the portfolios’
expected returns vary substantially. Betas to zombie-adjusted factors appear to capture the variation: the
betas monotonically increase, moving from growth to value stocks within a size group. If the price of risk is
positive and constant, as estimated in cross-sectional regressions, the betas should vary as expected returns
increase. The zombie adjustment slightly dampens value betas.
Figure 2.3 plots the portfolios’ betas to the momentum and value factors against the portfolios’ average
excess returns. The betas to the zombie-adjusted momentum factor line up better with expected returns. The
slope is statistically indistinguishable from zero using the Fama–French momentum factor WML to calculate
the portfolios’ betas. But the betas to WMLZA have a significantly positive slope.6
2.3.4 Spanning Tests
Spanning tests show whether a factor’s economic content is contained in a linear combination of other factors.
Table 2.5 shows the factor spanning tests. Each row of the table is a separate regression. Panel A shows the
spanning tests for the unadjusted Fama–French factors. The results show that other factors span momentum,
implying that momentum does not need to be included in the model. Panel B uses zombie-adjusted factors
HMLZA and WMLZA, constructed by dropping crisp zombies. Panel C drops crisp and fuzzy zombies. Panel
D uses the triple-sort method discussed in Section 3.4 and controls for crisp zombies, and Panel E triple-sorts
crisp and fuzzy zombies.
The significant intercept on WMLZA in all four panels shows that other factors do not span zombie-
adjusted momentum, and the results support the inclusion of momentum in the model. The spanning tests
also highlight the negative covariance between value and momentum: the zombie adjustment does not affect
the negative covariance between value and momentum.
Quality Caballero et al. (2008) classify zombie firms based on their interest-rate gap rather than by
operating characteristics like productivity or profitability metrics. They show that zombies tend to be low
productivity firms. I show that common quality factors in Japan do not span zombie-adjusted factors.
Table 2.6 adds the three Japanese quality factors—RMW (Robust Minus Weak), QMJ (Quality Minus
Junk) and BAB (Betting Against Beta)—individually to the spanning tests. The table shows intercepts and
t-statistics from a regression of the labeled factor on the other four factors in the panel and column. For
example, the first coefficient is the intercept from the regression of the market factor on SMB, HML, WML,
and RMW . The last coefficient is the intercept from the regression of BAB on the market factor, SMB,
6The slope is significant regardless of whether I drop zombies or triple-sort zombies in the construction of WMLZA.
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HMLZA, and WMLZA, where HMLZA and WMLZA are constructed by triple-sorting crisp and fuzzy zombies.
Panel A shows that the other factors span the unadjusted Japanese momentum factor. Panels B, C, D, and
E use different forms of the zombie-adjusted value and momentum factors to show that zombie-adjusted
momentum, WMLZA, is not spanned by quality.
The results show that controlling for quality does not change the spanning results. Controlling for zombies
is not just a reincarnation of controlling for the quality or profitability anomaly.
2.3.5 Zombie Lending Drives Low Momentum
In this section, I argue that the relationship between zombies and their bank lenders drives low momentum
and high value in Japan. The syndicated loan results in Section 2.3.2—which shows that firms with
forbearance-inclined lenders drive Japan’s high value and low momentum premiums—also support this
argument.
An event study shows that zombies have lower returns than non-zombies after a shock to the banking
system. Zombies have a higher bank beta than non-zombies, and zombie losers have particularly high bank
beta. When banks have high returns, zombie losers have high returns, driving down momentum for zombies
and overall. I find that the best 20 months of bank returns—5.5% of the sample—account for nearly 40% of
the difference between zombie momentum and non-zombie momentum.
Event Study I compare cumulative abnormal returns of zombies and non-zombies in November 1997, the
beginning of the “acute phase” of Japan’s lost two decades and a period associated with tighter credit (Hoshi
and Kashyap, 2010). During the month, four financial institutions unexpectedly failed. Like all panics, the
panics after the failures in November 1997 were abrupt and unexpected (Nakaso, 2001).
On November 3, Sanyo Securities, a mid-sized brokerage firm with $25 billion in assets, filed for bankruptcy.
The event immediately disrupted the domestic interbank market, in which Sanyo Securities was a borrower,
and they defaulted on 8.3 billion of unsecured funding. Although the amount was small compared to the
market’s turnover, it was the first loan default in Japan’s interbank market history, and this paralyzed the
interbank market (Nakaso, 2001). The Japan premium—the spread between the 3-month Eurodollar Tokyo
Interbank Borrowing Rate and Libor—spiked. Two weeks later, Japan’s tenth largest bank failed, and on
November 24, Yamaichi Securities, one of Japan’s four major securities dealers, abruptly failed (Nakaso,
2001). On November 26, Tokuyo City Bank failed, and market participants began to speculate about other
regional banks’ collapse. Many viewed November 26 as the day Japan’s financial system was closest to a
systemic collapse (Nakaso, 2001). Ultimately, the panic abated after the Finance Minister and the Governor
of the Bank of Japan issued a joint statement that reaffirmed their “strong will to fulfill the commitment to
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ensure the stability of interbank transactions as well as to fully protect deposits.”
I study cumulative abnormal returns compared to a CAPM model. I use daily data before November 3,
1997, and regress the return of each firm i on the market return:
Ri,t = αi + βi(Rm,t − Rf,t) + εi,t. (2.11)
I use the estimated coefficients to calculate each firm’s predicted returns, R̂i,t, and I calculate the abnormal
return, ARi,t, as the difference between the realized and predicted return:
ARi,t = Ri,t − R̂i,t. (2.12)
Figure 2.4 shows the cumulative abnormal returns for zombie and non-zombie firms over November 1997.
I sort firms into five equal groups using the interest-rate gap, and I calculate the value-weighted cumulative
abnormal return for the zombie and non-zombie groups. After each of the four events, the zombies earned
lower cumulative abnormal returns than non-zombies.
Sorting firms based on industry, a related but distinct measure of zombie-ness, generates a similar
result. Caballero et al. (2008) find that the manufacturing industry has a lower incidence of zombies than
construction, real estate, wholesale and retail, and services industries since manufacturing firms face more
global competition than non-manufacturing firms. Thus, a firm’s industry is a measure of zombie-ness that
does not rely on the balance sheet data used to calculate the interest-rate gap.
Figure 2.5 shows that non-manufacturing firms—which are more likely to be zombies—saw large negative
cumulative abnormal returns over November 1997. Meanwhile, manufacturing firms’ returns align with
market returns.7 Appendix 2.7.2 shows similar results in Europe. Around negative financial news, European
zombies have large negative cumulative abnormal returns relative to non-zombies.
Zombie Bank Beta Zombies have a higher bank beta than non-zombies. Bank distress translates to
concern about zombie firms’ underlying funding and has a differential effect between zombie and non-zombies
returns.
I sort firms into five equal-sized groups based on the interest-rate gap and construct daily value-weighted
portfolios. The non-zombie portfolio consists of firms with the largest interest-rate gaps, and firms in the
zombie portfolio have the most negative interest-rate gaps. Table 2.7 regresses the portfolio returns on daily
7Datastream does not classify firms into similar industry groups as Caballero et al. (2008), so I hand-classify the manufacturing
and non-manufacturing groups. The left panel of Figure 2.5 shows value-weighted cumulative abnormal returns for two groups:
manufacturing companies and companies in the construction, retailer, and services industries, which leaves some firms unclassified.
In the right panel, I classify the remaining firms. I match the group based on which industry descriptor best fits—for example, I
place “Media Agencies” into the non-manufacturing group.
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bank returns. When banks have weak returns, or weak returns relative to the market, zombies also have
lower returns.8 Appendix 2.7.2 shows similar results in Europe.
Zombie Losers’ High Bank Beta Drives Low Momentum There is also a differential bank beta
within zombies: zombie losers have a higher bank beta than zombie winners. When banks have strong returns,
zombie losers have outsized returns, driving down zombie momentum. Non-zombies winners and losers have
similar bank beta, so non-zombie momentum is not affected by strong bank returns.
I study the difference between zombie and non-zombie momentum:
MomDiff = Zombie Momentum − Non-zombie Momentum
= (Zombie Winners − Zombie Losers) − (Non-zombie Winners − Non-zombie Losers).
(2.13)
I classify zombie and non-zombie winners and losers using the same breakpoints (the full data’s cutoffs).
In this way, the overall momentum series combines value-weighted zombie and non-zombie momentum. Table
2.8 shows the regression of each value-weighted leg on bank returns. Zombie losers have the highest bank
beta and have the best performance when banks outperform relative to the market. Table 2.9 shows that
zombie losers have the strongest returns on top bank return months, leading zombie momentum to perform
poorly and the gap between zombie and non-zombie momentum to widen.
Figure 2.6 shows the cumulative difference between zombie and non-zombie momentum returns and the
cumulative difference in the 20 months with the largest bank returns. Figure 2.7 plots the contribution of the
20 months to the overall difference. The results show that the top 20 months, which constitute 5.5% of the
sample, contribute over 40% of the difference between zombie momentum and non-zombie momentum.
Momentum and Government Risk The existence of zombies depends on the ability of banks to continue
providing subsidized credit. Zombies ultimately rely on the government to continue allowing banks to forbear
on zombies’ loans. I show that momentum loads on the government risk from Ross (2021).
Adjusting for zombies removes the factor’s dependence on the government’s constraints. Figure 2.8
shows each momentum factor’s beta to the government risk factor from a regression with controls for the
market, size, and value factors. Once the momentum factor is adjusted for zombies—either by dropping
crisp zombies, dropping crisp and fuzzy zombies, triple-sorting crisp zombies, or triple-sorting crisp and fuzzy
zombies—momentum no longer loads on government risk.
8I use the Nikkei 225 returns for the market return. For the daily Japanese bank return, I use a value-weighted return of all
Japanese stocks in Datastream in the industry “Banks”. All daily returns are in log terms.
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2.4 Conclusion
I show that the effects of regulatory forbearance confound asset pricing premiums in Japan. After controlling
for zombies, value and momentum look more similar to value and momentum internationally. Japanese
momentum is very low without controlling for zombies because zombie losers’ high bank beta leads to declines
in zombie momentum in months with strong bank returns.
Ultimately, zombies are about optimal bank policy when facing crises and lending. In the recovery stage
of a crisis, banks must provide credit, and it is critical that the funding supports productive firms rather
than insolvent firms that would be unable to survive without subsidized credit. Failing to allocate credit to
the appropriate firms has broad implications for both productivity and asset prices.
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2.5 Tables
Dataset Full Data Drop Drop Random Random
Crisp Crisp + Fuzzy Half Other Half
Zombies Zombies
Value Premium
Mean 11.45 10.15 8.02 10.87 12.15
(t-statistic) (4.46) (3.87) (2.97) (3.83) (4.63)
Standard Deviation 15.24 15.63 16.27 16.89 15.49
Sharpe Ratio 0.75 0.65 0.49 0.64 0.78
Value Strategy
Mean 9.57 9.09 7.76 9.37 9.31
(t-statistic) (4.17) (3.63) (2.97) (4.09) (3.72)
Standard Deviation 13.74 15.00 15.74 13.71 14.97
Sharpe Ratio 0.70 0.61 0.49 0.68 0.62
Momentum Premium
Mean 0.96 2.73 2.82 0.42 1.99
(t-statistic) (0.31) (0.84) (0.86) (0.12) (0.65)
Standard Deviation 19.17 19.94 20.29 21.08 18.78
Sharpe Ratio 0.05 0.14 0.14 0.02 0.11
Momentum Strategy
Mean 0.93 1.81 2.94 0.66 1.16
(t-statistic) (0.35) (0.66) (1.04) (0.24) (0.42)
Standard Deviation 16.66 17.08 17.31 16.92 17.28
Sharpe Ratio 0.06 0.11 0.17 0.04 0.07
Table 2.1: Value and Momentum in Japan. Table presents the average return, t-statistic of the average return, the standard deviation of returns,
and the Sharpe ratio for the value premium, value strategy, momentum premium, and momentum strategy factors. Statistics are computed from
monthly returns and reported as annualized numbers. See the text for details on the factors’ construction.
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Mean Sharpe Ratio
Value Momentum Value Momentum Value Momentum Value Momentum
Premium Premium Strategy Strategy Premium Premium Strategy Strategy
International
U.S. 1.16 3.71 2.37 5.89 0.10 0.25 0.16 0.36
Europe 3.07 5.50 2.84 7.43 0.28 0.38 0.28 0.56
U.K. 3.73 8.20 4.02 9.65 0.28 0.51 0.29 0.61
Global Average 2.66 5.80 3.08 7.66 0.22 0.38 0.24 0.51
Global Factor 4.21 6.14 0.39 0.50
Japan
Full Data 10.96 0.64 9.66 0.59 0.59 0.05 0.63 0.10
Drop Crisp Zombies 9.59 2.50 9.16 1.51 0.60 0.12 0.60 0.09
Drop Crisp and Fuzzy Zombies 7.36 2.60 7.75 2.69 0.45 0.13 0.48 0.15
Japan vs. International
Ratio (relative to Global Average)
Full Data 4.13× 0.11× 3.14× 0.08× 2.67× 0.14× 2.61× 0.20×
Drop Crisp Zombies 3.61× 0.43× 2.98× 0.20× 2.74× 0.33× 2.49× 0.17×
Drop Crisp and Fuzzy Zombies 2.77× 0.45× 2.52× 0.35× 2.02× 0.33× 2.01× 0.30×
Ratio (relative to Global Factor)
Full Data 2.29× 0.10× 1.61× 0.20×
Drop Crisp Zombies 2.17× 0.25× 1.53× 0.18×
Drop Crisp and Fuzzy Zombies 1.84× 0.44× 1.23× 0.31×
Table 2.2: Global Comparison of Value and Momentum. Table presents the average return in percent and the Sharpe ratio for the value
premium, value strategy, momentum premium, and momentum strategy factors internationally. Japan’s factors are calculated with crisp zombies
removed and crisp and fuzzy zombies removed. International data are from the AQR website, including the Global Average (calculated as the
equal-weighted average of the U.S., the U.K., and Europe premiums or strategies) and the Global Strategy Factor. Ratios are calculated as the Japan
statistics divided by the Global Average or the Global Factor. Statistics are computed from monthly returns and reported as annualized numbers. See
the text for details on the factors’ construction.
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Dataset Full Data Firms with Firms with Firms with Firms without
Only Japanese International Capital Injection Capital Injection
Lead Arrangers Lead Arrangers Lead Arrangers Lead Arrangers
Value Premium
Mean 6.61 16.84 6.37 14.20 3.30
(t-statistic) (1.78) (3.66) (1.57) (3.44) (0.79)
Standard Deviation 15.89 18.92 17.36 17.15 18.13
Sharpe Ratio 0.42 0.89 0.37 0.83 0.18
Momentum Premium
Mean 0.79 −4.68 4.30 −1.35 3.98
(t-statistic) (0.20) (−1.01) (0.95) (−0.34) (0.95)
Standard Deviation 17.29 21.01 19.62 17.92 18.15
Sharpe Ratio 0.05 −0.22 0.22 −0.08 0.22
Table 2.3: Value and Momentum for Japanese Firms Classified by Syndicated Loan Lending Relationships. Table presents the average
return in percent, t-statistic of the average return, the standard deviation of returns, and the Sharpe ratio for the value premium, value strategy,
momentum premium, and momentum strategy factors. Statistics are calculated separately for firms in the full liquid sample from Asness et al. (2013a),
for firms with only Japanese lead arrangers, firms with international lead arrangers, firms with capital injection lead arrangers, and firms without
capital injection lead arrangers. Statistics are computed from monthly returns and reported as annualized numbers. See the text for details on the
samples and factors’ construction.
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Prices of Risk: E[Re
i,t




Drop Drop Triple-Sort Triple-Sort
Unadjusted Factors Crisp Crisp + Fuzzy Crisp Crisp + Fuzzy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Intercept 0.205 −0.397 −0.093 −0.533 0.125 −0.628 0.050 −0.534 −0.110 −0.536 −0.041
(0.27) (−0.64) (−0.15) (−0.80) (0.20) (−0.91) (0.08) (−0.81) (−0.17) (−0.81) (−0.06)
(0.27) (−0.61) (−0.14) (−0.77) (0.17) (−0.87) (0.06) (−0.77) (−0.15) (−0.77) (−0.06)
Mkt − Rf −0.012 0.461 0.181 0.592 −0.012 0.688 0.067 0.591 0.196 0.592 0.132
(−0.01) (0.67) (0.26) (0.81) (−0.02) (0.92) (0.09) (0.82) (0.27) (0.82) (0.19)
(−0.01) (0.64) (0.25) (0.79) (−0.01) (0.88) (0.08) (0.79) (0.25) (0.78) (0.17)
SMB 0.185 0.186 0.176 0.182 0.175 0.179 0.180 0.194 0.178 0.191
(1.02) (1.03) (0.97) (1.00) (0.97) (0.99) (1.00) (1.07) (0.98) (1.05)







HMLZA 0.628 −0.245 0.703 −0.214 0.554 −0.046 0.560 −0.085
(1.81) (−0.67) (1.82) (−0.54) (1.95) (−0.14) (1.92) (−0.26)
(1.75) (−0.65) (1.75) (−0.50) (1.88) (−0.13) (1.85) (−0.24)
WMLZA 1.689 1.882 1.217 1.345
(2.58) (2.71) (1.76) (1.98)
(2.33) (2.38) (1.59) (1.78)
Ann. Risk Premium (σβ × λ) 0.43 2.32 2.16 1.73 1.86
TS GRS p-value 0.12 0.16 0.20 0.10 0.07 0.17 0.31 0.08 0.02 0.10 0.05
MAPE (%) 0.16 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.14
TS Avg R2 0.77 0.92 0.93 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
Quarters (T ) 332 332 332 332 332 332 332 332 332 332 332
Portfolios (N) 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Table 2.4: Cross-Sectional Regressions with Zombie-Adjusted Factors. Table presents the cross-sectional pricing results for the 25 Fama–
French monthly portfolios, which are double-sorted on size and book-to-market. The regressions test if the portfolios are priced by the Japanese
Fama–French factors and zombie-adjusted factors, which are adjusted by dropping crisp zombies, dropping crisp and fuzzy zombies, triple-sorting crisp
zombies, and triple-sorting crisp and fuzzy zombies. See the text for additional details on the factors. Coefficients are the price of risk estimates, and
Fama–MacBeth and GMM t-statistics are reported. Intercept is included in each regression but omitted from the table. Ann. Risk Premium (σβ × λ)
is the annualized increase in expected risk premium associated with a one standard deviation increase in the portfolio’s beta to the momentum factor.
TS GRS p-value is the p-value of the Gibbons–Ross–Shanken test of whether the pricing errors are jointly zero. MAPE is the mean absolute pricing
error. TS Avg R2 is the average time-series R2.
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Panel A: Fama–French Factors
Intercept Mkt − Rf SMB HML WML
Mkt − Rf 0.251 0.173 −0.453 −0.280
(0.86) (1.91) (−4.36) (−4.11)
SMB 0.099 0.064 0.119 −0.039
(0.56) (1.91) (1.84) (−0.91)
HML 0.335 −0.121 0.086 −0.200
(2.24) (−4.36) (1.84) (−5.81)
WML 0.281 −0.175 −0.065 −0.466
(1.23) (−4.11) (−0.91) (−5.81)
Panel B: Zombie-Adjusted Factors, Drop Crisp Zombies
Intercept Mkt − Rf SMB HMLZA WMLZA
Mkt − Rf 0.446 0.146 −0.408 −0.354
(1.48) (1.61) (−4.47) (−4.15)
SMB 0.157 0.054 −0.015 −0.050
(0.85) (1.61) (−0.26) (−0.94)
HMLZA 0.847 −0.141 −0.014 −0.661
(4.93) (−4.47) (−0.26) (−18.30)
WMLZA 0.797 −0.141 −0.054 −0.764
(4.28) (−4.15) (−0.94) (−18.30)
Panel C: Zombie-Adjusted Factors, Drop Crisp and Fuzzy Zombies
Intercept Mkt − Rf SMB HMLZA WMLZA
Mkt − Rf 0.370 0.152 −0.376 −0.317
(1.24) (1.68) (−4.55) (−3.88)
SMB 0.148 0.056 −0.005 −0.039
(0.82) (1.68) (−0.10) (−0.77)
HMLZA 0.730 −0.157 −0.006 −0.684
(3.86) (−4.55) (−0.10) (−17.65)
WMLZA 0.695 −0.138 −0.046 −0.712
(3.59) (−3.88) (−0.77) (−17.65)
Panel D: Zombie-Adjusted Factors, Triple-Sort Crisp Zombies
Intercept Mkt − Rf SMB HMLZA WMLZA
Mkt − Rf 0.502 0.169 −0.504 −0.427
(1.69) (1.89) (−5.30) (−5.11)
SMB 0.082 0.064 0.071 −0.015
(0.45) (1.89) (1.17) (−0.29)
HMLZA 0.814 −0.156 0.058 −0.578
(5.09) (−0.53) (1.17) (−15.87)
WMLZA 0.693 −0.173 −0.016 −0.752
(3.73) (−5.11) (−0.29) (−15.87)
Panel E: Zombie-Adjusted Factors, Triple-Sort Crisp and Fuzzy Zombies
Intercept Mkt − Rf SMB HMLZA WMLZA
Mkt − Rf 0.484 0.163 −0.501 −0.417
(1.63) (1.82) (−5.33) (−5.01)
SMB 0.102 0.062 0.052 −0.024
(0.56) (1.82) (0.86) (−0.45)
HMLZA 0.773 −0.159 0.043 −0.587
(4.77) (−5.33) (0.86) (−16.21)
WMLZA 0.691 −0.171 −0.026 −0.757
(3.71) (−5.01) (−0.45) (−16.21)
Table 2.5: Spanning Tests for Zombie-Adjusted Factors. Table presents time-series regressions at the
monthly level. The regressions test if each factor is spanned by other factors. Panel A uses the Fama–French
factors. Panels B, C, D, and E use the zombie-adjusted factors HMLZA and WMLZA, created by dropping
crisp zombies, dropping crisp and fuzzy zombies, triple-sorting crisp zombies, and triple-sorting crisp and
fuzzy zombies. t-statistics using robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Panel A: Fama–French Factors
Intercept Intercept Intercept
Mkt − Rf 0.416 Mkt − Rf 0.574 Mkt − Rf 0.252
(1.49) (2.43) (0.86)
SMB 0.148 SMB 0.245 SMB 0.027
(0.83) (1.39) (0.16)
HML 0.405 HML 0.451 HML 0.337
(2.92) (2.87) (2.25)
WML 0.194 WML 0.196 WML 0.171
(0.85) (0.82) (0.77)
RMW 0.225 QMJ 0.376 BAB 0.280
(2.24) (2.90) (1.32)
Panel B: Zombie-Adjusted Factors, Drop Crisp Zombies
Intercept Intercept Intercept
Mkt − Rf 0.687 Mkt − Rf 0.745 Mkt − Rf 0.478
(2.38) (3.14) (1.58)
SMB 0.253 SMB 0.309 SMB 0.061
(1.38) (1.70) (0.34)
HMLZA 0.918 HMLZA 0.932 HMLZA 0.873
(5.76) (5.18) (5.11)
WMLZA 0.844 WMLZA 0.823 WMLZA 0.766
(4.49) (4.10) (4.09)
RMW 0.321 QMJ 0.474 BAB 0.392
(3.09) (3.53) (1.76)
Panel C: Zombie-Adjusted Factors, Drop Crisp and Fuzzy Zombies
Intercept Intercept Intercept
Mkt − Rf 0.556 Mkt − Rf 0.615 Mkt − Rf 0.393
(1.95) (2.62) (1.31)
SMB 0.222 SMB 0.277 SMB 0.071
(1.23) (1.56) (0.40)
HMLZA 0.797 HMLZA 0.741 HMLZA 0.746
(4.48) (3.69) (3.94)
WMLZA 0.717 WMLZA 0.671 WMLZA 0.655
(3.68) (3.20) (3.38)
RMW 0.257 QMJ 0.396 BAB 0.315
(2.47) (2.93) (1.42)
Panel D: Zombie-Adjusted Factors, Triple-Sort Crisp Zombies
Intercept Intercept Intercept
Mkt − Rf 0.749 Mkt − Rf 0.793 Mkt − Rf 0.524
(2.64) (3.36) (1.76)
SMB 0.166 SMB 0.230 SMB −0.012
(0.90) (1.27) (−0.07)
HMLZA 0.889 HMLZA 0.892 HMLZA 0.834
(5.97) (5.29) (5.21)
WMLZA 0.735 WMLZA 0.671 WMLZA 0.627
(3.91) (3.32) (3.38)
RMW 0.343 QMJ 0.483 BAB 0.382
(3.26) (3.61) (1.73)
Panel E: Zombie-Adjusted Factors, Triple-Sort Crisp and Fuzzy Zombies
Intercept Intercept Intercept
Mkt − Rf 0.730 Mkt − Rf 0.751 Mkt − Rf 0.508
(2.59) (3.20) (1.71)
SMB 0.188 SMB 0.244 SMB 0.010
(1.03) (1.35) (0.06)
HMLZA 0.848 HMLZA 0.824 HMLZA 0.794
(5.67) (4.82) (4.90)
WMLZA 0.736 WMLZA 0.653 WMLZA 0.636
(3.91) (3.22) (3.41)
RMW 0.332 QMJ 0.462 BAB 0.373
(3.20) (3.46) (1.69)
Table 2.6: Spanning Tests with Quality Factors. Table presents the intercepts and t-statistics from
monthly time-series regressions of each factor on the other four factors in the column. For example, the
first coefficient is the intercept from the regression of the market factor on SMB, HML, WML, and RMW .
The last coefficient is the intercept from the regression of BAB on the market factor, SMB, HMLZA, and
WMLZA, where HMLZA and WMLZA are constructed by triple-sorting crisp and fuzzy zombies.
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Zombie Non-zombie Zombie−Non-zombie Zombie−Non-zombie
Full Sample Pre-crisis Post-crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bank Return 0.551∗∗∗ 0.526∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗
(17.16) (15.71) (2.98)
Bank Return−Market Return 0.068∗∗ 0.151∗ 0.046∗∗
(3.33) (3.15) (2.88)
N 8,958 8,392 8,392 7,854 2,623 4,505
Adj. R2 0.38 0.36 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 2.7: Bank Betas in Japan. Table presents time-series regressions at the daily level. The dependent variable is the value-weighted portfolio
return. Firms are sorted into five equal-sized groups based on the interest-rate gap; the zombie portfolio consists of firms with the most negative
interest-rate gap, and the non-zombie portfolio consists of firms with the largest interest-rate gap. Independent variables are the domestic bank return,
alone and relative to the market return. Intercept is included in each regression but omitted from the table. t-statistics using robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Panel A: Bank Beta
Non-zombie Non-zombie Zombie Zombie
Winners Losers Winners Losers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Bank Return 0.528∗∗∗ 0.501∗∗∗ 0.624∗∗∗ 0.614∗∗∗ 0.584∗∗∗ 0.557∗∗∗ 0.683∗∗∗ 0.675∗∗∗
(9.26) (7.45) (9.62) (8.89) (8.30) (7.31) (10.70) (9.73)
N 374 374 374 374 374 374 373 373
Adj. R2 0.33 0.36 0.45 0.45 0.39 0.42 0.47 0.47
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Panel B: Market Beta
Non-zombie Non-zombie Zombie Zombie
Winners Losers Winners Losers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Market Return 0.574∗∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗ 0.691∗∗∗ 0.681∗∗∗ 0.582∗∗∗ 0.539∗∗∗ 0.672∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗
(7.76) (6.70) (8.97) (8.24) (7.25) (6.45) (8.76) (7.69)
N 374 374 374 374 374 374 373 373
Adj. R2 0.22 0.24 0.31 0.29 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.23
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Panel C: Bank Beta, Controlling for Market Beta
Non-zombie Non-zombie Zombie Zombie
Winners Losers Winners Losers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Bank Return−Market Return 0.233∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗
(3.68) (3.62) (4.32) (4.19) (4.77) (4.59) (5.44) (5.30)
N 374 374 374 374 374 374 373 373
Adj. R2 0.05 0.13 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.15 0.11 0.13
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Table 2.8: Bank Beta and Market Beta for Momentum Legs. Table presents time-series regressions at the monthly level. The dependent
variable is the value-weighted portfolio return. Independent variables are the bank return, the market return, and the difference between the bank
return and market return. Intercept is included in each regression but omitted from the table. t-statistics using robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Panel A: Returns in Top Bank Return Months
Zombie−Non-zombie Zombie Non-zombie
Momentum Momentum Momentum Zombie Winners Zombie Losers Non-zombie Winners Non-zombie Losers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
I(Top Bank Return) −0.024∗ −0.056∗∗∗ −0.032∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
(−2.16) (−3.88) (−2.25) (5.53) (8.93) (5.27) (8.93)
N 360 360 360 360 360 360 360
Adj. R2 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.18 0.07 0.14
Panel B: Returns in Top Market Return Months
Zombie−Non-zombie Zombie Non-zombie
Momentum Momentum Momentum Zombie Winners Zombie Losers Non-zombie Winners Non-zombie Losers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
I(Top Market Return) −0.012 −0.028 −0.016 0.057∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(−0.93) (−1.75) (−1.35) (4.07) (4.93) (3.63) (4.60)
N 360 360 360 360 360 360 360
Adj. R2 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.05
Panel C: Returns in Top Bank Return Months and Top Market Return Months
Zombie−Non-zombie Zombie Non-zombie
Momentum Momentum Momentum Zombie Winners Zombie Losers Non-zombie Winners Non-zombie Losers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
I(Top Bank Return) −0.022∗ −0.053∗∗∗ −0.031∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗
(−1.98) (−3.54) (−2.10) (5.29) (8.27) (5.03) (8.73)
I(Top Market Return) −0.010 −0.022 −0.012 0.049∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(−0.71) (−1.33) (−1.03) (3.84) (4.47) (3.37) (4.51)
N 360 360 360 360 360 360 360
Adj. R2 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.11 0.23 0.09 0.17
Table 2.9: Returns in Months with Top Bank and Market Performance. Table presents time-series regressions at the monthly level. The
dependent variable is the value-weighted portfolio return. Zombie momentum is the zombie winners portfolio minus the zombie losers portfolio.
Non-zombie momentum is the non-zombie winners portfolio minus the non-zombie losers portfolio. Independent variables are indicators for the
top bank return months and top market return months. I(Top Bank Return) = 1 if the month is a top 20 bank return month, and 0 otherwise.
I(Top Market Return) = 1 if the month is a top 20 market return month, and 0 otherwise. Intercept is included in each regression but omitted from
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Figure 2.1: Global Comparison of Value and Momentum. Figure shows the average returns and Sharpe ratios for value and momentum
premiums and strategies in the U.S., Europe, U.K., and Japan. See the text for details on the factors’ construction. Left panel plots the average
returns, and right panel plots the Sharpe ratio. International statistics are calculated using data from the AQR website. Statistics are computed from
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Figure 2.2: Value and Momentum Betas. Figure shows the betas of the 25 Fama–French portfolios to value and momentum factors. Betas are
estimated using the four-factor model. Left panel plots betas to the value factors, HML and HMLZA. Right panel plots betas to the momentum factors,
WML and WMLZA. Zombie-adjusted factors, HMLZA and WMLZA, are constructed by dropping zombies and triple-sorting zombies. Section 3.4 for







































































Figure 2.3: Securities Market Line for Value and Momentum. Figure shows the betas of the 25
Fama–French portfolios to value and momentum factors and the portfolios’ expected returns. Betas are
estimated using the four-factor model. Top panel plots betas to the value factors, HML and HMLZA. Bottom
panel plots betas to the momentum factors, WML and WMLZA. Zombie-adjusted factors, HMLZA and
WMLZA, are constructed by dropping zombies and triple-sorting zombies. Section 3.4 for details on the























Figure 2.4: Cumulative Abnormal Returns in Japan, November 1997. Figure shows the daily
value-weighted cumulative abnormal returns for zombies and non-zombies. Each firm’s abnormal returns are
calculated as the difference between the realized return and predicted return, which is estimated using the
CAPM beta before November 3, 1997, the day of the Sanyo Securities’ failure. Vertical lines mark the dates

































Figure 2.5: Cumulative Abnormal Returns in Japan, November 1997. Figure shows the daily
value-weighted cumulative abnormal returns manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms. Left panel considers
construction companies, retailers, and services firms as non-manufacturing. Right panel includes other non-
manufacturing industries. Each firm’s abnormal returns are calculated as the difference between the realized
return and predicted return, which is estimated using the CAPM beta before November 3, 1997, the day of
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Figure 2.8: Momentum Factors’ Betas to Government Risk. Figure shows the betas of Japanese momentum factors to the Japanese government
risk factor. Betas are estimated controlling for the excess market return, SMB, and HML. The momentum factors used include the Fama–French factor
WML and four zombie-adjusted factors WMLZA. Zombie-adjusted factors are constructed by dropping crisp zombies, dropping crisp and fuzzy zombies,
triple-sorting crisp zombies, or triple-sorting crisp and fuzzy zombies. See Section 3.4 for details on the construction of the zombie-adjusted factors.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Value and Momentum Details
Value and Momentum Summary Statistics Combined, crisp and fuzzy zombies make up 50% to 60%
of firms in the high and low value and momentum terciles (Table 2.10). There are more zombies in high value
stocks and past loser stocks. Table 2.11 shows the returns of each leg of the value and momentum premiums.
Dropping zombies increases the returns of both winners and losers, but the improvement is smaller for losers.
Value (P3) exceeds growth (P1) in all three datasets, and the the value premium decreases with zombies
removed because the growth tercile return increases while the value tercile remains more stable.
Dropping zombies does not change the strong negative correlation between value and momentum. Table 2.12
shows that value and momentum premiums have a correlation coefficient of −0.62 for the premiums and
−0.65 for the strategies, compared to −0.60 and −0.66 with zombies included.
2.7.2 European Zombies
Event Study Since the Global Financial Crisis, zombies have been on the rise in Europe. I identify
European zombies following the method described in Section 3.4. Since the short-term and long-term prime
rates are not available, I use the European Central Bank rate on the marginal lending facility, which offers
overnight credit to banks.
Similar to Japan in 1997, European event studies show that bad news for banks leads to lower abnormal
returns for firms receiving subsidized credit from banks compared to non-zombies. Upon the announcement
of additional government support, zombies have positive abnormal returns relative to non-zombies. Three
early Global Financial Crisis events in Europe illustrate the divergence in abnormal returns.
On August 9, 2007, BNP Paribas—France’s largest bank, the Eurozone’s second-largest bank by market
value, and the world’s third-largest bank by assets—froze three mortgage-related investment funds that
totaled €1.6 billion ($2.2 billion). BNP’s suspension of redemptions sparked credit concerns both in Europe
and worldwide as the TED and LIBOR-OIS spreads saw sharp upward moves, and many viewed the event
as the start of the Global Financial Crisis reaching European markets. Figure 2.9 shows the cumulative
abnormal returns for zombies and non-zombies after the event. Zombies suffered lower abnormal returns.
On September 14, 2007, the British bank Northern Rock faced an old-fashioned bank run with depositors
lining the streets outside of retail branches. The event was the first run on a British bank in 140 years (since
Overend & Gurney in 1866) and occurred despite the Bank of England’s announcement the previous day
that it would intervene and provide emergency support as the lender of last resort. Depositors withdrew
an estimated one billion pounds or around 4% of retail deposits (Slater, 2007). At that time, just 31,700
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pounds per person were guaranteed by deposit insurance: more specifically, the first 2000 pounds were fully
insured, and then 90% up to 35,000 pounds. On September 17, the U.K. government announced that it
would guarantee all deposits at Northern Rock and would provide guarantees for other banks that faced
difficulties. This intervention stemmed the bank run, and later, deposit insurance was raised. Figure 2.9
shows the cumulative abnormal returns around the Northern Rock events. Zombies had negative abnormal
returns immediately after the bank run; but after the September 17 announcement of government support,
zombies had strong positive abnormal returns while non-zombie returns fluctated more closely with market
returns.
In September 2008, global sentiment about the financial system was extremely low as funding liquidity
dried up following the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15, and the LIBOR-OIS spread spiked
to over 300 bps. On September 28, Fortis, Belgium’s largest bank, was partially nationalized, and the next
day, on September 29, zombie cumulative abnormal returns in Europe dropped even lower as Congress failed
to pass the U.S. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 TARP bill to inject $700 billion of capital
injections. Zombies faced strong negative abnormal returns after the event. Markets continued to view the
financial system as fragile, and the LIBOR-OIS remained elevated.
On October 8, the British government announced a £500 billion bank rescue package, and the Federal
Reserve, European Central Bank, Bank of England, Bank of Canada, Swedish Riksbank, and Swiss National
Bank cut rates. On October 10, the U.S. government announced equity purchases of banks as part of
the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act. After the large government interventions, zombie cumulative
abnormal returns appeared to recover.
Bank Betas In Japan, zombies have higher bank beta than non-zombies, even controlling for the market
return. The comparison also holds in Europe, and the result is driven by the post-crisis period after markets
are more sensitive to the link between zombies and their underlying funding.
Similar to the method for the Japanese event study, I sort European firms into five equal-sized groups
based on the interest-rate gap and construct daily value-weighted portfolios. The non-zombie portfolio
consists of firms with the largest interest-rate gap, and the zombie portfolio holds the firms with the most
negative interest-rate gap.
Table 2.13 shows that the European zombie portfolio has higher bank beta than the non-zombie portfolio.
And when banks outperform the market, zombies outperform non-zombies, which is driven by the post-crisis
period. In Table 2.14, I regress daily individual stock returns on bank returns relative to the market return.




Value Total Crisp Fuzzy
P1 54 44 10
P2 61 49 12
P3 63 52 11
Momentum Total Crisp Fuzzy
P1 63 51 12
P2 61 50 11
P3 55 44 11
Table 2.10: Average Percentage of Zombies. Table shows the average percent of zombies in each tercile
of the value and momentum sorts. P1 refers to the lowest tercile, and P3 is the highest tercile.
P1 (Growth) P3 (Value) Value Premium
Full Data 0.03 11.49 11.45
Drop Crisp Zombies 1.40 11.67 10.15
Drop Crisp and Fuzzy Zombies 2.90 11.13 8.02
P1 (Losers) P3 (Winners) Momentum Premium
Full Data 4.87 5.87 0.96
Drop Crisp Zombies 4.62 7.46 2.73
Drop Crisp and Fuzzy Zombies 5.06 8.01 2.82
Table 2.11: Components of Value and Momentum Premiums. Table shows value-weighted portfolio
returns. P1 refers to the lowest tercile, and P3 is the highest tercile.
89
Premium Strategy
Full Data (VME) −0.60 −0.66
Full Data −0.59 −0.65
Drop Crisp Zombies −0.62 −0.66
Drop Crisp and Fuzzy Zombies −0.62 −0.65
Table 2.12: Value and Momentum Correlation. Table shows the correlation between value and
momentum premiums and strategies. The value and momentum premiums and strategies are constructed
using the full data, dropping crisp zombies, and dropping crisp and fuzzy zombies. The first line of the table
uses the updated premium and strategy factors from Asness et al. (2013a) that are available on the AQR
website.
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Zombie Non-zombie Zombie−Non-zombie Zombie−Non-zombie
Full Sample Pre-crisis Post-crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bank Return 0.778∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗
(36.78) (19.54) (15.82)
Bank Return−Market Return 0.343∗∗∗ −0.084 0.482∗∗∗
(5.69) (−0.94) (12.61)
N 4,804 4,804 4,804 4,726 1,647 2,054
Adj. R2 0.89 0.63 0.38 0.18 0.00 0.54
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 2.13: Bank Betas in Europe. Table presents time-series regressions at the daily level. The dependent variable is the value-weighted portfolio
return. Firms are sorted into five equal-sized groups based on the interest-rate gap; the zombie portfolio consists of firms with the most negative
interest-rate gap, and the non-zombie portfolio consists of firms with the largest interest-rate gap. Independent variables are the domestic bank return,
alone and relative to the market return. Intercept is included in each regression but omitted from the table. t-statistics using robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Europe Japan
Crisis Event BNP Sanyo
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Return Return Return Return
Bank Return−Market Return 0.093 0.094 −0.304∗∗ −0.305∗∗
(1.51) (1.51) (−3.39) (−3.43)
(Bank Return−Market Return)×I(Zombie) −0.063∗ −0.0621∗ −0.253∗∗ −0.251∗∗
(−2.19) (−2.12) (−2.86) (−2.86)
(Bank Return−Market Return)×I(Post) 0.219∗ 0.216∗ 0.276∗∗ 0.277∗∗
(2.79) (2.73) (2.78) (2.80)
(Bank Return−Market Return)×I(Zombie) × I(Post) 0.210∗∗ 0.206∗ 0.263∗∗ 0.261∗∗
(3.01) (2.85) (2.88) (2.89)
Constant −0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.000∗∗∗
(−0.09) (14.34) (0.07) (−24.86)
N 10,879,694 10,879,694 4,227,802 4,227,802
Adj. R2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Table 2.14: Bank Beta Relative to Market Beta After Crises. Table presents time-series regressions at the daily level. The dependent variable
is return. Independent variables include the domestic market return and bank return, alone and interacted with indicator variables. I(Zombie) = 1 if
the firm is a zombie, and 0 otherwise. I(Post) = 1 if the date is after the BNP event or Sanyo event, and 0 otherwise. t-statistics using robust standard
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Figure 2.9: Cumulative Abnormal Returns in Europe. Figure shows the value-weighted cumulative
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3.1 Introduction
We study the effect of corporate cash holdings on stock returns. Cash is necessary for a firm’s operations,
and firms use their cash holdings as a means of payment, financing investments, and managing risk. Firms
earn different returns on cash and their non-cash assets, and failing to account for cash holdings and the
return on cash leads to biases in standard asset pricing frameworks.
Cash is also an economically significant source of time-series and cross-sectional variation in public firms’
assets (Figure 3.1). In December 2020, the value-weighted U.S. stock market held roughly 22% of its assets in
cash and short-term equivalents compared to approximately 8% on average in the late 1970s. The variation
in individual firms’ cash share has increased on average almost every decade, with a substantial large peak
during the dot-com bubble.
We estimate firm-specific cash returns with a model of the value of cash from Faulkender and Wang
(2006). We find the average value of a $1 inside a firm is $0.95, but the value varies considerably over time
(Figure 3.2). We calculate a firm’s cash-hedged stock return with the firm’s stock return, cash return estimate,
and our stock return decomposition. We use our firm-level cash return and cash-hedged return to study how
cash balances affect portfolio optimization, factor creation, betas, and cross-sectional asset pricing.
We motivate our results with a simple model to show the effect of a firm’s implicit cash holding on the
investor’s portfolio optimization. We decompose a firm’s standard stock return into the firm’s cash-hedged
return, cash share, and return on cash, and we present five main empirical results.
First, we show that standard equity returns are not cash-hedged returns by decomposing stock returns
into their cash and non-cash components. Second, we show that common empirical asset pricing factors—size,
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value, and momentum—have large and time-varying net cash positions. We show that our cash-hedging
strategy effectively removes these net cash positions. Third, we show how common empirical asset pricing
factors covary with cash holdings; namely, that value strongly covaries with high cash holding. Motivated by
this strong covariance structure, we propose the Cash factor, which captures the premia between firms with
high cash holdings and firms with low cash holdings.
Fourth, we show how to decompose standard betas into the cash-hedged return beta and other components.
We perform this beta decomposition for CAPM betas and multifactor betas. We show that the CAPM
decomposition provides a securities market line that clearly shows the positive relationship between expected
returns and betas. The beta decomposition shows that cash-hedged portfolios will have a more efficient
tangency portfolio and a steeper efficient frontier.
Last, we run cross-sectional regressions. We find a significant and positive price of market risk only when
using the cash-hedged market factor. Using characteristics instead of betas, we show that firms with higher
cash shares have higher expected equity returns and suggest that firms do not hold cash because they think
their cash balances will have a strong return.
Related Literature We contribute to the literature that studies how cash affects firm equity returns. A
firm’s cash holdings may increase firm value. Cash kept on a firm’s balance sheet allows firms to finance
investments without incurring transaction costs (Miller and Orr, 1966), information asymmetry costs (Myers
and Majluf, 1984), agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and other costs (Huberman, 1984) associated
with raising funds from external capital markets. Cash allows firms to decrease the probability of incurring
costs associated with financial distress and bankruptcy when cash flow is inadequate for paying interest and
principal on debt obligations (Acharya et al., 2012).
Firms may use cash as an instrument for risk management (Bolton et al., 2011; Acharya et al., 2007). A
firm’s cash holdings may also decrease firm value. Cash may create differences in the interests of managers
and shareholders and allow managers to invest in projects with negative net present value for shareholders
but positive benefits for themselves (Jensen, 1986; Richardson, 2006). The benefits of cash for a firm’s
shareholders also depend on the strength of the firm’s corporate governance (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007).
Additional empirical studies showing cash influences firm value for shareholders are Opler et al. (1999) and
Faulkender and Wang (2006). Several other studies1 also investigate the relationship between cash holdings
and firm value.
1Some additional studies are Kim et al. (1998), Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), Smith and Kim (1994), Bates et al. (2009),
Pinkowitz and Williamson (2007), Foley et al. (2007), Mikkelson and Partch (2003), Dittmar et al. (2003), Almeida et al. (2004),
Harford et al. (2008), Denis and Sibilkov (2010), Pinkowitz et al. (2006), Gamba and Triantis (2008), Han and Qiu (2007),
Livdan et al. (2009), and Haushalter et al. (2007).
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The paper most closely related to the present paper is Palazzo (2012). Palazzo (2012) shows firms’
cash holdings may be influenced by the correlation between firm cash flows and aggregate cash flows. The
correlation increases cash holdings because financing operations with cash may be cheaper than external
financing following adverse aggregate cash flow shocks. The paper uses accounting-based estimates of stocks’
expected returns and cross-sectional tests with stock portfolios to evaluate the paper’s hypothesized connection
between cash holdings and stock returns. Palazzo (2012) is broadly similar to this paper because both study
the relationship between firms’ cash holdings, firms’ expected returns, and aggregate risks. Palazzo (2012)
differs from the present paper because the focus of Palazzo (2012) shows the correlation between firm cash
flows and aggregate cash flows creates a novel precautionary savings motive for firms. This paper estimates
cash and non-cash returns for several established risk factors—market, size, value, and —and studies the
cross-sectional properties of the factors’ cash and non-cash returns.
3.2 Motivating Model
We describe a simple model to show the effect of a firm’s implicit cash holding on the investor’s portfolio
optimization. We solve the problem with infinite horizon optimal portfolio choice problem, intermediate
consumption, no outside income, lognormal stock returns, and independent and identically distributed
returns.2 A representative investor with CRRA utility makes a consumption and portfolio choice between the
two assets available, a risk-free bond Bt which pays rtdt and a firm’s stock St which follows
dR = μSdt + σSdZ
The investor’s problem is






such that dNt = NtαtdRt + Nt(1 − αt)rdt − ctdt.
We model the effect of corporate cash holdings on the firm’s stock return by assuming the stock is a
portfolio of two assets, the firm’s non-cash assets with price Et and the firm’s cash invested in risk-free bonds.
The stock’s weight on the non-cash asset is (1 − ωt), and the stock’s weight on the risk-free bonds is ωt.
The stock’s weight on the risk-free bond asset satisfies 0 ≤ ωt < 1. We also assume, for simplicity, ωt is
deterministic with no volatility. We assume the investor observes ωt, Et, and Bt. We assume the investor
2Section 5.2 of Cochrane (2007) provides details on this special case of the Merton problem and on a number of extensions.
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realizes the firm’s stock is a portfolio of the firm’s risk-free bonds and non-cash assets. The stock’s return is a
function of the firm’s non-cash assets, cash assets, and cash weight
dR = (1 − ωt) (μEdt + σEdZ) + ωtrdt.












Equation 3.1 shows the investor holds the stock St in proportion to its Sharpe ratio, and hedges the firm’s
bond position using leverage. For example, if ωt = 0.5 then the investor would hedge the bond position by
selling a risk-free bond and purchasing additional stock in a ratio that offsets the bond share indicated by ωt.
For comparison, suppose the investor mistakenly thinks the stock’s return follows the process
dR = μSdt + σSdZt.









When the investor does not account for the effect of cash on the firm’s return, the investor’s allocation to the
stock is too small by a factor of 11−ωt when 1 > ωt > 0. The investor’s allocation to the bond is too large.
Equation 3.1 presents two adjustments the investor must make in her portfolio allocation decision. First,
she must correctly measure the first and second moments of the true source of risk; the optimal portfolio
share depends on the Sharpe ratio of E (using moments μE and σE) not S (using moments μS and σS).
Second, she must hedge out the stock’s implicit risk-free bond position. Figure 3.3 confirms the intuition of
the model by plotting αt as a function of ωt. When the risky asset available to the investor carries a larger
implicit risk-free bond position, the investor must lever up their risky asset allocation to compensate.
3.3 Decomposing Stock Returns
We assume a firm’s stock, with return rit for firm i in month t, is a portfolio of two assets: a firm’s cash and a
firm’s non-cash assets. The firm’s cash earns monthly return bit. We assume cash returns are firm-specific due
to the empirical and theoretical evidence indicating many factors generate variation in the value of cash across
97
firms. The firm’s non-cash assets include all of a firm’s assets except for the firm’s cash and has monthly
return eit, which we call the cash-hedged stock return. Partitioning each stock’s value into the two disjoint
assets lets us equate a stock’s gross return as the weighted average of the cash return and the cash-hedged













= (1 − wit)eit + witbit.
(3.3)
Modeling a stock’s return with equation 3.3 gives us a standard accounting identity equating a portfolio’s
return to the returns of the portfolio’s constituent securities. Thus, we can back out unknown variables from
the equation’s observed variables.
For our empirical analysis, we use the ratio of cash and short-term equivalents to total assets from
Compustat to compute wit, and we will use stock returns from CRSP for rit. We use a model from Faulkender
and Wang (2006) to help us compute bit, the return on firms’ cash assets. The equation’s only unknown
variable is eit, a firm’s non-cash return. We use the following equation to determine a stock’s non-cash return








Using equation 3.4, we can consider a stock’s non-cash return, or its cash-hedged return, eit as the return of a
particular portfolio constructed with two hypothetical trades. The first trade buys 1(1−wit) shares of the firm’s
stock. Since the fraction of a firm’s total assets held in cash is between zero and one, the stock’s weight
in equation 3.4 exceeds one. In other words, the non-cash portfolio’s first position is a levered position in




, underlying the portfolio’s
1
(1−wit)
units of the firm’s stock. The second trade hedges the non-cash portfolio’s exposure to the firm’s cash
associated with the portfolio’s long position in the firm’s stock. The portfolio’s two trades leave the portfolio
with net-zero units of the firm’s cash and one unit of the firm’s non-cash assets. The equation’s description
as a portfolio implemented with two trades is hypothetical because firms’ cash and non-cash assets cannot be
individually bought and sold.
We use the firm-level stock return decomposition to determine the cash and non-cash components of
several value-weighted portfolios. The return of value-weighted stock portfolio rpt where member stocks have
98









vit((1 − wit)eit + witbit). (3.5)
The value-weighted non-cash only and cash only portfolio returns—ept and b
p
t— are useful for measuring
a stock portfolio’s aggregate cash and non-cash returns without cash-share changes contributing to the













where vit is asset i’s value weight within portfolio p. We define the term γit = wit(eit − bit) as the difference
between a stock’s non-cash and cash return, weighted by the stock’s cash share. We use γit to decompose a
stock’s return:
rit = eit − wit(eit − bit)
= eit − γit .
(3.8)
The equation is helpful for two reasons. First, we can interpret the equation’s first term as the stock’s return
if management saved no cash on its balance sheet; the second term is the cost that management incurs by
holding cash on its balance sheet instead of additional non-cash assets. Second, we can view the equation
as the reorganization of a stock’s cash and non-cash returns into one term γit), containing variation in the
stock’s return due to variation in the firm’s cash holdings, and another term, eit, that does not.
We also define a stock’s excess return as ri,xst = rit − rft , where rft is the risk free rate, and define a stock’s
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= ep,xst − γpt
(3.9)




We use monthly stock return, price, and share data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
and Compustat. We join CRSP and Compustat data with the CCM link table provided by Wharton Research
Data Services. Our stock sample construction follows Asness et al. (2013b). Our stock sample’s construction
begins with all U.S. stocks (sharecodes 10 and 11) traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ, with share
prices greater than one dollar at the beginning of each month. We exclude REITS, ADRs, preferred shares,
financial firms (SIC codes 6000–6799), and we require stocks to have monthly returns for the previous 12
months to construct the momentum characteristic. We require stocks to have book values available six
months before the current month, and we require stocks to have share prices and shares outstanding for the
previous month and six months ago. These conditions are necessary for constructing the book-to-market and
size characteristics. We require firms’ book-to-market ratios and market capitalization are greater than zero.
We also use the market capitalization procedure from Asness et al. (2013b) to create a very liquid
collection of stocks with low trading costs for moderately sized trade volumes. Each month we rank stocks
by their market capitalization at the beginning of the month, beginning with the largest stock by market
capitalization and ending with the smallest stock by market capitalization. Beginning with the largest stock,
we incrementally add stocks to the current month’s stock sample until the stock sample makes up 90% of the
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stock market’s total market capitalization. This procedure creates a sample of large and very liquid stocks.
Asness et al. (2013b) report the stocks included in the sample, on average, make up the largest 17% of firms
in the United States.
To estimate firms’ cash returns, we also use conditions from Faulkender and Wang (2006) to build our
stock sample. We exclude utility firms from our sample (SIC codes 4900–4999). We require firms have
non-missing observations for the following Compustat variables during the current and previous fiscal year:
cash and short term securities, total assets, income before extraordinary items, common stock dividends, and
the total debt, including current debt or total long term debt. We also use the following Compustat variables
for the present and previous fiscal years but replace missing observations with zero: sales of common and
preferred stock, purchases of common and preferred stock, long-term debt issuance, long-term debt reduction,
research and development expense, and interest expense. Setting these variables to zero may introduce
measurement error into our cash return estimates. However, these variables are required for estimating cash
returns using Faulkender and Wang (2006). Dropping observations where these variables’ values are missing
would create a prohibitively small sample.
We place restrictions on the paper’s stock sample to estimate firms’ cash shares and non-cash returns.
We require non-missing quarterly total assets and non-missing quarterly cash and short-term equivalent
observations six months before the current month. We also require firms’ quarterly total assets and quarterly
cash and short-term equivalents variables to be greater than zero. These sample restrictions are necessary to
construct the paper’s cash share variable. We do not use annual analogs of the quarterly total asset and cash
variables. We consider these variables’ timeliness for determining the contribution of firms’ cash and non-cash
returns to their stock returns. Since the most recent annual versions of these variables are potentially 16
months old, the annual variables for fiscal periods too far in the past to reasonably proxy for a firm’s current
cash share.
We also drop pharmaceutical firms (SIC codes 2830–2836) because these firms’ cash holdings are unusually
large relative to their total assets. Pharmaceutical firms’ unusually large cash-to-asset ratios maybe due to
the pharmaceutical industry practicing much more conservative accounting than other industries (Easton
and Pae, 2004). Accounting conservatism may prompt these firms to provide pessimistic valuations of assets
with uncertain value, like drug research and development, but not easily valued assets, like cash. As a
consequence, cash makes up a large fraction of these firms’ reported balance sheets. Chandra (2011) also finds
that pharmaceutical firms are particularly likely to practice conservative financial accounting because of these
firms’ greater shareholder litigation risk and the high level of conservatism required by accounting standard
Financial Accounting Standard Board (1974) for their research and development activities. Pharmaceutical
conservative accounting practices mean their reported net assets are too low (Watts, 2003a,b), and their
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assets subject to less conservative accounting, like cash, make up too large a fraction of their reported balance
sheets.
Our paper’s sample begins in January 1976 and ends in December 2020. Both CRSP and Compustat
provide data for years before 1976. We do not include earlier years in our sample because the quarterly cash
and total asset observations necessary for our cash share variable are missing for approximately 80% of the
merged, monthly CRSP–Compustat sample before 1976. We use observations from 1976 to the end of 1977
to construct some of the paper’s variables. We do not use the years 1976 and 1977 to construct factor and
test portfolios because many of the requisite variables are not available before 1976.
3.4.2 Variables
We use the variable definitions from Asness et al. (2013b) for the book-to-market and momentum firm charac-
teristics. A stock’s book-to-market ratio (BEME) at the beginning of the month is Book Valueit−6/Market Valueit−1.
Asness et al. (2013b) use this specific value definition because it is a standard, conservative, and easily
implemented definition of BEME. Fama and French (1992b) provide another common BEME definition with
more complex lags than the above definition. The paper’s results are similar when using the BEME and
market value definitions from Fama and French (1992b). We compute the firm size characteristic as the
product of a firm’s shares outstanding and share price at the beginning of the current month. We define
momentum (MOM) as a stock’s gross return from the beginning of month t − 12 to the end of month t − 2
(Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Asness, 1994; Grinblatt and Moskowitz, 2004). Our definition of MOM is
standard, including our omission of a stock’s return over month t − 1 from the construction of MOM.3 We
use these characteristics to characterize empirical features of stocks’ aggregate cash and non-cash returns, so
basic definitions of these variables suffice.









where t − 6 reflects accounting variables for the period six months before. We view a stock’s cash share
in month t as an unobserved variable and a firm’s lagged cash to total asset ratio as a reasonable proxy
for a stock’s cash share. We later report results supporting our assumption that lagged cash shares proxy
3A stock’s month t − 1 return also predicts stock returns and may attenuate the return predictability of MOM. Standard
explanations for t − 1 month return reversals are market microstructure and limited liquidity (Jegadeesh, 1990; Boudoukh et al.,
1994).
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for current cash shares. We chose a six-month lag for the cash share, consistent with the BEME variable’s
timeliness. A six-month lag also makes the variables’ information relatively recent without risking the use of
financial information before it’s available to investors. Impink et al. (2012) report 91% of 10Ks between 1999
and 2006 are filed within 90 days of the fiscal year-end. Alford et al. (1994) report 20% of firms between 1977
and 1985 filed 10Ks more than 90 days after fiscal year-end. Only 2% of firms file 10Ks more than 150 days
after fiscal year-end. The paper’s six-month lag for BEME and cash shares could contain information for this
2% of firms before it’s available to the public. However, the average market cap of a firm filing more than 150
days after fiscal year-end is $4.9 million. The smallest firm’s market capitalization in our sample between
1977 and 1985 is $54 million. The 2% of firms where financial statements may not be available within six
months of fiscal year-end are likely too small to be in our sample.
3.4.3 Firm-Level Cash Return Variable Construction
Our procedure for estimating the return on firms’ cash has four steps. First, we use the methodology from
Faulkender and Wang (2006) to estimate the marginal value of cash for each firm in our sample. Second, we
integrate our estimate of the marginal value for a firm’s cash to determine the average value of the firm’s
cash. Third, we compute the return on a firm’s cash by dividing the market value of a firm’s cash at fiscal
year-end by the market value of a firm’s cash at the previous fiscal year-end. Last, we create firm-specific
cash return mimicking portfolios to estimate cash returns at a higher frequency.
We follow the methodology from Faulkender and Wang (2006) to calculate the marginal value of cash
for each firm, and we summarize this methodology below.4 For the dependent variable in the regression,
Faulkender and Wang (2006) use a stock’s excess return over a fiscal year t, which is calculated as the stock’s
return from the beginning to the end of the fiscal year return less the return of a benchmark portfolio over
the same year. The benchmark portfolio controls for a stock’s expected return associated with the stock’s size
and book-to-market ratio. The regression’s independent variables are firm characteristics that could fluctuate
alongside the firm’s cash. The independent variables are scaled by the firm’s market equity at the beginning
of the fiscal year, M it−1. Since both the dependent and independent variables are scaled by a stock’s beginning
of fiscal year market equity, the regression coefficient measures the dollar change in shareholder value when
4See Faulkender and Wang (2006) 1967–1968 for further details.
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the firm’s cash changes by one dollar. The regression specification from Faulkender and Wang (2006) is




































The return of stock i over fiscal year t is rit, and R
i,B
t is the fiscal year return for one of the 5×5 size and
book-to-market portfolios available on Ken French’s website. The dependent variable is the firm’s return
after controlling for the firm’s expected return, as calculated using the corresponding 5× 5 portfolio. The
portfolios’ fiscal year returns are computed from the portfolios’ monthly returns over each firm’s fiscal year.
The stock’s size and BEME quintiles determine which of the 25 value-weighted size and BEME portfolios
Ri,Bt represents.5
In the regression, ΔXit equals Xit − Xit−1 and proxies for unexpected changes in the variable. Cit is cash
and short-term equivalents. Iit is interest expense. Dit is common dividends paid. Lit is market leverage at the
end of fiscal year t and equals total debt divided by total debt plus market equity. NF it is net financing and
equals total equity issuance minus repurchases plus debt issuance minus debt redemptions. RDit is research
and development expense. Eit is earnings before extraordinary items plus deferred tax credits and investment
tax credits. NAit is net assets and equals total assets minus cash holdings. Last, M it−1 is the market value
of equity at the end of the previous year. Earnings, net assets, research and development expense, interest
expense, dividends paid, and net financing are variables controlling for correlation between cash and returns
and unobserved variables that affect stock returns.
Table 3.23 reports regression coefficients for the Faulkender and Wang (2006) regression specification.
Our regression results are similar to the results in Faulkender and Wang (2006). Since Faulkender and Wang
(2006) provides a detailed discussion and analysis of the regression, we refer interested readers to the original
paper’s methodology.
Taking the partial derivative of equation 3.11 with respect to ΔCit yields the marginal value of $1 to firm
5We use NYSE breakpoints from Ken French’s website for the size and BEME quintiles. We use firm ME at the beginning of
month t and the ME breakpoint for month t to determine a stock’s ME quintile. We use the current year’s BEME breakpoint to
assign stocks BEME quintiles for July to December. We use the previous year’s BEME breakpoint to assign stocks BEME
quintiles for January through June of the current year. We align stocks’ BEME values with BEME breakpoints in this manner
because the BEME breakpoints are updated at the beginning of each July. July through December of year t and January
through June of year t + 1 form one, complete BEME “breakpoint year.” Months are assigned to BEME “breakpoint years” in
the same manner months are assigned to fiscal years.
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i at time t:













The equal-weighted average marginal cash value across all firms is 1.261+(−0.719× 0.17)+ (−1.171× 0.20) =
$0.90. We then compute the average value of a firm’s cash by integrating the marginal dollar value equation
with respect to the firm’s cash at the beginning of the year, then dividing by the firm’s cash at the beginning
of the year. We assume the value of zero dollars to the shareholder is zero, as the value of the next dollar
would likely have to go toward expenses or debtors.





Marginal Cash Valueit dCit−1
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We use a firm’s average cash value estimates to compute the return on a firm’s cash by dividing the current
fiscal year-end average cash value by the previous fiscal year-end average cash value:




Last, we compute a firm’s monthly cash return over a fiscal year t by forming firm-specific cash return
mimicking portfolios in the spirit of Adrian et al. (2014). We form the mimicking portfolios by regressing a
firm’s cash returns on returns for 30-day, 1-year, 10-year, and 30-year U.S. Treasuries using annual data. We
then estimate a firm’s monthly cash returns with the mimicking portfolio weights.
3.4.4 Cash-Hedged Stock Return Construction
After estimating firms’ cash returns, we have the variables necessary for creating estimates of firms’ cash-
hedged stock returns. We use firms’ monthly stock returns rit, cash-to-total asset ratios (wit, estimated using
the six-®month lag of the cash-to-total asset ratio), and monthly cash return estimates (bit). We use the
quarterly frequency Compustat variables cash and short-term equivalents and total assets for the cash-to-total
assets ratio. We drop from our sample firms with cash-to-total asset ratios that are less than or equal to
zero; firms with negative cash and short-term equivalents; and firms with negative total assets. To compute a
firm’s cash-hedged monthly stock return we substitute the firm’s cash return, bit, cash-to-total assets ratio,
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We winsorize the yearly cash return and eit at the 1 and 99 percent levels to reduce the effect of outliers. After
estimating firms’ monthly cash-hedged stock returns, we construct value-weighted test and factor portfolios
using definitions collected in Table 3.1.
3.4.5 Portfolio Construction
Gathering stocks in portfolios sorted on a characteristic is a standard procedure for constructing cross-
sectional asset pricing tests dependent variables. All of the portfolios we construct use monthly returns, use
value-weights, and are re-balanced monthly. Stocks value weights are determined monthly by their beginning
of month market capitalizations. We construct two sets of 25 size and book-to-market portfolios, which
we will use as test assets in our cross-sectional regressions. First, we construct 25 size and book-to-market
portfolios, similar to Fama and French (1992b). We independently double sort on size and book-to-market,
each into five groups. By intersecting these groups, we assign stocks to one of 25 portfolio groups. We then
calculate the value-weighted portfolio returns for each of these 25 portfolio groups. These are the standard
5x5 size and book-to-market portfolios in stock return terms. Second, we construct 25 cash-hedged portfolio
returns. We use the same methodology to assign stocks to portfolios, but we calculate the returns using each
firm’s cash-hedged returns rather than the firm’s stock return to calculate the value-weighted returns. We
follow an analogous procedure to form 10 momentum-sorted portfolios.
3.4.6 Factor Construction
For analysis, we use two approaches to construct factors: the first only uses the sorting variable in a single
sort, and the second uses double and triple sorts. Each approach results in long-short self-financing factors.
All of the factors use monthly returns, use value-weights, and are re-balanced monthly. Stocks value weights
are determined monthly by their beginning of month market capitalizations.
First, we create simple factors: based on only the sorting variable, we single sort our data into three
equal-sized groups, and then we calculate the three value-weighted portfolios (High (P3), Middle (P2) and
Low (P1)). We calculate each strategy’s premium as P3-P1. For example, the value premium is the difference
between the return of the high book-to-market portfolio less the return of the low book-to-market portfolio.
We construct five simple factors: Value, Size, Mom, and Cash and calculate the standard returns and
cash-hedged returns to each trading strategy. The first three factors are constructed using the commonly-used
106
sorting variables of book-to-market, book value, and past returns as discussed in 3.4.2. The sorting variable
for Cash is a firm’s cash share.
Second, we construct HML, HMLTriple, SMB, SMBTriple, WML, WMLTriple, and CASH T riple using
double and triple sorts. SMB and HML are constructed using the same strategy as Fama and French (1993).
We construct WML in the same way as HML, but using sorts on size and past returns. In this way, all three
factors control for size. As in Fama and French (1993), SMB is constructed to be largely independent of
value, and HML is designed to be largely independent of size. Double sorting helps “control” for the fact that
high and low value stocks may consistently coincide with higher and lower returns because sorting on value
implicitly sorts on another variable that coincides with differential expected returns.
Likewise, we construct triple sorted-factors that “control” for cash share—which we find varies with returns—
in addition to size. To construct HMLTriple we perform independent sorts on cash share (Flush/Mid/Pennies),
size (Big/Midsize/Small), and book-to-market (HiBM/MidBM/LoBM), and then construct the triple-sorted
factor. To be explicit, the equation for HMLTriple is below. As we discuss later, the results suggest that it is
important to triple sort to construct the cash factor CASH T riple because cash holdings and value strongly
covary.
HMLTriple =HiBM/Flush/Big + HiBM/Mid/Big + HiBM/Pennies/Big6
+ HiBM/Flush/Small + HiBM/Mid/Small + HiBM/Pennies/Small6
− LoBM/Flush/Big + LoBM/Mid/Big + LoBM/Pennies/Big6
− LoBM/Flush/Small + LoBM/Mid/Small + LoBM/Pennies/Small6
The remaining triple-sorted factors are constructed analogously.
3.5 Results
First, we show that standard equity returns are not cash-hedged returns by decomposing stock returns into
their cash and non-cash components. Second, we show that common empirical asset pricing factors—size,
value, and momentum—have large and time-varying net cash positions. We show that our cash-hedging
strategy effectively removes these net cash positions. Third, we show how common empirical asset pricing
factors covary with cash holdings; namely, that value strongly covaries with high cash holding. Motivated by
this strong covariance structure, we propose the Cash factor that captures the premia between firms with
high cash holdings and low cash holdings.
Fourth, we show how to decompose standard betas into the cash-hedged return beta and other components.
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We perform this beta decomposition for CAPM betas and multifactor betas. The CAPM decomposition
provides a securities market line that clearly shows the positive relationship between expected returns and
betas. The beta decomposition shows that cash-hedged portfolios will have a more efficient tangency portfolio
and a steeper efficient frontier.
Last, we run cross-sectional regressions. We find a significant and positive price of market risk only when
using the cash-hedged market factor. Using characteristics instead of betas, we show that firms with higher
cash shares have higher expected equity returns and suggest that firms do not hold cash because they think
their cash balances will have a strong return.
3.5.1 Stock Portfolio Return Decomposition
Table 3.2 reports summary statistics for book-to-market, size, momentum, and cash-to-total asset portfolios.
The portfolios are constructed by sorting stocks into terciles (P1, P2, and P3), and P3-P1 is the spread
between the top and bottom terciles. We calculate each portfolio’s stock return and the separate the non-cash
and cash components of the overall stock return. For each portfolio p, the non-cash return is calculated as∑
i∈p v
i









The table reports the portfolios’ average return, standard deviation, annualized Sharpe ratio, and the
alpha and t-statistic from time-series regressions of the portfolio’s return on the market return. The t-statistics
use Newey-West standard errors with ten lags.
The stock portfolios’ average returns and other statistics are consistent with the previous literature
using the same characteristics. Looking across the low to high portfolios, we can broadly see the value and
momentum effects. The value and momentum effects have smaller t-statistics than usual due to our use of a
sample of large and liquid stocks.
The non-cash and cash return columns indicate the bulk of the stock returns come from the non-cash
return component. The cash components are smaller returns, with values around 0.05%, and the portfolios’
non-cash component is slightly larger than the portfolios’ stock returns.
Table 3.3 reports the average non-cash and cash returns for each tercile. These returns are formed using
firms’ non-cash and cash returns and equations 3.6 and 3.7. We do not scale the returns by firms’ cash-shares,
which distinguishes the returns from the non-cash and cash component returns reported in Table 3.2.
Compared to stock returns formed on the same characteristics, the non-cash returns are slightly larger in
magnitude and are more volatile, but the Sharpe ratios and alphas are in a similar range. The cash portfolios’
returns are noticeably larger than the cash return component of stock returns in Table 3.2, but, overall, the
cash portfolios’ returns are small relative to the non-cash portfolios returns.
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Table 3.4 reports summary statistics on the cash share of each tercile portfolio. For a given month t and






t. The table reports time-series averages and
standard deviations of the portfolios’ monthly cash-shares. Unsurprisingly, cash-to-total asset portfolios’ cash
shares increase considerably, from 0.02 for the low portfolio up to 0.25 for the high portfolio. The average
cash-share decreases from the low to the high book-to-market portfolio. The other sorting variables have a
weaker correlation with firms’ cash shares. Across size portfolios, the average cash share is flat; and across
momentum portfolios, cash share increases slightly.
3.5.2 Stock Returns Differ from Non-Cash Returns
What is a firm’s stock return? An inspection of Equation 3.3 makes it clear that rit, the firm’s stock return, is
a firm’s non-cash return only under the unlikely event a firm carries no cash or other short-term equivalents:
that is, rit = eit if and only if wit = 0. The stock return rit is less than return of a public firm’s non-cash return.
Specifically, if Eeit > Ebit, then Equation 3.3 shows:
Erit = E
[
(1 − wit)eit + ωitbit
]
≤ E [(1 − wit)eit + witeit] = Eeit
Similarly, in the aggregate market, rm,xst = e
m,xs
t − γmt , so the aggregate stock market return is less than the
aggregate non-cash market return.
Table 3.5 shows summary statistics for the stock market excess return, market non-cash excess return,
market cash excess return, and the value-weighted market cash share. For the market-level aggregate returns,
the average monthly non-cash return is 1.06% and larger than the average stock return of 0.76%, as predicted.
The Sharpe ratio for the cash-hedged market return is about 20% larger, with the 40% increase in average
return offset by larger volatility. This is sensible since the stock returns had an implicit investment in cash,
which is a low volatility asset.
Table 3.6 confirms that firms’ non-cash excess returns are greater than stock excess returns on average,
both at the firm level (column 1) and at the aggregate market level (columns 2 and 3). The table reports
the regression of the standard stock excess returns on non-cash excess returns. If the stock excess return is
less than the non-cash excess return, the coefficient in this regression will be less than one. The regression’s
coefficient is 0.71 in the firm-level regression and significantly different from zero. The regression at the
aggregate market level yields similar results: the coefficient is 0.82 in our sample and 0.72 using Fama–French’s
market excess return. This means that for a one percentage point increase in non-cash return, the stock
return increases by less than one percentage point.
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3.5.3 Cash-Adjusted Factor Premia
Table 3.7 presents the returns for the most common asset pricing factors when calculating returns and
volatilities for the standard stocks and separately for the cash-hedged returns, which corresponds to the
standard return and the cash-hedged return. Figure 3.4 presents the cumulative returns for standard and
cash-hedged HML and WML.
We find that comparing the standard measure against the cash-hedged measure flips the sign of value
to negative. A similar phenomenon appears for HML, in which in standard terms carries a 1.46% average
excess return, but when adjusted for its cash holdings has a −2.37% average monthly excess return. Table
3.8 shows the average cash share for each of the 25 size- and BEME-sorted portfolios. Within each size
bucket, the cash share monotonically increases as we move from value portfolios to growth portfolios. The
results suggest that growth stocks have lower returns because they have larger cash shares and thus a larger
implicit investment in the risk-free bond, which drags the overall return down for growth stocks. Value stocks
outperform growth stocks–in standard returns–in the same way a 95% stock/5% bond portfolio outperforms
an 80%/20% portfolio.
The differential cash holding between growth and value means growth stocks will grow proportionally
more as the investor hedges out the larger cash share: since growth stocks have a larger implicit holding
of a low-return investment, moving from standard returns to cash-hedged returns will change the mean
and standard deviation of growth stocks. Of course, average cash-hedged returns and volatility should also
increase for value stocks, but to a lesser extent. In Table 3.21, we can see this: comparing standard to
cash-hedged returns, the mean and standard deviation of growth stocks increase more than that of value
stocks. Thus, in standard terms, value outperforms growth; but in cash-hedged terms, growth outperforms
value.
Looking at the mean and standard deviation together, it appears that as cash-hedged returns increase—
going from value to growth—volatility also increases. This relationship is in line with the simple idea that
returns are compensation for risk. In contrast, looking at standard returns, value stocks have higher returns
and less volatile returns. This result suggests that cash share helps us refine our understanding of the value
premium as compensation for risk.
These results strongly suggest that there is a strong covariance between value and cash, and thus it
is crucial to triple sort value when looking in cash-hedged terms. Looking back at Table 3.7, HMLTriple
maintains the positive mean return and Sharpe ratio when we look between standard returns and cash-hedged
returns.
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3.5.4 Cash-Related Covariance in Common Asset Pricing Factors
We test how common asset pricing characteristics covary with cash holdings by sorting each stock at each
point in time into percentiles for size, book-to-market, momentum, and cash share separately. We then regress
the cash share percentile on the percentile for size, value, and momentum in Table 3.9. The table shows that
cash holdings negatively covary with size and value and positively covaries with momentum. In other words:
larger firms hold less of their assets in cash; firms with higher book equity-to-market equity ratios hold less of
their assets in cash; and, firms with high momentum have a larger cash share. Most notable is the magnitude
of the covariance: cash share and value have a large negative coefficient of −0.332, nearly twenty times larger
than the negative correlation between cash share and size. We get similar results for value and momentum
when we regress the change in a firm’s cash share percentile on the change in a firm’s characteristic percentile.
The covariance between cash holdings and value motivates triple sorting of HML, SMB, and WML to
control for cash. We report summary statistics for the triple sorted factors in Table 3.7 which shows that
after triple sorting HML the value premium nearly triples. Controlling for cash for SMB and WML do not
appear to have a significant effect on their average standard returns.
Additionally, we test covariance via spanning tests: we regress each factor on the other candidate factors
from standard pricing models. If a factor is not spanned by other factors, it will have a statistically significant
intercept and therefore should be included in our pricing model. Table 3.10 presents the spanning tests for the
Fama–French 3 factor model with a momentum factor. These factor returns are in standard terms. Scanning
across the constant terms, we can see that only SMB is spanned by the other factors, as each other factor
has a statistically significant intercept. Therefore, each factor except for SMB is not spanned by a linear
combination of the other factors, consistent with the asset pricing literature consensus that size, without
adjustments, is a marginally significant anomaly.
Table 3.11 presents the spanning tests for the cash-hedged factors. Again, SMB is spanned by the other
hedged factors. HML’s constant is marginally significant. Since our sample ends in early 2021—which
coincides with a large drawdown in value—we expect that the HML constant will become positive again as
the cycle continues.
The cash factor and HML have a strong negative covariance. Table 3.12 presents the spanning tests for
the cash-hedged factors in the previous table, and the Cash factor. Importantly, all of the factors significantly
load and covary with Cash, and the Cash factor has a large significant coefficient and a strong negative
covariance with HML. This table motivates an asset pricing model with a cash factor or an asset pricing
model in which the factors control for their implicit cash holdings. As in the previous spanning tests, SMB is
spanned by the other factors.
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3.5.5 Factor Legs Have Varying Cash Holdings
Firm cash holdings bias factor returns constructed from sorts on a characteristic like size, book-to-market,
and momentum. We can decompose the returns to the factor, long, and short portfolios into the returns to
the constituent firms’ equity and cash holdings. Let ft be the factor return, rLt be the return to the long leg
of the factor, and rSt be the short leg of the factor. Then:
ft = rLt − rSt (3.14)
Substituting the portfolio decompositions for the long and short legs into the equation for the factor portfolio
return is
ft = (eLt − eSt ) − (γLt − γSt ) (3.15)
The first term, eLt − eSt , denotes the return of the cash-hedged components of the factor’s long and short
portfolios and is typically the term of interest when constructing a factor from a characteristic sort’s high and
low portfolios. The last term, γLt − γSt , describes bias in the factor’s realizations due to firm cash holdings in
the long and short legs.
Figure 3.5 shows there is considerable time variation in the net cash position of factor portfolios constructed
size, value, and momentum. The value factor portfolio’s negative time series values mean stocks in the sort’s
low portfolio have larger cash holdings than stocks in the sort’s high portfolio. The momentum portfolio
typically contains a long but volatile cash position. The size factor portfolio’s net cash holding is the smallest
of all three characteristics. However, the size factor’s net holdings also appear to exhibit long-lived trends up
and down in the factor’s net cash.
Table 3.13 reports the results of regressing each factor’s net cash position on a constant; the coefficient
is the average net cash holdings for each factor portfolio. Importantly, this provides a test of whether the
factor’s net cash position is statistically different from zero. The table’s results are in line with the time series
figures. The value factor has a significant, negative average net cash position. The momentum factor has a
significant, positive average net cash position.
We report empirical results for size, book-to-market, and value factor portfolios constructed after adjusting
for their estimated cash holdings in Figure 3.6 and Table 3.14. These results show using our estimate of
cash holdings of the high and low characteristic portfolios’ cash holdings suffices for reducing the effect of
firm cash holdings on the factor portfolios. The average net cash holdings for the cash-adjusted value, size,
and momentum factor portfolios remain close to zero in Figure 3.6. We also test if the cash-adjusted factor
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portfolios’ average net cash is significantly different from zero and report the results in Table 3.14. The
average net cash position of the cash-adjusted factor portfolios is not significantly different from zero for the
size, value, and momentum characteristics. Therefore, we conclude that hedging cash holdings by using our
conservative measure of what is known to investors effectively hedges out implicit cash holdings implicit in
these portfolios.
3.5.6 Decomposing Standard Betas
In this section, we show the relationship between the standard time-series beta and the cash-hedged beta. We
study both a one-factor CAPM model and an expanded multifactor model, and we show that cash holdings
affect both betas and expected returns. In particular, the effect of cash attenuates beta estimates, and using
cash-hedged returns produces betas with more heterogeneity which leads to better estimates of risk prices.
CAPM Beta Decomposition
We calculate the excess returns of each portfolio, rp,xst , and the market-level excess standard stock return,
rm,xst , using the equations from Section 3.3. We can decompose the standard stock CAPM into the cash-
hedged beta, scaled by the ratio between the variance of the market-level excess cash-hedged return and the





























t ) − Cov(ep,xst , γmt ) + Cov(γpt , γmt )
V ar(rm,xst )
(3.16)
For each portfolio, the market beta calculated using a time series regression is equivalent to the sum of the
parts using the decomposition above. In addition, intuitively, if all companies held no cash (wit = 0 for all i)
then the market beta and the cash-hedged beta are equivalent, and the standard return and cash-hedged
return are also equal.
Figure 3.7 shows the Securities Market Line (SML), with the standard returns of the 25 size and book-
to-market portfolios on the y-axis and the market beta of each portfolio on the x-axis. As reported in the
literature, the SML is flat and betas and expected returns fail to line up linearly in a positively sloped
line. The right panel of Figure 3.7 shows the SML for cash-hedged returns. Now, there is a stronger linear
relationship between average cash-hedged betas and expected cash-hedged returns. The results suggest that
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adjusting standard returns for cash holdings brings basic empirical asset pricing facts to be consistent with
basic CAPM intuition that the only measure of risk that is relevant for pricing securities is covariance with
the market, which has served as the foundation of asset pricing over the last 60 years.
Table 3.15 shows the empirical beta decomposition. Looking at the averages row, it appears that βstandard
and βcash−hedged are very similar. The ratio of the variances is equivalent for all portfolios since we compute
both parts at the market-level. The ratio of 1.51 indicates that the aggregate cash-hedged return is 51%
more volatile than the standard aggregate return.
Figure 3.8 shows the cash-hedged and standard beta for each portfolio and the difference between the two
betas. In each size bucket, the result is consistent: portfolios with the largest and smallest value numbers
have the biggest difference between βstandard and βcash−hedged. Moving from growth to value in each size
bucket, it switches from βstandard < βcash−hedged to βstandard > βcash−hedged. It is unsurprising that the
most extreme value portfolios have the largest discrepancy: as we discussed previously, there is a strong
covariance between cash share and value as growth stocks tend to have high cash share and value stocks
tend to have low cash share. Ultimately, even though there is no difference in beta on average, there is a
differential effect on beta depending on the portfolio’s BEME. Since growth stocks have the largest cash share
and the most negative difference in beta, this suggests that cash shares attenuate the standard market beta
relative to the cash-hedged market beta (|βstandard| < |βcash−hedged|).
The CAPM beta decomposition shows that cash holdings affect both beta and expected returns, leading
to the substantial change in the securities market line. When firms choose their cash holdings, they are also
implicitly choosing their expected returns and beta.
Multivariate Beta Decomposition
We can extend the beta decomposition to the multivariate factor model. We will focus on the Fama–French
3 factor model. We use the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell Theorem (FWL) to produce an equation of each factor’s
standard beta as a function of the factor’s cash-hedged beta and the adjustment term. Below, we have
described the process for HML, but the procedure is similar for SMB and the market. For the three-factor
Fama–French asset pricing model, the time-series regression for each portfolio p is:
rp,xst = α + r
m,xs
t β
p,standard + rSMBt βp,SMB + rHMLt βp,HML + et
We will use the following FWL procedure to decompose the HML standard stock beta βp,HML. The procedure
is similar for βp,SMB and βp,standard.
1. Regress rp,xst onto r
m,xs




2. Regress rHMLt onto r
m,xs
t and rSMBt . Define the residuals as r̃HMLt .
3. Regress r̃p,xst on r̃HMLt . The coefficient on r̃HMLt is equivalent to βp,HML from the time-series regression.
Let us construct xz as a matrix using three vectors xz = [1, rm,xs, rSMB ], where 1 is a T ×1 vector of ones, and
rm,xs and rSMB are vectors of the excess standard return and SMB return. Let βz = [α;βp,standard;βSMB ]
be the 3 × 1 vector of coefficients from the first regression. Then:
r̃p,xst = r
p,xs
t − xzβz = (1 − xz(x′zxz)−1x′z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Q z
rp,xst
Let us define Q z = (1 − xz(x′zxz)−1xz), and let Q z be the operator that transforms any variable x into x̃ so
that rp,xst = e
p,xs
t − γpt and Q zrp,xst = Q zep,xst − Q zγpt . As before, we can decompose standard return rp,xst
into a cash-hedged component and the remaining component γpt We can also write r̃
p,xs
t as:
r̃p,xst = Q zr
p,xs
t = Q z(e
p,xs
t − γpt ) = ẽp,xst − γ̃pt
We analogously create r̃HMLt = ẽHMLt − γ̃HMLt , where eHMLt is created from the same 6 portfolios as rHMLt .





























t ) − cov(ẽp,xst , γ̃HMLt ) + cov(γ̃pt , γ̃HMLt )
var(r̃HMLt )
(3.17)
Using this equation, we decompose HML betas into the HML cash-hedged beta multiplied by the ratio of the
variances (of the cash-hedged component of HML to the standard HML returns), plus an adjustment term.
Analogous decompositions for SMB beta and market beta of the 3 factor Fama-French model can be formed
switch out the parts in xz and βz.
Tables 3.16, 3.17, and 3.18 show the multivariate beta decompositions for the market factor, the size
factor, and the value factor, from the 3 factor model. For the market factor decomposition, the results are
similar to the decomposition of the market beta using the CAPM model. For SMB, the cash-hedged beta
and standard beta are similar.
For the value factor decomposition, the results suggest a large difference between the standard HML
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factor and the cash-hedged component of the HML factor, which filters to the betas. On average, the 25
portfolios have a HML beta of 0.10, but a cash-hedged HML beta of 0, meaning the volatility and adjustment
terms do not offset each other as much as in the previous results. In addition, the cash-hedged component of
HML is 75% more volatile than the standard factor.
Figure 3.9 shows the decomposition of the market standard beta from the 3 factor model against the
expected returns. As in the univariate CAPM model, we fail to find a positive linear relationship. However,
once we adjust all returns to be in cash-hedged terms, as we do in the right panel, we recover a positive,
linear relationship between portfolios’ expected returns and market cash-hedged beta. Figure 3.10 shows a
similar pattern for the size factor.
For value, we also see a flat relationship between HML standard beta and expected returns in Figure 3.11;
but for the cash-hedged returns and betas, there is a negative linear relationship. It is clear that cash-adjusted
growth stocks outperform cash-adjusted value stocks, which has implications for the value premium and the
explanations for the value premium in the literature. The results in Figure 3.11 imply that if we formed our
value factor as Low minus High, rather than High minus Low, the relationship would be positive and linear.
Figure 3.12 plots the standard beta and cash-hedged beta for each of the three factors, and Figure 3.13
plots the difference between the betas for each factor. For the size and market factors, growth stocks tend to
have a smaller standard beta than cash-hedged beta, and value stocks tend to have a smaller cash-hedged
beta than standard beta. However, for the value factor, the cash-hedged beta is smaller than the standard
beta for each of the 25 portfolios. The figures again highlight the negative covariance between value and cash
holdings.
3.5.7 Efficient Frontier
Investors can benefit from using cash-hedged portfolios for two reasons. First, cash-hedging produces a
richer covariance structure across test portfolios by eliminating the correlation across portfolios due to shared
exposure. Second, cash-hedging produces a larger variation in the cross-section of expected returns, which is
important if the investor is concerned they have poorly sorted their test portfolios or are unsure of which
characteristics to use as sorting variables. These two issues suggest that the cash-hedged efficient frontier is
steeper than the standard returns efficient frontier, and therefore the cash-hedged tangency portfolio is more
efficient than the standard return tangency portfolio.
An immediate consequence of cash-hedging portfolios is that the difference in expected returns across
portfolios will grow so long as the portfolios have different amounts of cash holdings, which is empirically
true across many batches of single, double, and triple sorts. Why? Suppose ten portfolios have the same
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average return but with considerable variance in their average cash holdings. When we estimate the portfolios’
standard market CAPM beta, each portfolio will have approximately the same beta, and the cross-sectional
regression may struggle to find a significant slope between betas and expected returns. However, when you
cash-hedged these same portfolios, there will be variation in cash-hedged returns even if the standard expected
returns across portfolios are equivalent purely because the differential cash holdings will require the investor
to differentially lever up the portfolios proportional to their cash share.
A second advantage to using cash-hedged returns is to protect against lousy sorting. What if investors
poorly sorting stocks into test portfolios? If an investor sorts portfolios according to some arbitrary
characteristic, then the cross-sectional regressions will struggle to find a significant price of risk for their risk
factor of preference.
But we argue the investor can better detect priced risk factors by using cash-hedged returns. This is
because hedging out the cash implicit in portfolios will both give the investor a larger spread in expected
returns—so long as the portfolios have differential cash shares—and additionally the portfolios will have a
richer covariance structure because the share of each portfolio invested in cash will bias the correlation of
portfolios’ standard returns upwards.
This logic generates a prediction: with poorly-sorted portfolios, the tangency portfolio calculated from
standard returns will have a lower Sharpe ratio than the tangency portfolio formed from the same portfolios
cash-hedged returns. To be concrete, by poorly sorted we mean little variation in the expected returns across
the portfolios. If, however, portfolios are sorted in a way that generates substantial differences in expected
returns in unhedged returns, the tangency portfolio improvement using hedged returns will be smaller. In
this sense, using cash-hedged portfolios serves as a hedge against poorly-sorted portfolios.
We now provide an example. First, we sort portfolios into nine size and book-to-market portfolios. This
sorting allows for a large difference in expected returns across the portfolios. We calculate both standard
and cash-hedged returns for these portfolios, where the latter hedge out the implicit cash holding of each
portfolio. Figure 3.14 plots the resulting tangency portfolio using both the standard and cash-hedged returns.
Table 3.19 provides the summary statistics for the portfolios: the annualized Sharpe ratio is 0.63 for the
standard return portfolios and 0.69 for the cash-hedged portfolio, roughly a 10% increase in efficiency.
To test the implications of lousy sorting, we sort stocks into 26 portfolios based on the first letter of
their ticker and look at the first 13 letter portfolios. In order for a test of CAPM to work in pricing these
portfolios, we need considerable variation in expected returns. Since we have poorly sorted stocks, each
portfolio’s expected return is approximately the market’s return with an error term. Effectively, we have
nearly-random samples of the market.6 Thus, there is little variation in the cross-sectional of expected
6Of course, some risk factors may covary with tickers starting with certain letters for a good reason—or some other subtle
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returns for these portfolios, and if we run the standard cross-sectional CAPM regression on these portfolios,
we will not find a significant price of risk. However, insofar as these ticker portfolios have meaningfully
different cash shares—which they empirically do—we can now scale the small difference in their average
stock return by their cash shares. This scaling allows us to create more dispersion in expected returns across
these poorly sorted portfolios and allows us to reduce the correlation across these portfolios by eliminating
their shared covariance stemming from the return of risk-free bonds implicit in their cash holdings (Table
3.19). Figure 3.15 shows the result of calculating the tangency portfolio on these poorly-sorted portfolios:
now, the difference in the efficiency of the tangency portfolio is large. The annualized Sharpe ratio for the
tangency portfolio using standard returns is 0.80, whereas the cash-hedged portfolio is 21% more efficient
with a Sharpe ratio of 0.97.
3.5.8 Cross-Sectional Asset Pricing Results
We now implement the CAPM model using the two-stage asset pricing regressions. In expected return-beta
terms, we first implement the time-series regression:
Ri = ai + βi,afat + βi,bf bt + . . . , i = 1, . . . , N, t = 1, . . . , T (3.18)
where f is a factor which proxies the stochastic discount factor, index i indicates each test portfolio and t
indicates time. This regression relates a portfolio’s return with its exposure to the various proposed factors,
and estimates β’s for each test portfolio. In particular, CAPM posits that f is equal to the return on the
market portfolio.
The second regression is the cross-sectional regression:
ERi = γ + βi,aλa + βi,bλb + . . . , i = 1, . . . , N (3.19)
The cross-sectional regression provides estimates of the price of risk for a given factor. Our main focus will be
on the price of market risk, λMkt. More generally, a good factor pricing model will feature an economically
small and statistically insignificant intercept γ, a stable and significant price of risk across many sets of
test portfolios of different assets, and an economically small and jointly zero pricing errors ai across all test
portfolios. The second test implies that we will reject CAPM if λMkt is statistically negative and less than
zero. We will check the third test by examining the Gibbons-Ross-Shaken test statistic, which tests whether
the ai from the time-series regressions are jointly zero.
pattern may exist— but we are abstracting away from this to make a simple illustrative point.
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Table 3.20 presents the results from the cross-sectional regression for the 25 size- and book-to-market-sorted
portfolio and 10 momentum-sorted portfolios. The first two columns test the CAPM model—column one
is in standard terms and column two cash-hedged terms—and the last two columns test a model with four
factors: the market, HML, SMB, and WML.
The cross-sectional test reveals two facts. First, the price of risk for the cash-hedged market is both
significant and positive (1.08 with a GMM t-statistic of 1.94), whereas the standard market price of risk is not
statistically different from zero (0.63 with a t-statistic of 1.3). The cash-hedged price of risk is economically
large: a one standard-deviation increase in beta corresponds to an increase of 2.16 percentage points annually.
Second, although the price of market risk is marginal in the four-factor model, each price of risk point
estimate is larger using cash-hedged terms relative to the standard terms. As shown in the beta decompositions,
cash in standard portfolios attenuate beta estimates, which attenuates cross-sectional price of risk estimates.
The expected positive slope between betas and expected returns is clear only after hedging cash holdings.
Characteristic Cross-Sectional Regressions Table 3.22 shows firm-level cross-sectional regressions
using characteristics. Columns 1 and 2 show that firms with higher cash shares have higher expected equity
returns, consistent with our finding of a strong return on the cash factor. Switching from no cash on the
balance sheet to 100% cash reflects a 1.3% increase in a firm’s monthly equity return. Cash-hedged returns
in columns 3 and 4 are mechanically higher when cash share is higher.
Firms hold cash for many reasons. One way to categorize the reasons is based on their anticipated
return on cash: firms may hold cash because they think they can earn a high return on cash based on good
management; alternatively, firms may hold cash that earns a low return in order to have precautionary savings
or avoid financing. Table 3.22 indicates that firms with higher cash shares face lower average returns on cash,
which suggests that firms hold cash despite the lower returns.
3.6 Conclusion
Firms hold cash on their balance sheet, and an investor with a position in that firm’s stock implicitly holds
a position in the firm’s cash position. We produce a model to motivate the effect of a firm’s implicit cash
holding on portfolio optimization. We decompose a firm’s standard stock return into the firm’s cash-hedged
return, cash share, and return on cash.
We show that standard stock returns are not cash-hedged returns: standard stock returns are lower
on average and less volatile. Common asset pricing factors also have time-varying and non-zero net cash
positions, and hedging out these implicit cash positions change factor premia. In the cross-section, cash
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Figure 3.1: Aggregate market cash share and cross-sectional cash share standard deviation. The left panel reports the time-series of the
aggregate market’s value-weighted cash share from 1978 to 2021. The cash share is the share of cash and short-term equivalents as a percent of total
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Figure 3.2: Aggregate market average value of $1 and its cross-sectional standard deviation. The left panel reports the time-series of
the aggregate market’s value-weighted cash share from 1978 to 2021. The cash share is the share of cash and short-term equivalents as a percent of
























Figure 3.3: Optimal portfolio allocation to risky asset. Assumes CRRA utility, γ = 10, μE = μS = 1.1%, σE = σS = 4.7%. Vertical grey lines
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WML (Triple Sorted w/Cash)
Note: Cumulative return is sum of log returns.
Standard Cash-Hedged
Figure 3.4: Cumulative returns for value and momentum. Figure plots the cumulative return—defined as sum of log returns—for both HML
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Figure 3.5: Factor portfolios’ net cash holdings. This figures report time series of net cash holdings for factor portfolios constructed on the size,
book-to-market, and momentum characteristics. In other words, the figure shows the difference between the cash share of the long leg less the cash
share of the short leg. Notice: the cash share is measured at the same time as the return, and hence deviates from our standard cash adjustment which
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Figure 3.6: Net Cash Holdings. This figure reports the time series of net cash holdings for cash-hedged factor portfolios. We estimate the cash
position in each factor’s long and short legs. Then, build the factor portfolio as long the cash-adjusted high portfolio and short the cash-adjusted low
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Cash-Hedged Market Beta
Figure 3.7: Security Market Line for Standard Market and Cash-Hedged Betas for 25 size and book-to-market portfolios. The left
panel is the standard common stock security market line using Fama–French’s market factor and the Fama–French size/book-to-market 5 × 5 sorted
portfolios. Market beta for each portfolio is the sum of the components of the decomposition shown in Equation 3.16 and equivalent to the coefficient
of a time-series regression of the portfolio’s return on the market return. The right panel is the security market line for the 25 portfolios using the
portfolio’s cash-hedged excess returns and cash-hedged beta calculated as the coefficient of a time-series regression of the portfolio’s cash-hedged excess
return on the market’s cash-hedged excess return. To calculate the portfolio’s cash-hedged excess return, we calculate each stock’s cash-hedged return
as the return after adjusting for cash share and then aggregate individual firm cash-hedged returns to the portfolio and market level. The right panel
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Standard Beta Minus Cash-Hedged Beta
Figure 3.8: CAPM Beta Comparison. The top panel plots the standard beta and cash-hedged beta across the 25 size/book-to-market sorted
portfolios. The common beta is calculated from the beta of the 25 portfolios and excess market factor on French’s website. The cash-hedged market beta


















































0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2
Market Cash-Hedged Beta
Figure 3.9: Security Market Line for Market from the Fama–French 3 Factor Model for 25 size and book-to-market portfolios. The
left panel plots the standard excess returns for the 25 Fama–French size/book-to-market sorted portfolios against that portfolio’s market beta from a
time-series regression of the Fama–French 3 Factor model. The right panel plots the 25 portfolios’ cash-hedged excess returns and cash-hedged market
beta calculated using Equation 3.17. To calculate the portfolio’s cash-hedged excess return, we calculate each stock’s cash-hedged return as the return
after adjusting for cash share and then aggregate individual firm cash-hedged returns to the portfolio and market level. The right panel shows the line

















































-0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
SMB Cash-Hedged Beta
Figure 3.10: Expected Excess Returns and SMB Betas from the Fama–French 3 Factor Model for 25 size and book-to-market
portfolios. The left panel plots the standard excess returns for the 25 Fama–French size/book-to-market sorted portfolios against that portfolio’s
SMB beta from a time-series regression of the Fama–French 3 Factor model. The right panel plots the 25 portfolios’ cash-hedged excess returns and
cash-hedged SMB beta calculated using Equation 3.17. To calculate the portfolio’s cash-hedged excess return, we calculate each stock’s cash-hedged
return as the return after adjusting for cash share and then aggregate individual firm cash-hedged returns to the portfolio and market level. The right

















































-1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
HML Cash-Hedged Beta
Figure 3.11: Expected Excess Returns and HML Betas from the Fama–French 3 Factor Model for 25 size and book-to-market
portfolios. The left panel plots the standard excess returns for the 25 Fama–French size/book-to-market sorted portfolios against that portfolio’s
HML beta from a time-series regression of the Fama–French 3 Factor model. The right panel plots the 25 portfolios’ cash-hedged excess returns and
cash-hedged HML beta calculated using Equation 3.17. To calculate the portfolio’s cash-hedged excess return, we calculate each stock’s cash-hedged
return as the return after adjusting for cash share and then aggregate individual firm cash-hedged returns to the portfolio and market level. The right






























































Standard Beta Cash-Hedged Beta
Figure 3.12: Stock and Cash-Hedged Beta from 3 Factor Model. Standard betas are standard betas from Fama–French 3 factor model.

















































































































Figure 3.13: Stock and Cash-Hedged Beta Comparison from 3 Factor Model. Plot shows the difference between the standard stock beta
and the cash-hedged beta for each factor in the Fama–French 3 factor model. Common stock betas are standard betas from Fama–French 3 factor
model. Equity betas are calculated as described in Section 3.5.6.
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Figure 3.14: Efficient frontier for 9 standard and cash hedged size and book-to-market sorted portfolios. This figure reports the
efficient frontier calculated using 9 size and book-to-market sorted portfolios. The two efficient frontiers are calculated using different return data: the
standard efficient frontier uses the unhedged stock return portfolios. The cash-hedged efficient frontier uses the cash-hedged stock returns calculated
for each of the 9 portfolios. This latter measure of returns uses the cash balance known to investors at the time to hedge out the portfolio’s implicit
cash holdings. Time frame is January 1980 to December 2020.
134













Figure 3.15: Efficient frontier for standard and cash hedged first-letter-of-ticker-symbol sorted portfolios. This figure reports the
efficient frontier calculated based on the first letter of the firms’ ticker symbols. The two efficient frontiers are calculated using different return data:
the standard efficient frontier uses the standard common return on the portfolios. The cash-hedged efficient frontier uses the cash-hedged equity returns
calculated for each of the 26 portfolios. This latter measure of returns uses the cash balance known to investors at the time to hedge out the portfolio’s
implicit cash holdings. Time frame is January 1980 to December 2020.
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3.8 Tables
Individual stock i Value-Weighted Portfolio p, including p = m






































Table 3.1: Summary of return decompositions.
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Book-to-market
Stock Returns Non-Cash Component Cash Component
P1 P2 P3 P3-P1 P1 P2 P3 P3-P1 P1 P2 P3 P3-P1
Mean 0.96 1.00 1.14 0.19 1.01 0.99 1.16 0.16 −0.06 0.02 −0.03 0.03
Stdev 5.08 4.55 4.68 3.17 5.05 4.53 4.66 3.13 0.21 0.25 0.21 0.27
Sharpe 0.65 0.76 0.85 0.20 0.69 0.76 0.86 0.17 −1.00 0.27 −0.51 0.38
Alpha, CAPM 0.26 0.38 0.53 0.27 0.32 0.37 0.55 0.23 −0.06 0.02 −0.03 0.03
t-stat 2.86 4.33 5.26 1.69 3.60 4.24 5.40 1.49 −2.65 0.65 −1.51 0.86
Size
Stock Returns Non-Cash Component Cash Component
P1 P2 P3 P3-P1 P1 P2 P3 P3-P1 P1 P2 P3 P3-P1
Mean 1.14 1.10 1.01 −0.13 1.19 1.14 1.03 −0.16 −0.11 −0.05 −0.01 0.10
Stdev 5.57 5.31 4.48 2.71 5.53 5.27 4.46 2.73 0.86 0.20 0.13 0.85
Sharpe 0.71 0.72 0.78 −0.16 0.75 0.75 0.80 −0.21 −0.45 −0.93 −0.34 0.40
Alpha, CAPM 0.41 0.38 0.37 −0.03 0.47 0.43 0.39 −0.07 −0.11 −0.06 −0.01 0.10
t-stat 2.95 3.40 7.44 −0.21 2.99 3.73 8.18 −0.44 −1.31 −2.80 −0.93 1.16
Momentum
Stock Returns Non-Cash Component Cash Component
P1 P2 P3 P3-P1 P1 P2 P3 P3-P1 P1 P2 P3 P3-P1
Mean 0.93 0.98 1.25 0.32 1.00 1.00 1.23 0.22 −0.07 −0.03 0.02 0.09
Stdev 5.27 4.33 5.54 4.78 5.25 4.33 5.48 4.70 0.15 0.17 0.21 0.23
Sharpe 0.61 0.78 0.78 0.23 0.66 0.80 0.77 0.17 −1.64 −0.57 0.30 1.37
Alpha, CAPM 0.27 0.38 0.55 0.28 0.34 0.41 0.53 0.19 −0.08 −0.03 0.02 0.09
t-stat 2.40 6.24 4.57 1.42 3.19 6.53 4.53 0.97 −4.60 −1.73 1.03 4.04
Cash-to-total assets
Stock Returns Non-Cash Component Cash Component
P1 P2 P3 P3-P1 P1 P2 P3 P3-P1 P1 P2 P3 P3-P1
Mean 0.90 1.02 1.21 0.30 0.90 1.01 1.30 0.40 0.01 0.01 −0.10 −0.10
Stdev 4.39 4.36 5.84 3.90 4.39 4.36 5.75 3.78 0.03 0.17 0.32 0.31
Sharpe 0.71 0.81 0.72 0.27 0.71 0.80 0.78 0.37 0.66 0.26 −1.07 −1.15
Alpha, CAPM 0.33 0.42 0.43 0.10 0.32 0.41 0.53 0.20 0.00 0.01 −0.10 −0.10
t-stat 3.23 5.96 3.47 0.52 3.16 5.77 4.80 1.10 1.72 0.68 −2.95 −3.12
Table 3.2: Decomposition of Portfolio Returns into Non-cash and Cash Components. Table
reports the returns of value-weighted portfolios formed from sorting stocks into terciles on the book-to-market,
size, momentum, and cash-to-total assets. Returns are monthly and reported in percentage points. The
table reports returns for value-weighted portfolios of stock returns as well as the stock portfolios returns
decomposed into portfolios their non-cash and cash returns. The return of each non-cash portfolio p is defined













t. The variable vit is each firm’s value weight, wit is a firm’s ratio of cash to total assets, eit
is a firm’s non-cash return, and bit is a firm’s cash return. The “Alpha, CAPM” row reports a portfolio’s
alpha from a time series regression of the portfolio’s return on the market return. The t-stat column contains
t-stats for the alphas reported in the above column. t-statistics are computed with Newey-West standard
errors and ten lags.
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Book-to-Market Portfolios
Non-Cash Portfolio Return Cash Portfolio Return
P1 P2 P3 P3-P1 P1 P2 P3 P3-P1
Mean 1.31 1.20 1.30 0.00 −0.38 0.37 0.13 0.51
Stdev 6.68 5.24 5.05 4.23 1.28 2.26 2.60 2.52
Sharpe 0.68 0.79 0.89 0.00 −1.03 0.56 0.17 0.70
Alpha, CAPM 0.41 0.49 0.64 0.23 −0.38 0.33 0.09 0.47
t-stat 3.19 4.91 5.86 1.14 −2.91 1.28 0.31 1.66
Size Portfolios
Non-Cash Portfolio Return Cash Portfolio Return
P1 P2 P3 P3-P1 P1 P2 P3 P3-P1
Mean 1.40 1.40 1.25 −0.15 −0.54 0.17 0.05 0.59
Stdev 6.64 6.37 5.46 3.34 3.91 1.78 1.53 3.73
Sharpe 0.73 0.76 0.80 −0.15 −0.48 0.33 0.11 0.55
Alpha, CAPM 0.54 0.54 0.48 −0.05 −0.58 0.15 0.03 0.61
t-stat 3.00 4.13 7.46 −0.25 −1.58 0.87 0.18 1.86
Momentum Portfolios
Non-Cash Portfolio Return Cash Portfolio Return
P1 P2 P3 P3-P1 P1 P2 P3 P3-P1
Mean 1.18 1.16 1.60 0.42 −0.56 0.16 0.43 0.99
Stdev 6.33 5.06 7.07 6.21 1.95 1.49 1.99 2.26
Sharpe 0.64 0.79 0.78 0.23 −0.99 0.37 0.74 1.51
Alpha, CAPM 0.39 0.47 0.72 0.34 −0.58 0.14 0.41 0.99
t-stat 3.21 6.13 4.58 1.38 −2.77 1.00 1.99 3.88
Cash Share Portfolios
Non-Cash Portfolio Return Cash Portfolio Return
P1 P2 P3 P3-P1 P1 P2 P3 P3-P1
Mean 0.92 1.08 1.91 1.00 0.14 0.18 −0.31 −0.46
Stdev 4.46 4.65 8.69 6.42 1.84 2.22 1.55 2.06
Sharpe 0.71 0.80 0.76 0.54 0.27 0.28 −0.70 −0.77
Alpha, CAPM 0.33 0.44 0.79 0.46 0.12 0.16 −0.32 −0.44
t-stat 3.17 5.78 4.32 1.75 0.56 0.70 −1.95 −1.76
Table 3.3: Non-cash and Cash Portfolio Returns for Single-Sorted Portfolios. The non-cash












t. Note, firms’ non-cash
and cash returns are not scaled by firms’ cash-shares for these portfolios’ construction. The “Alpha, CAPM”
column reports a portfolio’s alpha from a time series regression of the portfolio’s return on the market return.
The t-stat column contains t-stats for the alphas reported in the above column. t-statistics are computed
with Newey-West standard errors and ten lags.
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Book-to-Market Portfolios
P1 P2 P3 P3-P1
Mean 0.16 0.10 0.07 −0.09
Stdev 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.05
Size Portfolios
P1 P2 P3 P3-P1
Mean 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.00
Stdev 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03
Momentum Portfolios
P1 P2 P3 P3-P1
Mean 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.04
Stdev 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06
Cash Share Portfolios
P1 P2 P3 P3-P1
Mean 0.02 0.06 0.25 0.23
Stdev 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.07
Table 3.4: Cash to total asset ratios for tercile portfolio sorts on book-to-market, size, momentum, and cash-to-total assets. The
table reports average cash shares for portfolios formed from stocks sorted into terciles on the book-to-market, size, momentum, and cash-to-total assets







column reports the time series average of each portfolios’ monthly cash-shares. The standard deviation reports the time series standard deviation of
each portfolios’ monthly cash-shares.
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Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Sharpe
Market Standard Excess Return 0.76 4.73 −23.16 14.52 0.50
Market Cash-Hedged Excess Return 1.06 5.76 −25.43 20.60 0.58
Market Cash Excess Return −0.12 1.62 −8.09 8.26 −0.26
Cash Share 11.71 4.38 3.30 23.59
Table 3.5: Summary statistics. We describe the construction of firm cash-hedged excess returns in section 3.5.2. Briefly, a firm’s cash-hedged
return is the return of a portfolio long the firm’s common stock and short the firm’s cash and short-term equivalents. Excess returns are monthly. Cash
share is the value-weighted aggregate market cash share. Sharpe ratio is annualized using monthly data.
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(1) (2) (3)
Unhedged Unhedged Market Unhedged Market (Fama–French)
Cash-Hedged 0.711∗∗∗
(59.26)
Cash-Hedged Market 0.820∗∗∗ 0.720∗∗∗
(106.02) (28.21)
Constant 0.000∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000
(2.70) (−4.42) (0.44)
Observations 217,672 555 555
Adjusted R2 0.86 0.99 0.86
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.6: Regression of stock excess returns on non-cash excess returns. We describe the construction of firm cash-hedged excess returns
in section 3.5.2. Briefly, a firm’s cash-hedged return is the return of a portfolio long the firm’s common stock and short the firm’s cash and short-term
equivalents. “Unhedged Market” in Column 2 is the value-weighted aggregate market return of the sample described in Section 3.4. “Unhedged Market
(Fama–French)” in Column 3 is the value-weighted aggregate market return as available on Ken French’s website. The firm level regression in column
includes firm fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.
141
Standard Cash-Hedged
Mean Sharpe Mean Sharpe
Simple Factors Value 2.80 0.19 0.45 0.02
Size −1.93 −0.18 −1.87 −0.14
Mom 3.95 0.23 5.41 0.24
Cash 3.98 0.27 13.40 0.56
Sorts HML 1.46 0.14 −2.37 −0.16
HMLTriple 2.98 0.32 1.24 0.11
SMB 1.24 0.14 1.63 0.14
SMBTriple 0.74 0.09 0.35 0.04
WML 5.37 0.34 6.17 0.29
WMLTriple 4.22 0.31 3.88 0.23
CashTriple 5.29 0.47 13.11 0.71
Strategies 1/2HML + 1/2WML 3.25 0.52 1.67 0.19
1/2HMLTriple + 1/2WMLTriple 3.60 0.62 2.55 0.35
1/3HML + 1/3WML + 1/3CASH 3.84 0.70 5.77 0.75
1/3HMLTriple + 1/3WMLTriple + 1/3CASH 4.16 0.78 5.97 0.80
Table 3.7: Sort and factor premia. Annualized returns and sharpe ratios. Simple factors are high tercile minus low tercile (p3−p1), whereas sorts
are double or triple sorts to control for covariance with size and cash holdings. E.g., Cash refers to the premia earned by the strategy long firms in the
top tercile for cash share and short firms in the bottom tercile for cash share. HMLT riple is triple sorted to control for covariance between value, size
and cash; CashT riple is tripled sorted to control for covariance between cash holdings, size and cash.
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Book-to-Market Portfolios
Size Low 2 3 4 High
Small 0.21 0.15 0.11 0.08 0.07
0.21 0.14 0.10 0.08 0.06
0.21 0.13 0.10 0.07 0.06
0.17 0.13 0.10 0.07 0.05
Big 0.16 0.14 0.10 0.08 0.07
Table 3.8: Average Cash Share for 25 Size/BEME-Sorted Portfolios. For each portfolio, the value-weighed cash share is calculated at each
point in time. Table reports the time-series average of the value-weighted cash share.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)













Constant 51.329∗∗∗ 67.076∗∗∗ 45.535∗∗∗ 69.374∗∗∗ −0.570∗∗∗ −0.412∗∗∗ −0.461∗∗∗ −0.440∗∗∗
(59.49) (72.97) (68.20) (49.90) (−8.06) (−5.82) (−6.60) (−6.25)
Observations 17,910 17,910 17,708 17,708 15,437 15,437 15,282 15,282
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.9: Regression of cash share percentile onto characteristic percentiles. Observations are firm-year, as measured by characteristics
known in January of each year. We independently sort stocks into percentiles for size, value, momentum and cash share each January, as well as the
change in the percentile from the previous January. Percentile on percentile regression (columns 1 through 3) have Newey-West standard errors with
ten lags, corresponding to a decade. Difference in percentile on difference in percentile regression are are clustered at the firm level.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market HML SMB WML
HML −0.344∗∗∗ −0.168∗∗ −0.422∗∗∗
(−3.51) (−2.62) (−4.01)
SMB 0.329∗∗∗ −0.155∗∗ 0.040
(3.42) (−3.17) (0.36)
WML −0.205∗∗∗ −0.177∗∗∗ 0.018
(−3.72) (−4.34) (0.35)
MKT −0.146∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ −0.208∗∗
(−3.68) (4.27) (−3.24)
Constant 0.008∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.001 0.008∗∗∗
(4.08) (2.76) (0.47) (4.26)
Observations 516 516 516 516
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.14 0.09 0.09
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.10: Spanning Test: Fama–French Factors. Table presents the results from regressing the standard, unhedged Fama–French factors on
the remaining factors. Data from Ken French’s website. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market HML SMB WML
HML −0.676∗∗∗ −0.142∗ −0.775∗∗∗
(−10.00) (−2.23) (−6.33)
SMB 0.256∗ −0.142∗ −0.154
(2.41) (−2.35) (−1.45)
WML −0.215∗∗∗ −0.394∗∗∗ −0.051
(−3.94) (−7.42) (−1.11)
MKT −0.266∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗ −0.246∗∗∗
(−6.11) (2.63) (−3.85)
Constant 0.009∗∗∗ 0.002 0.000 0.009∗∗∗
(4.00) (1.60) (0.16) (3.89)
Observations 516 516 516 516
Adjusted R2 0.23 0.47 0.07 0.28
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.11: Spanning Test: Cash-Hedged Factors. Table presents the results from regressing the cash-hedged factors on the remaining
cash-hedged factors. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Market HML SMB WML CASH
HML 0.097 −0.183∗∗ −1.125∗∗∗ −0.903∗∗∗
(1.16) (−2.65) (−10.65) (−15.60)
SMB 0.218∗∗ −0.116∗∗ −0.130 −0.065
(2.64) (−2.81) (−1.34) (−0.90)
WML −0.019 −0.333∗∗∗ −0.061 −0.208∗∗∗
(−0.39) (−9.34) (−1.30) (−3.86)
CASH 0.626∗∗∗ −0.411∗∗∗ −0.047 −0.320∗∗∗
(13.50) (−9.92) (−0.88) (−3.41)
MKT 0.035 0.123∗∗ −0.023 0.492∗∗∗
(1.17) (2.79) (−0.39) (12.43)
Constant 0.003 0.004∗∗ 0.000 0.006∗∗ 0.005∗∗
(1.52) (3.17) (0.34) (2.86) (3.17)
Observations 516 516 516 516 516
Adjusted R2 0.47 0.67 0.08 0.39 0.66
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.12: Spanning Test: Cash-Hedged Factors with CASH Factor. Table presents the results from regressing the cash-hedged factors on




Constant 0.342 −9.273∗∗∗ 4.146∗∗∗
(0.59) (−12.28) (5.18)
Observations 516 516 538
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.13: Net Cash Holding Is Statistically Non-zero for Value and Momentum. Table shows result from regressing net cash holding
shown in Figure 3.5 – the cash holding of the long leg minus the cash holding of the short leg, in percentage points – on a constant. Newey-West




Constant 0.061 −0.177 −0.025
(0.81) (−1.88) (−0.26)
Observations 516 516 516
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.14: Net Cash Holding is Statistically Zero in Cash-Hedged Factors. Table shows result from regressing net cash holding of the cash
hedged portfolios (equivalently, the forecast errors shown in Figure 3.6) on a constant. Newey-West standard errors with 12 lags.
149
















Small Lo 1.17 1.35 1.51 -0.59 -0.41 0.13
2 1.09 1.10 1.51 -0.35 -0.31 0.07
3 1.07 1.06 1.51 -0.29 -0.30 0.07
4 1.09 0.98 1.51 -0.17 -0.26 0.03
Hi 1.07 0.94 1.51 -0.12 -0.25 0.02
ME2 Lo 1.13 1.30 1.51 -0.57 -0.40 0.13
2 1.09 1.08 1.51 -0.29 -0.30 0.06
3 1.10 1.02 1.51 -0.21 -0.28 0.04
4 1.15 1.02 1.51 -0.15 -0.28 0.03
Hi 1.09 0.93 1.51 -0.10 -0.23 0.02
ME3 Lo 1.19 1.37 1.51 -0.61 -0.40 0.14
2 1.12 1.11 1.51 -0.31 -0.32 0.07
3 1.04 0.99 1.51 -0.23 -0.27 0.05
4 1.02 0.90 1.51 -0.14 -0.23 0.03
Hi 1.12 0.97 1.51 -0.12 -0.25 0.02
ME4 Lo 1.08 1.20 1.51 -0.49 -0.36 0.11
2 1.08 1.09 1.51 -0.33 -0.31 0.07
3 0.99 0.92 1.51 -0.21 -0.24 0.05
4 0.98 0.86 1.51 -0.12 -0.21 0.02
Hi 0.97 0.81 1.51 -0.07 -0.20 0.01
BIG Lo 1.09 1.21 1.51 -0.48 -0.39 0.12
2 1.00 1.01 1.51 -0.31 -0.29 0.07
3 0.88 0.83 1.51 -0.20 -0.22 0.05
4 0.89 0.79 1.51 -0.12 -0.20 0.03
Hi 0.90 0.79 1.51 -0.12 -0.20 0.03
Average 1.06 1.03 1.51 -0.27 -0.28 0.06
Table 3.15: Beta Decomposition for 25 Size and Book-to-Market Sorted Portfolios. The beta for each portfolio is decomposed into the
cash-hedged beta, ratio of variances, and drag terms as defined in Equation 3.16.
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Small Lo 0.98 1.09 1.49 -0.43 -0.30 0.09
2 0.96 0.96 1.49 -0.29 -0.25 0.06
3 0.95 0.93 1.49 -0.24 -0.25 0.06
4 1.00 0.91 1.49 -0.15 -0.24 0.03
Hi 1.01 0.90 1.49 -0.10 -0.25 0.02
ME2 Lo 0.93 1.03 1.49 -0.41 -0.29 0.09
2 0.96 0.94 1.49 -0.25 -0.25 0.05
3 1.03 0.96 1.49 -0.19 -0.25 0.04
4 1.07 0.97 1.49 -0.14 -0.27 0.03
Hi 1.02 0.89 1.49 -0.10 -0.23 0.02
ME3 Lo 1.06 1.20 1.49 -0.51 -0.33 0.11
2 1.01 1.00 1.49 -0.28 -0.27 0.06
3 0.98 0.93 1.49 -0.20 -0.25 0.04
4 0.97 0.87 1.49 -0.13 -0.23 0.03
Hi 1.10 0.97 1.49 -0.12 -0.26 0.03
ME4 Lo 0.97 1.05 1.49 -0.39 -0.28 0.09
2 1.01 1.01 1.49 -0.29 -0.28 0.07
3 0.94 0.89 1.49 -0.19 -0.23 0.04
4 0.96 0.84 1.49 -0.11 -0.21 0.02
Hi 0.97 0.82 1.49 -0.06 -0.21 0.01
BIG Lo 1.08 1.19 1.49 -0.46 -0.35 0.11
2 1.01 1.03 1.49 -0.31 -0.28 0.07
3 0.93 0.89 1.49 -0.22 -0.23 0.05
4 0.94 0.85 1.49 -0.13 -0.22 0.03
Hi 0.97 0.87 1.49 -0.13 -0.23 0.03
Average 0.99 0.96 1.49 -0.23 -0.26 0.05
Table 3.16: Decomposition of Market Beta from the Fama–French 3 Factor Regression for 25 Size and Book-to-Market Sorted
Portfolios. The market beta for each portfolio is decomposed into the cash-hedged market beta, ratio of variances, and an adjustment term, defined
analogously to Equation 3.17.
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Small Lo 0.87 1.19 1.64 -0.81 -0.59 0.33
2 0.86 0.82 1.64 -0.29 -0.28 0.10
3 0.83 0.81 1.64 -0.27 -0.32 0.09
4 0.91 0.80 1.64 -0.20 -0.28 0.08
Hi 0.86 0.72 1.64 -0.15 -0.23 0.06
ME2 Lo 0.90 1.21 1.64 -0.82 -0.59 0.32
2 0.78 0.77 1.64 -0.27 -0.30 0.09
3 0.55 0.54 1.64 -0.16 -0.25 0.07
4 0.73 0.58 1.64 -0.11 -0.14 0.03
Hi 0.84 0.69 1.64 -0.11 -0.23 0.04
ME3 Lo 0.60 0.70 1.64 -0.41 -0.28 0.14
2 0.64 0.60 1.64 -0.20 -0.19 0.05
3 0.56 0.52 1.64 -0.18 -0.17 0.06
4 0.60 0.48 1.64 -0.07 -0.12 0.01
Hi 0.61 0.45 1.64 -0.04 -0.09 0.00
ME4 Lo 0.41 0.50 1.64 -0.31 -0.21 0.11
2 0.41 0.43 1.64 -0.19 -0.15 0.04
3 0.36 0.33 1.64 -0.11 -0.09 0.03
4 0.46 0.40 1.64 -0.09 -0.13 0.03
Hi 0.42 0.35 1.66 -0.04 -0.12 0.00
BIG Lo -0.25 -0.31 1.64 0.15 0.19 -0.07
2 -0.12 -0.12 1.64 0.06 0.07 -0.04
3 -0.24 -0.25 1.64 0.10 0.12 -0.06
4 -0.23 -0.17 1.64 0.05 0.02 -0.02
Hi -0.16 -0.12 1.64 0.08 0.00 -0.04
Average 0.49 0.48 1.64 -0.18 -0.17 0.06
Table 3.17: Decomposition of SMB Beta from the Fama–French 3 Factor Regression for 25 Size and Book-to-Market Sorted
Portfolios. The SMB beta for each portfolio is decomposed into the cash-hedged SMB beta, ratio of variances, and an adjustment term, defined
analogously to Equation 3.17.
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Small Lo -0.71 -0.98 1.75 0.77 0.53 -0.30
2 -0.12 -0.20 1.75 0.23 0.07 -0.08
3 0.03 -0.06 1.75 0.15 0.04 -0.06
4 0.43 0.33 1.75 -0.02 -0.12 -0.01
Hi 0.70 0.54 1.75 -0.06 -0.21 0.03
ME2 Lo -0.68 -0.96 1.75 0.76 0.53 -0.30
2 -0.18 -0.22 1.75 0.18 0.12 -0.08
3 0.15 0.11 1.75 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01
4 0.42 0.38 1.75 -0.09 -0.16 0.02
Hi 0.67 0.56 1.75 -0.09 -0.22 0.01
ME3 Lo -0.45 -0.65 1.75 0.55 0.42 -0.28
2 -0.20 -0.21 1.75 0.12 0.11 -0.07
3 0.16 0.11 1.75 0.04 -0.04 -0.03
4 0.46 0.37 1.75 -0.05 -0.15 0.01
Hi 0.74 0.59 1.75 -0.06 -0.24 0.01
ME4 Lo -0.54 -0.72 1.75 0.58 0.36 -0.22
2 -0.14 -0.14 1.75 0.09 0.06 -0.05
3 0.20 0.15 1.75 0.03 -0.07 -0.03
4 0.49 0.37 1.75 0.00 -0.16 -0.01
Hi 0.64 0.51 1.74 -0.05 -0.20 0.01
BIG Lo -0.52 -0.58 1.75 0.35 0.28 -0.14
2 -0.12 -0.12 1.75 0.06 0.07 -0.04
3 0.17 0.17 1.75 -0.04 -0.10 0.00
4 0.33 0.25 1.75 -0.03 -0.09 0.01
Hi 0.49 0.35 1.75 -0.05 -0.10 0.02
Average 0.10 0.00 1.75 0.14 0.03 -0.06
Table 3.18: Decomposition of HML Beta from the Fama–French 3 Factor Regression for 25 Size and Book-to-Market Sorted
Portfolios. The HML beta for each portfolio is decomposed into the cash-hedged HML beta, ratio of variances, and an adjustment term, defined in
Equation 3.17.
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9 Size/Book-to-Market Sorted Portfolios Rtan σtan rf Sharpe
Standard 1.34 5.45 0.36 0.63
Cash Hedged 1.51 5.90 0.36 0.68
First Letter of Ticker Portfolios Rtan σtan rf Sharpe
Standard 1.46 4.80 0.36 0.80
Cash Hedged 1.95 5.70 0.36 0.97
Table 3.19: Tangency Portfolio Summary Statistics. Table reports the monthly moments of the tangency portfolio as calculated from the
efficient frontier shown in Figures 3.14 and 3.15. Cash hedged portfolios contain the same stocks as the standard portfolios, but their returns are equity
returns and hedged to compensate for the portfolio’s implicit cash holdings. Sharpe ratio annualized from monthly statistics.
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Prices of Risk: E[Rei ] = α + β′λ
Model CAPM 4 Factor
Standard Hedged Standard Hedged
Intercept 0.099 −0.057 −0.053 0.191
t-GMM (0.23) −0.114 (−0.13) (0.43)
t-FM (0.24) (−0.12) (−0.14) (0.45)
Mkt−Rf 0.631 1.081 0.774 0.824
t-GMM (1.31) (1.94) (1.67) (1.58)











MAPE (%) 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.12
Mean TS R2 0.72 0.68 0.84 0.81
GRS p-value 0.00 0.30 0.01 0.44
Annualized Risk Premium 0.73 2.16 0.55 0.72
Months (T ) 515 515 515 515
Portfolios (N) 35 35 35 35
Table 3.20: Pricing 25 Size/Book-to-Market Portfolios. Table presents the pricing results for the 25 size and book-to-market and 10 momentum-
sorted portfolios. Coefficient presents the price of risk, λfac. Unhedged columns present the results from a model using common excess returns for both
factors and portfolios: that is, returns for the factors and portfolios that have not been adjusted for cash holdings. Hedged columns refers to tests in
which both the factors and portfolios have been adjusted to hedge out the implicit cash holdings. Standard and hedged factors and portfolios are those
as described in the data construction section. All returns are excess returns. Fama-MacBeth t-stats. MAPE is mean absolute pricing error. T.S. R2 is
the average time series R2. GRS is the Gibbons-Ross-Shaken test whether the pricing errors are jointly zero. Annualized risk premium row is the
increase in expected return associated with a 1 standard deviation increase in βMkt: σβ × λMkt.
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Standard Returns Cash-Hedged Returns
Average Return Low Book-to-Market High Average Average Return Low Book-to-Market High Average
Small 0.58 0.53 0.92 0.87 1.05 0.79 Small 1.21 1.00 1.26 0.98 1.05 1.10
1.06 0.88 0.76 0.73 0.75 0.83 1.73 1.23 0.99 0.96 0.93 1.17
0.62 0.64 0.71 0.70 0.84 0.70 1.15 1.01 0.92 0.82 0.97 0.97
0.55 0.69 0.69 0.60 0.89 0.69 1.02 1.01 0.86 0.68 0.94 0.90
Big 0.77 0.82 0.56 0.49 0.82 0.69 Big 1.14 1.18 0.78 0.65 1.09 0.97
Average 0.72 0.71 0.73 0.68 0.87 Average 1.25 1.08 0.96 0.82 1.00
Standard Deviation Standard Deviation
7.09 6.17 5.91 6.17 6.28 6.33 10.81 7.93 7.35 7.04 6.95 8.02
6.86 6.01 6.00 6.22 6.35 6.29 10.48 7.48 7.07 7.01 6.91 7.79
6.64 5.98 5.58 5.81 6.48 6.09 9.77 7.49 6.65 6.44 7.02 7.47
5.94 5.67 5.26 5.52 5.63 5.60 8.37 7.19 6.14 6.11 5.98 6.76
Big 5.70 5.19 4.73 4.79 5.05 5.09 Big 7.79 6.57 5.69 5.31 5.57 6.19
Average 6.44 5.80 5.50 5.70 5.96 Average 9.44 7.33 6.58 6.38 6.49
CAPM Pricing Errors CAPM Pricing Errors
Small −0.27 −0.26 0.13 0.07 0.26 −0.01 Small −0.17 −0.12 0.18 −0.02 0.09 −0.01
0.23 0.09 −0.05 −0.12 −0.06 0.02 0.40 0.14 −0.05 −0.09 −0.02 0.07
−0.25 −0.18 −0.04 −0.04 0.01 −0.10 −0.25 −0.13 −0.08 −0.10 −0.03 −0.12
−0.23 −0.10 −0.03 −0.11 0.18 −0.06 −0.20 −0.10 −0.08 −0.19 0.11 −0.09
Big −0.02 0.10 −0.08 −0.15 0.17 0.00 Big −0.10 0.16 −0.06 −0.14 0.29 0.03
Average −0.11 −0.07 −0.01 −0.07 0.11 Average −0.06 −0.01 −0.02 −0.11 0.09
Table 3.21: Summary Statistics and Pricing Errors 25 Size and Book-to-Market Portfolios Under Standard CAPM and Cash-
Hedged CAPM. Table presents the average returns in terms of both common returns and equity returns, where equity returns hedge out the cash
holdings known to investors. Common CAPM pricing errors are the time-series pricing errors across all 25 portfolios using the aggregate stock market
excess return as the single factor across the 25 Fama-French size and book-to-market portfolios, both available from Ken French’s website. Equity
CAPM pricing errors are the time-series pricing errors across all 25 portfolios using cash adjusted returns in the sample described in the data section,
and the market factor is similarly cash hedged. All returns are excess returns.
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Equity Return Cash-Hedged Return Cash Return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 0.987 1.552 0.892 1.424 -0.138 -5.559
(4.69) (2.17) (4.44) (1.75) (-0.98) (-3.85)
Cash Share 1.289 1.676 4.975 5.363 -3.069 -2.164
(2.04) (2.58) (4.31) (4.63) (-2.80) (-1.87)
ln(Size) -0.034 -0.035 0.358
(-0.87) (-0.74) (4.30)
ln(B/M) 0.212 0.200 0.416
(2.74) (2.24) (3.12)
Months (T ) 548 548 548 548 548 548
Firms (N) 1855 1855 1855 1855 1855 1855
Table 3.22: Cross-sectional Regression of Firm Returns Using Cash Share. Table presents the cross-sectional pricing results for monthly
firm returns. The regressions test the relationship between a firms’ cash shares and expected returns for equity, cash-hedged, and cash returns.






















Ct−1 × ΔCt −0.719∗∗∗
(0.064)






Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.23: Marginal cash value regression using Faulkender and Wang (2006) specification.
The regression’s explanatory variable is risk-adjusted annual, fiscal year stock returns. Risk-adjusted returns
are computed as the difference between a firm’s stock return and the return of the Fama and French (1992b)
portfolio with the most similar size and book-to-market characteristics. All of the explanatory variables
except Lit are scaled by lagged market value of equity. The explanatory variables are: Ct is cash. Et is
income before extraordinary items plus interest, deferred tax credits, and investment tax credits. NAt is
total assets less cash holdings. It is interest expense. Dt is common dividends paid. Lt is market leverage.
NF t is the total equity issuance minus equity repurchases plus debt issuance minus debt redemption. RDt is
research and development expense. The subscript t indicates at the end of year t. ΔXt is the first difference
of variable Xt, i.e. Xt − Xt−1. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses
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